5 files changed, 27 insertions, 85 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 68d50c54e431..97ce8fae49b3 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -136,16 +136,16 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
-                            struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                            int cap, int audit)
 {
         struct aa_profile *profile;
         /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
-        int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+        int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
         if (!error) {
                 profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
                 if (!unconfined(profile))
-                        error = aa_capable(task, profile, cap, audit);
+                        error = aa_capable(current, profile, cap, audit);
         }
         return error;
 }
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 3b5883b7179f..2f680eb02b59 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -998,7 +998,6 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
-        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_recv);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index ee4f8486e5f5..7ce191ea29a0 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -56,17 +56,8 @@ int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return 0;
 }
 
-int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-        if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
-                return -EPERM;
-        return 0;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
-
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
  * @cred: The credentials to use
  * @ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
  * @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +71,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
  * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
  * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
  */
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-                struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+                int cap, int audit)
 {
         for (;;) {
                 /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +213,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
         /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
          * capability
          */
-        if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
-                        current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
-                        SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+        if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+                        CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
                 return 0;
         return 1;
 }
@@ -874,7 +864,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                      & (new->securebits ^ arg2))                        /*[1]*/
                     || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))   /*[3]*/
-                    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+                    || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
                                     current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
                                     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)           /*[4]*/
                         /*
@@ -940,7 +930,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-        if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+        if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
                         SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -967,7 +957,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         int ret = 0;
 
         if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
-                ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+                ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
                                   SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
                 /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
                 if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 214502c772ab..d7542493454d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -155,35 +155,16 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                     effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
                      int cap)
 {
-        return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
-                                     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+        return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
-                          int cap)
+int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                             int cap)
 {
-        const struct cred *cred;
-        int ret;
-
-        cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
-        ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
-        put_cred(cred);
-        return ret;
-}
-
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
-                                  struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
-{
-        const struct cred *cred;
-        int ret;
-
-        cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
-        ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
-        put_cred(cred);
-        return ret;
+        return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
 }
 
 int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -994,12 +975,6 @@ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
 }
 
-int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
-{
-        return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb, cap);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv);
-
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
         return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7cd4c3affac8..6a3683e28426 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1415,8 +1415,7 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
 #endif
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
-static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
-                               const struct cred *cred,
+static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
                                int cap, int audit)
 {
         struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -1427,7 +1426,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
         int rc;
 
         COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
-        ad.tsk = tsk;
+        ad.tsk = current;
         ad.u.cap = cap;
 
         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
@@ -1811,7 +1810,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
+        if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
                 u32 sid = current_sid();
                 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
@@ -1868,16 +1867,16 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
  */
 
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
-                           struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+                           int cap, int audit)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
+        rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+        return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
@@ -1954,8 +1953,7 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-        rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
-                             &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+        rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
                              SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (rc == 0)
                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2859,8 +2857,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
          * in-core context value, not a denial.
          */
-        error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
-                                &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+        error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
                                 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (!error)
                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2993,8 +2990,8 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 
         case KDSKBENT:
         case KDSKBSENT:
-                error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
-                                        SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+                error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+                                            SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
                 break;
 
         /* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -4718,24 +4715,6 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
 }
 
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
-{
-        int err;
-        struct common_audit_data ad;
-        u32 sid;
-
-        err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
-        if (err)
-                return err;
-
-        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
-        ad.u.cap = capability;
-
-        security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
-        return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
-                            CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
-}
-
 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
                               u16 sclass)
@@ -5464,7 +5443,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
 
         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
-        .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
 
         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,