Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux into rmobile-latest

Conflicts:
	arch/arm/mach-shmobile/Makefile

Signed-off-by: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>

1 files changed, 68 insertions, 9 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
index e4d4a22e8b94..b07ba9393564 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ DEFINE_VVAR(struct vsyscall_gtod_data, vsyscall_gtod_data) =
         .lock = __SEQLOCK_UNLOCKED(__vsyscall_gtod_data.lock),
 };
 
-static enum { EMULATE, NATIVE, NONE } vsyscall_mode = NATIVE;
+static enum { EMULATE, NATIVE, NONE } vsyscall_mode = EMULATE;
 
 static int __init vsyscall_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -140,11 +140,40 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned long addr)
         return nr;
 }
 
+static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
+{
+        /*
+         * XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled
+         * sig_on_uaccess_error, this could go away.
+         */
+
+        if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, (void __user *)ptr, size)) {
+                siginfo_t info;
+                struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
+
+                thread->error_code      = 6;  /* user fault, no page, write */
+                thread->cr2             = ptr;
+                thread->trap_no         = 14;
+
+                memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
+                info.si_signo           = SIGSEGV;
+                info.si_errno           = 0;
+                info.si_code            = SEGV_MAPERR;
+                info.si_addr            = (void __user *)ptr;
+
+                force_sig_info(SIGSEGV, &info, current);
+                return false;
+        } else {
+                return true;
+        }
+}
+
 bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 {
         struct task_struct *tsk;
         unsigned long caller;
         int vsyscall_nr;
+        int prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
         long ret;
 
         /*
@@ -180,35 +209,65 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
         if (seccomp_mode(&tsk->seccomp))
                 do_exit(SIGKILL);
 
+        /*
+         * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.  We want to
+         * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
+         */
+        prev_sig_on_uaccess_error = current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error;
+        current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = 1;
+
+        /*
+         * 0 is a valid user pointer (in the access_ok sense) on 32-bit and
+         * 64-bit, so we don't need to special-case it here.  For all the
+         * vsyscalls, 0 means "don't write anything" not "write it at
+         * address 0".
+         */
+        ret = -EFAULT;
         switch (vsyscall_nr) {
         case 0:
+                if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(struct timeval)) ||
+                    !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(struct timezone)))
+                        break;
+
                 ret = sys_gettimeofday(
                         (struct timeval __user *)regs->di,
                         (struct timezone __user *)regs->si);
                 break;
 
         case 1:
+                if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(time_t)))
+                        break;
+
                 ret = sys_time((time_t __user *)regs->di);
                 break;
 
         case 2:
+                if (!write_ok_or_segv(regs->di, sizeof(unsigned)) ||
+                    !write_ok_or_segv(regs->si, sizeof(unsigned)))
+                        break;
+
                 ret = sys_getcpu((unsigned __user *)regs->di,
                                  (unsigned __user *)regs->si,
                                  0);
                 break;
         }
 
+        current_thread_info()->sig_on_uaccess_error = prev_sig_on_uaccess_error;
+
         if (ret == -EFAULT) {
-                /*
-                 * Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall.
-                 *
-                 * With a real vsyscall, that would have caused SIGSEGV.
-                 * To make writing reliable exploits using the emulated
-                 * vsyscalls harder, generate SIGSEGV here as well.
-                 */
+                /* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
                 warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
                                   "vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)");
-                goto sigsegv;
+
+                /*
+                 * If we failed to generate a signal for any reason,
+                 * generate one here.  (This should be impossible.)
+                 */
+                if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGBUS) &&
+                                 !sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGSEGV)))
+                        goto sigsegv;
+
+                return true;  /* Don't emulate the ret. */
         }
 
         regs->ax = ret;