diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 414 |
1 files changed, 414 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b5291ad5ef56 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,414 @@ | |||
1 | /* | ||
2 | * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation | ||
3 | * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | ||
6 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | ||
7 | * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * ima_policy.c | ||
10 | * - initialize default measure policy rules | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | */ | ||
13 | #include <linux/module.h> | ||
14 | #include <linux/list.h> | ||
15 | #include <linux/security.h> | ||
16 | #include <linux/magic.h> | ||
17 | #include <linux/parser.h> | ||
18 | |||
19 | #include "ima.h" | ||
20 | |||
21 | /* flags definitions */ | ||
22 | #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 | ||
23 | #define IMA_MASK 0x0002 | ||
24 | #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004 | ||
25 | #define IMA_UID 0x0008 | ||
26 | |||
27 | enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE }; | ||
28 | |||
29 | #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 | ||
30 | enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, | ||
31 | LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE | ||
32 | }; | ||
33 | |||
34 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry { | ||
35 | struct list_head list; | ||
36 | enum ima_action action; | ||
37 | unsigned int flags; | ||
38 | enum ima_hooks func; | ||
39 | int mask; | ||
40 | unsigned long fsmagic; | ||
41 | uid_t uid; | ||
42 | struct { | ||
43 | void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ | ||
44 | int type; /* audit type */ | ||
45 | } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES]; | ||
46 | }; | ||
47 | |||
48 | /* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be | ||
49 | * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid | ||
50 | */ | ||
51 | static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = { | ||
52 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, | ||
53 | .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
54 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
55 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
56 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
57 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, | ||
58 | .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
59 | {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}, | ||
60 | {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC, | ||
61 | .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, | ||
62 | {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC, | ||
63 | .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK}, | ||
64 | {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0, | ||
65 | .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID} | ||
66 | }; | ||
67 | |||
68 | static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules); | ||
69 | static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules); | ||
70 | static struct list_head *ima_measure; | ||
71 | |||
72 | static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex); | ||
73 | |||
74 | /** | ||
75 | * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule. | ||
76 | * @rule: a pointer to a rule | ||
77 | * @inode: a pointer to an inode | ||
78 | * @func: LIM hook identifier | ||
79 | * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) | ||
80 | * | ||
81 | * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. | ||
82 | */ | ||
83 | static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule, | ||
84 | struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) | ||
85 | { | ||
86 | struct task_struct *tsk = current; | ||
87 | int i; | ||
88 | |||
89 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func) | ||
90 | return false; | ||
91 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask) | ||
92 | return false; | ||
93 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) | ||
94 | && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) | ||
95 | return false; | ||
96 | if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid) | ||
97 | return false; | ||
98 | for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { | ||
99 | int rc; | ||
100 | u32 osid, sid; | ||
101 | |||
102 | if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) | ||
103 | continue; | ||
104 | |||
105 | switch (i) { | ||
106 | case LSM_OBJ_USER: | ||
107 | case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: | ||
108 | case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: | ||
109 | security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); | ||
110 | rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid, | ||
111 | rule->lsm[i].type, | ||
112 | AUDIT_EQUAL, | ||
113 | rule->lsm[i].rule, | ||
114 | NULL); | ||
115 | break; | ||
116 | case LSM_SUBJ_USER: | ||
117 | case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: | ||
118 | case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: | ||
119 | security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); | ||
120 | rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid, | ||
121 | rule->lsm[i].type, | ||
122 | AUDIT_EQUAL, | ||
123 | rule->lsm[i].rule, | ||
124 | NULL); | ||
125 | default: | ||
126 | break; | ||
127 | } | ||
128 | if (!rc) | ||
129 | return false; | ||
130 | } | ||
131 | return true; | ||
132 | } | ||
133 | |||
134 | /** | ||
