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authorDarrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>2006-06-29 17:56:39 -0400
committerAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>2006-07-01 05:44:08 -0400
commit3a6b9f85c641a3b89420b0c8150ed377526a1fe1 (patch)
treee44e64edf0620d3f6da443c57540b09882231459
parent5adc8a6adc91c4c85a64c75a70a619fffc924817 (diff)
[PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants
This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds additional definitions used by the following patch. The renaming avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> include/linux/audit.h | 15 ++++++++---- kernel/auditfilter.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++---- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------- 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h15
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c50
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c10
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c32
4 files changed, 56 insertions, 51 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index a489104ae3a..c211f0a2abb 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -151,12 +151,17 @@
151#define AUDIT_PERS 10 151#define AUDIT_PERS 10
152#define AUDIT_ARCH 11 152#define AUDIT_ARCH 11
153#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12 153#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12
154#define AUDIT_SE_USER 13 /* security label user */ 154#define AUDIT_SUBJ_USER 13 /* security label user */
155#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE 14 /* security label role */ 155#define AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE 14 /* security label role */
156#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE 15 /* security label type */ 156#define AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE 15 /* security label type */
157#define AUDIT_SE_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */ 157#define AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */
158#define AUDIT_SE_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */ 158#define AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */
159#define AUDIT_PPID 18 159#define AUDIT_PPID 18
160#define AUDIT_OBJ_USER 19
161#define AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE 20
162#define AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE 21
163#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW 22
164#define AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH 23
160 165
161 /* These are ONLY useful when checking 166 /* These are ONLY useful when checking
162 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */ 167 * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index e98db08fc6d..40a9931a13e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -470,11 +470,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
470 case AUDIT_ARG2: 470 case AUDIT_ARG2:
471 case AUDIT_ARG3: 471 case AUDIT_ARG3:
472 break; 472 break;
473 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 473 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
474 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 474 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
475 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 475 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
476 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 476 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
477 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 477 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
478 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); 478 str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
479 if (IS_ERR(str)) 479 if (IS_ERR(str))
480 goto exit_free; 480 goto exit_free;
@@ -611,11 +611,11 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
611 data->fields[i] = f->type; 611 data->fields[i] = f->type;
612 data->fieldflags[i] = f->op; 612 data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
613 switch(f->type) { 613 switch(f->type) {
614 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 614 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
615 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 615 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
616 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 616 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
617 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 617 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
618 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 618 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
619 data->buflen += data->values[i] = 619 data->buflen += data->values[i] =
620 audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str); 620 audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
621 break; 621 break;
@@ -654,11 +654,11 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
654 return 1; 654 return 1;
655 655
656 switch(a->fields[i].type) { 656 switch(a->fields[i].type) {
657 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 657 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
658 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 658 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
659 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 659 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
660 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 660 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
661 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 661 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
662 if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str)) 662 if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
663 return 1; 663 return 1;
664 break; 664 break;
@@ -774,11 +774,11 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
774 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ 774 * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
775 for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { 775 for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
776 switch (new->fields[i].type) { 776 switch (new->fields[i].type) {
777 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 777 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
778 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 778 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
779 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 779 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
780 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 780 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
781 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 781 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
782 err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i], 782 err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
783 &old->fields[i]); 783 &old->fields[i]);
784 break; 784 break;
@@ -1537,11 +1537,11 @@ static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
1537 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { 1537 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
1538 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; 1538 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
1539 switch (f->type) { 1539 switch (f->type) {
1540 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 1540 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1541 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 1541 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1542 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 1542 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1543 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 1543 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1544 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 1544 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1545 return 1; 1545 return 1;
1546 } 1546 }
1547 } 1547 }
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 31665785516..1d24fade17e 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -321,11 +321,11 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
321 if (ctx) 321 if (ctx)
322 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val); 322 result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
323 break; 323 break;
324 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 324 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
325 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 325 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
326 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 326 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
327 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 327 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
328 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 328 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
329 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating 329 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
330 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a 330 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
331 match for now to avoid losing information that 331 match for now to avoid losing information that
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e9548bc049e..92e80b99d18 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1845,15 +1845,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
1845 return -ENOTSUPP; 1845 return -ENOTSUPP;
1846 1846
1847 switch (field) { 1847 switch (field) {
1848 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 1848 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1849 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 1849 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1850 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 1850 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1851 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */ 1851 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
1852 if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL) 1852 if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
1853 return -EINVAL; 1853 return -EINVAL;
1854 break; 1854 break;
1855 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 1855 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1856 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 1856 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1857 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */ 1857 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
1858 if (strchr(rulestr, '-')) 1858 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
1859 return -EINVAL; 1859 return -EINVAL;
@@ -1874,29 +1874,29 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
1874 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting; 1874 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
1875 1875
1876 switch (field) { 1876 switch (field) {
1877 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 1877 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1878 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr); 1878 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
1879 if (!userdatum) 1879 if (!userdatum)
1880 rc = -EINVAL; 1880 rc = -EINVAL;
1881 else 1881 else
1882 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value; 1882 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
1883 break; 1883 break;
1884 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 1884 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1885 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr); 1885 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
1886 if (!roledatum) 1886 if (!roledatum)
1887 rc = -EINVAL; 1887 rc = -EINVAL;
1888 else 1888 else
1889 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value; 1889 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
1890 break; 1890 break;
1891 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 1891 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1892 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr); 1892 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
1893 if (!typedatum) 1893 if (!typedatum)
1894 rc = -EINVAL; 1894 rc = -EINVAL;
1895 else 1895 else
1896 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value; 1896 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
1897 break; 1897 break;
1898 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 1898 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1899 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 1899 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1900 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC); 1900 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
1901 break; 1901 break;
1902 } 1902 }
@@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
1948 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through 1948 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
1949 without a match */ 1949 without a match */
1950 switch (field) { 1950 switch (field) {
1951 case AUDIT_SE_USER: 1951 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
1952 switch (op) { 1952 switch (op) {
1953 case AUDIT_EQUAL: 1953 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
1954 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user); 1954 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
1958 break; 1958 break;
1959 } 1959 }
1960 break; 1960 break;
1961 case AUDIT_SE_ROLE: 1961 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
1962 switch (op) { 1962 switch (op) {
1963 case AUDIT_EQUAL: 1963 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
1964 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role); 1964 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
1968 break; 1968 break;
1969 } 1969 }
1970 break; 1970 break;
1971 case AUDIT_SE_TYPE: 1971 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
1972 switch (op) { 1972 switch (op) {
1973 case AUDIT_EQUAL: 1973 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
1974 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type); 1974 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1978,9 +1978,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
1978 break; 1978 break;
1979 } 1979 }
1980 break; 1980 break;
1981 case AUDIT_SE_SEN: 1981 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
1982 case AUDIT_SE_CLR: 1982 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
1983 level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ? 1983 level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
1984 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]); 1984 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
1985 switch (op) { 1985 switch (op) {
1986 case AUDIT_EQUAL: 1986 case AUDIT_EQUAL: