split cap_mmap_addr() out of cap_file_mmap()

... switch callers.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

4 files changed, 26 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 032daab449b0..8430d8937afb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -497,7 +497,7 @@ static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         int rc = 0;
 
         /* do DAC check */
-        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+        rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
         if (rc || addr_only)
                 return rc;
 
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e771cb1b2d79..ebac3618896e 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -958,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 }
 
 /*
- * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
- * @file: unused
- * @reqprot: unused
- * @prot: unused
- * @flags: unused
+ * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
  * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
- * @addr_only: unused
  *
  * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
  * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
  * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
  * -EPERM if not.
  */
-int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-                  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-                  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
         int ret = 0;
 
@@ -986,3 +979,24 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         }
         return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
+ * @file: unused
+ * @reqprot: unused
+ * @prot: unused
+ * @flags: unused
+ * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
+ * @addr_only: unused
+ *
+ * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
+ * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
+ * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
+ * -EPERM if not.
+ */
+int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+                  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
+                  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+{
+        return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fa2341b68331..25c125eaa3d8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3104,7 +3104,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         }
 
         /* do DAC check on address space usage */
-        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+        rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
         if (rc || addr_only)
                 return rc;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d583c0545808..a62197718768 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1199,7 +1199,7 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
         int rc;
 
         /* do DAC check on address space usage */
-        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+        rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
         if (rc || addr_only)
                 return rc;