135 | * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions | ||
136 | * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made | ||
137 | * @func: IMA hook identifier | ||
138 | * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) | ||
139 | * | ||
140 | * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) | ||
141 | * conditions. | ||
142 | * | ||
143 | * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list, | ||
144 | * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list | ||
145 | * change.) | ||
146 | */ | ||
147 | int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask) | ||
148 | { | ||
149 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; | ||
150 | |||
151 | list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) { | ||
152 | bool rc; | ||
153 | |||
154 | rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask); | ||
155 | if (rc) | ||
156 | return entry->action; | ||
157 | } | ||
158 | return 0; | ||
159 | } | ||
160 | |||
161 | /** | ||
162 | * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. | ||
163 | * | ||
164 | * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the | ||
165 | * the new measure_policy_rules. | ||
166 | */ | ||
167 | void ima_init_policy(void) | ||
168 | { | ||
169 | int i; | ||
170 | |||
171 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++) | ||
172 | list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules); | ||
173 | ima_measure = &measure_default_rules; | ||
174 | } | ||
175 | |||
176 | /** | ||
177 | * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules | ||
178 | * | ||
179 | * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new | ||
180 | * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be | ||
181 | * added to the policy. | ||
182 | */ | ||
183 | void ima_update_policy(void) | ||
184 | { | ||
185 | const char *op = "policy_update"; | ||
186 | const char *cause = "already exists"; | ||
187 | int result = 1; | ||
188 | int audit_info = 0; | ||
189 | |||
190 | if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) { | ||
191 | ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules; | ||
192 | cause = "complete"; | ||
193 | result = 0; | ||
194 | } | ||
195 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
196 | NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info); | ||
197 | } | ||
198 | |||
199 | enum { | ||
200 | Opt_err = -1, | ||
201 | Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, | ||
202 | Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, | ||
203 | Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, | ||
204 | Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid | ||
205 | }; | ||
206 | |||
207 | static match_table_t policy_tokens = { | ||
208 | {Opt_measure, "measure"}, | ||
209 | {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"}, | ||
210 | {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, | ||
211 | {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, | ||
212 | {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, | ||
213 | {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"}, | ||
214 | {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"}, | ||
215 | {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"}, | ||
216 | {Opt_func, "func=%s"}, | ||
217 | {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"}, | ||
218 | {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, | ||
219 | {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, | ||
220 | {Opt_err, NULL} | ||
221 | }; | ||
222 | |||
223 | static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, | ||
224 | char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) | ||
225 | { | ||
226 | int result; | ||
227 | |||
228 | entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; | ||
229 | result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, | ||
230 | AUDIT_EQUAL, args, | ||
231 | &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); | ||
232 | return result; | ||
233 | } | ||
234 | |||
235 | static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry) | ||
236 | { | ||
237 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | ||
238 | char *p; | ||
239 | int result = 0; | ||
240 | |||
241 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE); | ||
242 | |||
243 | entry->action = -1; | ||
244 | while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) { | ||
245 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; | ||
246 | int token; | ||
247 | unsigned long lnum; | ||
248 | |||
249 | if (result < 0) | ||
250 | break; | ||
251 | if (!*p) | ||
252 | continue; | ||
253 | token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args); | ||
254 | switch (token) { | ||
255 | case Opt_measure: | ||
256 | audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure"); | ||
257 | entry->action = MEASURE; | ||
258 | break; | ||
259 | case Opt_dont_measure: | ||
260 | audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure"); | ||
261 | entry->action = DONT_MEASURE; | ||
262 | break; | ||
263 | case Opt_func: | ||
264 | audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
265 | if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0) | ||
266 | entry->func = PATH_CHECK; | ||
267 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0) | ||
268 | entry->func = FILE_MMAP; | ||
269 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0) | ||
270 | entry->func = BPRM_CHECK; | ||
271 | else | ||
272 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
273 | if (!result) | ||
274 | entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC; | ||
275 | break; | ||
