1 files changed, 101 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
index ce6c247edad0..6cd930f3678f 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_unseal.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
  *
  *  Adapted from MIT Kerberos 5-1.2.1 lib/gssapi/krb5/k5unseal.c
  *
- *  Copyright (c) 2000 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
+ *  Copyright (c) 2000-2008 The Regents of the University of Michigan.
  *  All rights reserved.
  *
  *  Andy Adamson   <andros@umich.edu>
@@ -70,20 +70,21 @@
 /* read_token is a mic token, and message_buffer is the data that the mic was
  * supposedly taken over. */
 
-u32
-gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
+static u32
+gss_verify_mic_v1(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
                 struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
 {
-        struct krb5_ctx         *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
         int                     signalg;
         int                     sealalg;
-        char                    cksumdata[16];
-        struct xdr_netobj       md5cksum = {.len = 0, .data = cksumdata};
+        char                    cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+        struct xdr_netobj       md5cksum = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+                                            .data = cksumdata};
         s32                     now;
         int                     direction;
         u32                     seqnum;
         unsigned char           *ptr = (unsigned char *)read_token->data;
         int                     bodysize;
+        u8                      *cksumkey;
 
         dprintk("RPC:       krb5_read_token\n");
 
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
         /* XXX sanity-check bodysize?? */
 
         signalg = ptr[2] + (ptr[3] << 8);
-        if (signalg != SGN_ALG_DES_MAC_MD5)
+        if (signalg != ctx->gk5e->signalg)
                 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
 
         sealalg = ptr[4] + (ptr[5] << 8);
@@ -108,13 +109,17 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
         if ((ptr[6] != 0xff) || (ptr[7] != 0xff))
                 return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
 
-        if (make_checksum("md5", ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0, &md5cksum))
-                return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+        if (ctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum)
+                cksumkey = ctx->cksum;
+        else
+                cksumkey = NULL;
 
-        if (krb5_encrypt(ctx->seq, NULL, md5cksum.data, md5cksum.data, 16))
+        if (make_checksum(ctx, ptr, 8, message_buffer, 0,
+                          cksumkey, KG_USAGE_SIGN, &md5cksum))
                 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
 
-        if (memcmp(md5cksum.data + 8, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, 8))
+        if (memcmp(md5cksum.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+                                        ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
                 return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
 
         /* it got through unscathed.  Make sure the context is unexpired */
@@ -126,7 +131,8 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
 
         /* do sequencing checks */
 
-        if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx->seq, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8, &direction, &seqnum))
+        if (krb5_get_seq_num(ctx, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, ptr + 8,
+                             &direction, &seqnum))
                 return GSS_S_FAILURE;
 
         if ((ctx->initiate && direction != 0xff) ||
@@ -135,3 +141,86 @@ gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
 
         return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
+
+static u32
+gss_verify_mic_v2(struct krb5_ctx *ctx,
+                struct xdr_buf *message_buffer, struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+        char cksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+        struct xdr_netobj cksumobj = {.len = sizeof(cksumdata),
+                                      .data = cksumdata};
+        s32 now;
+        u64 seqnum;
+        u8 *ptr = read_token->data;
+        u8 *cksumkey;
+        u8 flags;
+        int i;
+        unsigned int cksum_usage;
+
+        dprintk("RPC:       %s\n", __func__);
+
+        if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_MIC)
+                return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+        flags = ptr[2];
+        if ((!ctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) ||
+            (ctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)))
+                return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+        if (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) {
+                dprintk("%s: token has unexpected sealed flag\n", __func__);
+                return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+        }
+
+        for (i = 3; i < 8; i++)
+                if (ptr[i] != 0xff)
+                        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+        if (ctx->initiate) {
+                cksumkey = ctx->acceptor_sign;
+                cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_ACCEPTOR_SIGN;
+        } else {
+                cksumkey = ctx->initiator_sign;
+                cksum_usage = KG_USAGE_INITIATOR_SIGN;
+        }
+
+        if (make_checksum_v2(ctx, ptr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN, message_buffer, 0,
+                             cksumkey, cksum_usage, &cksumobj))
+                return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+        if (memcmp(cksumobj.data, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN,
+                                ctx->gk5e->cksumlength))
+                return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
+
+        /* it got through unscathed.  Make sure the context is unexpired */
+        now = get_seconds();
+        if (now > ctx->endtime)
+                return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED;
+
+        /* do sequencing checks */
+
+        seqnum = be64_to_cpup((__be64 *)ptr + 8);
+
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+u32
+gss_verify_mic_kerberos(struct gss_ctx *gss_ctx,
+                        struct xdr_buf *message_buffer,
+                        struct xdr_netobj *read_token)
+{
+        struct krb5_ctx *ctx = gss_ctx->internal_ctx_id;
+
+        switch (ctx->enctype) {
+        default:
+                BUG();
+        case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+        case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+        case ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC:
+                return gss_verify_mic_v1(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
+        case ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+        case ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+                return gss_verify_mic_v2(ctx, message_buffer, read_token);
+        }
+}
+