Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights for this window:

   - improved AVC hashing for SELinux by John Brooks and Stephen Smalley

   - addition of an unconfined label to Smack

   - Smack documentation update

   - TPM driver updates"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (28 commits)
  lsm: copy comm before calling audit_log to avoid race in string printing
  tomoyo: Do not generate empty policy files
  tomoyo: Use if_changed when generating builtin-policy.h
  tomoyo: Use bin2c to generate builtin-policy.h
  selinux: increase avtab max buckets
  selinux: Use a better hash function for avtab
  selinux: convert avtab hash table to flex_array
  selinux: reconcile security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid() and mls_import_netlbl_cat()
  selinux: remove unnecessary pointer reassignment
  Smack: Updates for Smack documentation
  tpm/st33zp24/spi: Add missing device table for spi phy.
  tpm/st33zp24: Add proper wait for ordinal duration in case of irq mode
  smack: Fix gcc warning from unused smack_syslog_lock mutex in smackfs.c
  Smack: Allow an unconfined label in bringup mode
  Smack: getting the Smack security context of keys
  Smack: Assign smack_known_web as default smk_in label for kernel thread's socket
  tpm/tpm_infineon: Use struct dev_pm_ops for power management
  MAINTAINERS: Add Jason as designated reviewer for TPM
  tpm: Update KConfig text to include TPM2.0 FIFO chips
  tpm/st33zp24/dts/st33zp24-spi: Add dts documentation for st33zp24 spi phy
  ...

16 files changed, 324 insertions, 115 deletions

diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 69fdf3bc765b..b526ddc3add5 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline void print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
 static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
                                    struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-        struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+        char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
 
         /*
          * To keep stack sizes in check force programers to notice if they
@@ -220,8 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
          */
         BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(a->u) > sizeof(void *)*2);
 
-        audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(tsk));
-        audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+        audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
+        audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm)));
 
         switch (a->type) {
         case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE:
@@ -276,16 +276,19 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
                 audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
                 break;
         }
-        case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK:
-                tsk = a->u.tsk;
+        case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK: {
+                struct task_struct *tsk = a->u.tsk;
                 if (tsk) {
                         pid_t pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
                         if (pid) {
+                                char comm[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
                                 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", pid);
-                                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
+                                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab,
+                                    memcpy(comm, tsk->comm, sizeof(comm)));
                         }
                 }
                 break;
+        }
         case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
                 if (a->u.net->sk) {
                         struct sock *sk = a->u.net->sk;
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index afcc0aed9393..3c17dda9571d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -724,12 +724,10 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
         rcu_read_lock();
 
         node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-        if (unlikely(!node)) {
+        if (unlikely(!node))
                 node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
-        } else {
+        else
                 memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
-                avd = &node->ae.avd;
-        }
 
         denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
         if (unlikely(denied))
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index a3dd9faa19c0..b64f2772b030 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -25,10 +25,43 @@
 
 static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
 
-static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u16 mask)
+/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
+ * public domain.
+ */
+static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
 {
-        return ((keyp->target_class + (keyp->target_type << 2) +
-                 (keyp->source_type << 9)) & mask);
+        static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
+        static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
+        static const u32 r1 = 15;
+        static const u32 r2 = 13;
+        static const u32 m  = 5;
+        static const u32 n  = 0xe6546b64;
+
+        u32 hash = 0;
+
+#define mix(input) { \
+        u32 v = input; \
+        v *= c1; \
+        v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
+        v *= c2; \
+        hash ^= v; \
+        hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
+        hash = hash * m + n; \
+}
+
+        mix(keyp->target_class);
+        mix(keyp->target_type);
+        mix(keyp->source_type);
+
+#undef mix
+
+        hash ^= hash >> 16;
+        hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
+        hash ^= hash >> 13;
+        hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+        hash ^= hash >> 16;
+
+        return hash & mask;
 }
 
 static struct avtab_node*
@@ -46,8 +79,12 @@ avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
                 newnode->next = prev->next;
                 prev->next = newnode;
         } else {
-                newnode->next = h->htable[hvalue];
-                h->htable[hvalue] = newnode;
+                newnode->next = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
+                if (flex_array_put_ptr(h->htable, hvalue, newnode,
+                                       GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO)) {
+                        kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+                        return NULL;
+                }
         }
 
         h->nel++;
@@ -64,7 +101,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
                 return -EINVAL;
 
         hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-        for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+        for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
              cur;
              prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
                 if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
@@ -104,7 +141,7 @@ avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datu
         if (!h || !h->htable)
                 return NULL;
         hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
-        for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+        for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
              cur;