1 files changed, 13 insertions, 13 deletions

diff --git a/net/core/iovec.c b/net/core/iovec.c
index e6b133b77ccb..c40f27e7d208 100644
--- a/net/core/iovec.c
+++ b/net/core/iovec.c
@@ -35,14 +35,15 @@
  *      in any case.
  */
 
-long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode)
+int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode)
 {
-        int size, ct;
-        long err;
+        int size, ct, err;
 
         if (m->msg_namelen) {
                 if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
-                        err = move_addr_to_kernel(m->msg_name, m->msg_namelen,
+                        void __user *namep;
+                        namep = (void __user __force *) m->msg_name;
+                        err = move_addr_to_kernel(namep, m->msg_namelen,
                                                   address);
                         if (err < 0)
                                 return err;
@@ -53,21 +54,20 @@ long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address,
         }
 
         size = m->msg_iovlen * sizeof(struct iovec);
-        if (copy_from_user(iov, m->msg_iov, size))
+        if (copy_from_user(iov, (void __user __force *) m->msg_iov, size))
                 return -EFAULT;
 
         m->msg_iov = iov;
         err = 0;
 
         for (ct = 0; ct < m->msg_iovlen; ct++) {
-                err += iov[ct].iov_len;
-                /*
-                 * Goal is not to verify user data, but to prevent returning
-                 * negative value, which is interpreted as errno.
-                 * Overflow is still possible, but it is harmless.
-                 */
-                if (err < 0)
-                        return -EMSGSIZE;
+                size_t len = iov[ct].iov_len;
+
+                if (len > INT_MAX - err) {
+                        len = INT_MAX - err;
+                        iov[ct].iov_len = len;
+                }
+                err += len;
         }
 
         return err;