1 files changed, 258 insertions, 31 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index d3a8539f3a83..7c134906d689 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
 #include "audit.h"
 
 /* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
@@ -42,6 +43,13 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
 
 static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
 {
+        int i;
+        if (e->rule.fields)
+                for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+                        struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+                        kfree(f->se_str);
+                        selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+                }
         kfree(e->rule.fields);
         kfree(e);
 }
@@ -52,9 +60,29 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
         audit_free_rule(e);
 }
 
+/* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
+static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
+{
+        struct audit_entry *entry;
+        struct audit_field *fields;
+
+        entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (unlikely(!entry))
+                return NULL;
+
+        fields = kzalloc(sizeof(*fields) * field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (unlikely(!fields)) {
+                kfree(entry);
+                return NULL;
+        }
+        entry->rule.fields = fields;
+
+        return entry;
+}
+
 /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
  * buffer. */
-static __attribute__((unused)) char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+static char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
 {
         char *str;
 
@@ -84,7 +112,6 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
 {
         unsigned listnr;
         struct audit_entry *entry;
-        struct audit_field *fields;
         int i, err;
 
         err = -EINVAL;
@@ -108,23 +135,14 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
                 goto exit_err;
 
         err = -ENOMEM;
-        entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (unlikely(!entry))
-                goto exit_err;
-        fields = kmalloc(sizeof(*fields) * rule->field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (unlikely(!fields)) {
-                kfree(entry);
+        entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
+        if (!entry)
                 goto exit_err;
-        }
-
-        memset(&entry->rule, 0, sizeof(struct audit_krule));
-        memset(fields, 0, sizeof(struct audit_field));
 
         entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
         entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
         entry->rule.action = rule->action;
         entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
-        entry->rule.fields = fields;
 
         for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
                 entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
@@ -150,15 +168,20 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
         for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
                 struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
 
-                if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) {
-                        err = -EINVAL;
-                        goto exit_free;
-                }
-
                 f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
                 f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
                 f->val = rule->values[i];
 
+                if (f->type & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_USER ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_ROLE ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_TYPE ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_SEN ||
+                    f->type == AUDIT_SE_CLR) {
+                        err = -EINVAL;
+                        goto exit_free;
+                }
+
                 entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
 
                 /* Support for legacy operators where
@@ -188,8 +211,9 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
         int err = 0;
         struct audit_entry *entry;
         void *bufp;
-        /* size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); */
+        size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
         int i;
+        char *str;
 
         entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
         if (IS_ERR(entry))
@@ -207,10 +231,35 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
 
                 f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
                 f->type = data->fields[i];
+                f->val = data->values[i];
+                f->se_str = NULL;
+                f->se_rule = NULL;
                 switch(f->type) {
-                /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
-                default:
-                        f->val = data->values[i];
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+                        if (IS_ERR(str))
+                                goto exit_free;
+                        entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+
+                        err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+                                                      &f->se_rule);
+                        /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+                         * become valid after a policy reload. */
+                        if (err == -EINVAL) {
+                                printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+                                       "\'%s\' is invalid\n",  str);
+                                err = 0;
+                        }
+                        if (err) {
+                                kfree(str);
+                                goto exit_free;
+                        } else
+                                f->se_str = str;
+                        break;
                 }
         }
 
@@ -286,7 +335,14 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
                 data->fields[i] = f->type;
                 data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
                 switch(f->type) {
-                /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+                                audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+                        break;
                 default:
                         data->values[i] = f->val;
                 }
@@ -314,7 +370,14 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
                         return 1;
 
                 switch(a->fields[i].type) {
-                /* call type-specific comparison routines here */
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+                                return 1;
+                        break;
                 default:
                         if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
                                 return 1;
@@ -328,6 +391,81 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/* Duplicate selinux field information.  The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+ * re-initialized. */
+static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+                                           struct audit_field *sf)
+{
+        int ret = 0;
+        char *se_str;
+
+        /* our own copy of se_str */
+        se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (unlikely(IS_ERR(se_str)))
+            return -ENOMEM;
+        df->se_str = se_str;
+
+        /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
+        ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+                                      &df->se_rule);
+        /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+         * become valid after a policy reload. */
+        if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+                printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
+                       "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+                ret = 0;
+        }
+
+        return ret;
+}
+
+/* Duplicate an audit rule.  This will be a deep copy with the exception
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over.  The selinux specific fields
+ * will be updated in the copy.  The point is to be able to replace the old
+ * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
+{
+        u32 fcount = old->field_count;
+        struct audit_entry *entry;
+        struct audit_krule *new;
+        int i, err = 0;
+
+        entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
+        if (unlikely(!entry))
+                return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+        new = &entry->rule;
+        new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
+        new->flags = old->flags;
+        new->listnr = old->listnr;
+        new->action = old->action;
+        for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+                new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
+        new->buflen = old->buflen;
+        new->field_count = old->field_count;
+        memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
+
+        /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+         * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
+        for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
+                switch (new->fields[i].type) {
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+                                                       &old->fields[i]);
+                }
+                if (err) {
+                        audit_free_rule(entry);
+                        return ERR_PTR(err);
+                }
+        }
+
+        return entry;
+}
+
 /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate.  Protected by
  * audit_netlink_mutex. */
 static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
@@ -448,9 +586,10 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
  * @data: payload data
  * @datasz: size of payload data
  * @loginuid: loginuid of sender
+ * @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
  */
 int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
-                         size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid)
+                         size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
 {
         struct task_struct *tsk;
         int *dest;
@@ -493,9 +632,23 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 
                 err = audit_add_rule(entry,
                                      &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-                        "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d\n",
-                        loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                if (sid) {
+                        char *ctx = NULL;
+                        u32 len;
+                        if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                 "auid=%u ssid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+                                 loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        } else
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                 "auid=%u subj=%s add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+                                 loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        kfree(ctx);
+                } else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+                                loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
 
                 if (err)
                         audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -511,9 +664,24 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
 
                 err = audit_del_rule(entry,
                                      &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
-                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
-                        "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d\n",
-                        loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+                if (sid) {
+                        char *ctx = NULL;
+                        u32 len;
+                        if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+                                /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                        "auid=%u ssid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+                                         loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        } else
+                                audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                        "auid=%u subj=%s remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+                                         loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+                        kfree(ctx);
+                } else
+                        audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+                                "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+                                loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
 
                 audit_free_rule(entry);
                 break;
@@ -628,3 +796,62 @@ unlock_and_return:
         rcu_read_unlock();
         return result;
 }
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields.  Returns 1 if there
+   are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
+static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+        int i;
+
+        for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+                struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+                switch (f->type) {
+                case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+                case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+                case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+                case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+                        return 1;
+                }
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+ * specific filter fields.  When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
+ * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * updated rule. */
+int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+{
+        struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
+        int i, err = 0;
+
+        /* audit_netlink_mutex synchronizes the writers */
+        mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+        for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+                list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+                        if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+                                continue;
+
+                        nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&entry->rule);
+                        if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry))) {
+                                /* save the first error encountered for the
+                                 * return value */
+                                if (!err)
+                                        err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
+                                audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+                                list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
+                        } else {
+                                list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
+                        }
+                        call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
+                }
+        }
+
+        mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+        return err;
+}