276 | case Opt_mask: | ||
277 | audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
278 | if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) | ||
279 | entry->mask = MAY_EXEC; | ||
280 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) | ||
281 | entry->mask = MAY_WRITE; | ||
282 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0) | ||
283 | entry->mask = MAY_READ; | ||
284 | else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) | ||
285 | entry->mask = MAY_APPEND; | ||
286 | else | ||
287 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
288 | if (!result) | ||
289 | entry->flags |= IMA_MASK; | ||
290 | break; | ||
291 | case Opt_fsmagic: | ||
292 | audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
293 | result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16, | ||
294 | &entry->fsmagic); | ||
295 | if (!result) | ||
296 | entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC; | ||
297 | break; | ||
298 | case Opt_uid: | ||
299 | audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
300 | result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); | ||
301 | if (!result) { | ||
302 | entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum; | ||
303 | if (entry->uid != lnum) | ||
304 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
305 | else | ||
306 | entry->flags |= IMA_UID; | ||
307 | } | ||
308 | break; | ||
309 | case Opt_obj_user: | ||
310 | audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
311 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
312 | LSM_OBJ_USER, | ||
313 | AUDIT_OBJ_USER); | ||
314 | break; | ||
315 | case Opt_obj_role: | ||
316 | audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
317 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
318 | LSM_OBJ_ROLE, | ||
319 | AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE); | ||
320 | break; | ||
321 | case Opt_obj_type: | ||
322 | audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
323 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
324 | LSM_OBJ_TYPE, | ||
325 | AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE); | ||
326 | break; | ||
327 | case Opt_subj_user: | ||
328 | audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
329 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
330 | LSM_SUBJ_USER, | ||
331 | AUDIT_SUBJ_USER); | ||
332 | break; | ||
333 | case Opt_subj_role: | ||
334 | audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
335 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
336 | LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, | ||
337 | AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE); | ||
338 | break; | ||
339 | case Opt_subj_type: | ||
340 | audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from); | ||
341 | result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from, | ||
342 | LSM_SUBJ_TYPE, | ||
343 | AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE); | ||
344 | break; | ||
345 | case Opt_err: | ||
346 | audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p); | ||
347 | break; | ||
348 | } | ||
349 | } | ||
350 | if (entry->action == UNKNOWN) | ||
351 | result = -EINVAL; | ||
352 | |||
353 | audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1); | ||
354 | audit_log_end(ab); | ||
355 | return result; | ||
356 | } | ||
357 | |||
358 | /** | ||
359 | * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules | ||
360 | * @rule - ima measurement policy rule | ||
361 | * | ||
362 | * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers. | ||
363 | * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure. | ||
364 | */ | ||
365 | int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) | ||
366 | { | ||
367 | const char *op = "update_policy"; | ||
368 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry; | ||
369 | int result = 0; | ||
370 | int audit_info = 0; | ||
371 | |||
372 | /* Prevent installed policy from changing */ | ||
373 | if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) { | ||
374 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
375 | NULL, op, "already exists", | ||
376 | -EACCES, audit_info); | ||
377 | return -EACCES; | ||
378 | } | ||
379 | |||
380 | entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); | ||
381 | if (!entry) { | ||
382 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
383 | NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info); | ||
384 | return -ENOMEM; | ||
385 | } | ||
386 | |||
387 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list); | ||
388 | |||
389 | result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry); | ||
390 | if (!result) { | ||
391 | mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
392 | list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules); | ||
393 | mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
394 | } else { | ||
395 | kfree(entry); | ||
396 | integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, | ||
397 | NULL, op, "invalid policy", result, | ||
398 | audit_info); | ||
399 | } | ||
400 | return result; | ||
401 | } | ||
402 | |||
403 | /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */ | ||
404 | void ima_delete_rules(void) | ||
405 | { | ||
406 | struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; | ||
407 | |||
408 | mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
409 | list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) { | ||
410 | list_del(&entry->list); | ||
411 | kfree(entry); | ||
412 | } | ||
413 | mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex); | ||
414 | } | ||