1 files changed, 20 insertions, 19 deletions

diff --git a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
index b9c172b3fbbe..37194607162d 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c
@@ -94,37 +94,38 @@ xfs_mark_inode_dirty(
                 mark_inode_dirty(inode);
 }
 
+
+int xfs_initxattrs(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array,
+                   void *fs_info)
+{
+        const struct xattr *xattr;
+        struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
+        int error = 0;
+
+        for (xattr = xattr_array; xattr->name != NULL; xattr++) {
+                error = xfs_attr_set(ip, xattr->name, xattr->value,
+                                     xattr->value_len, ATTR_SECURE);
+                if (error < 0)
+                        break;
+        }
+        return error;
+}
+
 /*
  * Hook in SELinux.  This is not quite correct yet, what we really need
  * here (as we do for default ACLs) is a mechanism by which creation of
  * these attrs can be journalled at inode creation time (along with the
  * inode, of course, such that log replay can't cause these to be lost).
  */
+
 STATIC int
 xfs_init_security(
         struct inode    *inode,
         struct inode    *dir,
         const struct qstr *qstr)
 {
-        struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
-        size_t          length;
-        void            *value;
-        unsigned char   *name;
-        int             error;
-
-        error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, (char **)&name,
-                                             &value, &length);
-        if (error) {
-                if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
-                        return 0;
-                return -error;
-        }
-
-        error = xfs_attr_set(ip, name, value, length, ATTR_SECURE);
-
-        kfree(name);
-        kfree(value);
-        return error;
+        return security_inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+                                            &xfs_initxattrs, NULL);
 }
 
 static void