Merge branch 'next' into for-linus

13 files changed, 616 insertions, 266 deletions

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 69fc9952650f..7cd61a5f5205 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -45,26 +45,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
 /**
  * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
  * @tsk: The task to query
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
  * @cap: The capability to check for
  * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
  *
  * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
  * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
  *
- * NOTE WELL: cap_capable() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * function.  That is, it has the reverse semantics: cap_capable() returns 0
- * when a task has a capability, but the kernel's capable() returns 1 for this
- * case.
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
+ * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
+ * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
+ * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
  */
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
+                int audit)
 {
-        __u32 cap_raised;
-
-        /* Derived from include/linux/sched.h:capable. */
-        rcu_read_lock();
-        cap_raised = cap_raised(__task_cred(tsk)->cap_effective, cap);
-        rcu_read_unlock();
-        return cap_raised ? 0 : -EPERM;
+        return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -160,7 +156,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
         /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
          * capability
          */
-        if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+        if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+                        SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
                 return 0;
 #endif
         return 1;
@@ -869,7 +866,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                      & (new->securebits ^ arg2))                        /*[1]*/
                     || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))   /*[3]*/
-                    || (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
+                    || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+                                    SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)           /*[4]*/
                         /*
                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
                          * [2] no unlocking of locks
@@ -950,7 +948,8 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         int cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-        if (cap_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
+        if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+                        SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 6688765bd8b9..09796797d122 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1294,7 +1294,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_keyctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 
         case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
                 return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
-                                           (char *) arg3,
+                                           (char __user *) arg3,
                                            (size_t) arg4);
 
         default:
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 678d4d07b852..c3586c0d97e2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -154,14 +154,32 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                     effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-int security_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_capable(int cap)
 {
-        return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+        return security_ops->capable(current, current_cred(), cap,
+                                     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
 }
 
-int security_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
 {
-        return security_ops->capable(tsk, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+        const struct cred *cred;
+        int ret;
+
+        cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+        ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+        put_cred(cred);
+        return ret;
+}
+
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+{
+        const struct cred *cred;
+        int ret;
+
+        cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
+        ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+        put_cred(cred);
+        return ret;
 }
 
 int security_acct(struct file *file)
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 26301dd651d3..bca1b74a4a2f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -94,33 +94,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
 
           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
 
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
-        bool "NSA SELinux enable new secmark network controls by default"
-        depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
-        default n
-        help
-          This option determines whether the new secmark-based network
-          controls will be enabled by default.  If not, the old internal
-          per-packet controls will be enabled by default, preserving
-          old behavior.
-
-          If you enable the new controls, you will need updated
-          SELinux userspace libraries, tools and policy.  Typically,
-          your distribution will provide these and enable the new controls
-          in the kernel they also distribute.
-
-          Note that this option can be overridden at boot with the
-          selinux_compat_net parameter, and after boot via
-          /selinux/compat_net.  See Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
-          for details on this parameter.
-
-          If you enable the new network controls, you will likely
-          also require the SECMARK and CONNSECMARK targets, as
-          well as any conntrack helpers for protocols which you
-          wish to control.
-
-          If you are unsure what to do here, select N.
-
 config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
         bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version"
         depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index d43bd6baeeaa..eb41f43e2772 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -53,18 +53,20 @@ static const char *class_to_string[] = {
 #undef S_
 
 static const struct av_inherit av_inherit[] = {
-#define S_(c, i, b) { c, common_##i##_perm_to_string, b },
+#define S_(c, i, b) {   .tclass = c,\
+                        .common_pts = common_##i##_perm_to_string,\
+                        .common_base =  b },
 #include "av_inherit.h"
 #undef S_
 };
 
 const struct selinux_class_perm selinux_class_perm = {
-        av_perm_to_string,
-        ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
-        class_to_string,
-        ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
-        av_inherit,
-        ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
+        .av_perm_to_string = av_perm_to_string,
+        .av_pts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_perm_to_string),
+        .class_to_string = class_to_string,
+        .cts_len = ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string),
+        .av_inherit = av_inherit,
+        .av_inherit_len = ARRAY_SIZE(av_inherit)
 };
 
 #define AVC_CACHE_SLOTS                 512
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dbeaa783b2a9..00815973d412 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1433,12 +1433,13 @@ static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
 
 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
+                               const struct cred *cred,
                                int cap, int audit)
 {
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         struct av_decision avd;
         u16 sclass;
-        u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
+        u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
         int rc;
 
@@ -1865,15 +1866,16 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
-static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
+static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+                           int cap, int audit)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap, audit);
+        rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        return task_has_capability(tsk, cap, audit);
+        return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 }
 
 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
@@ -2037,7 +2039,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
 
-        rc = selinux_capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+        rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+                             SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (rc == 0)
                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
 
@@ -2880,7 +2883,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
          * in-core context value, not a denial.
          */
-        error = selinux_capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+        error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+                                SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
         if (!error)
                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
                                                       &size);
@@ -4185,7 +4189,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
                                        u16 family)
 {
-        int err;
+        int err = 0;
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
         u32 peer_sid;
         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
@@ -4202,7 +4206,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         if (selinux_compat_net)
                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
                                                            family, addrp);
-        else
+        else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
         if (err)
@@ -4705,7 +4709,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
                 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
                                                          &ad, family, addrp))
                         return NF_DROP;
-        } else {
+        } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
                         return NF_DROP;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index c0d314d9f8e1..bb1ec801bdfe 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -17,16 +17,16 @@ struct av_perm_to_string {
 };
 
 struct av_inherit {
-        u16 tclass;
         const char **common_pts;
         u32 common_base;
+        u16 tclass;
 };
 
 struct selinux_class_perm {
         const struct av_perm_to_string *av_perm_to_string;
         u32 av_pts_len;
-        const char **class_to_string;
         u32 cts_len;
+        const char **class_to_string;
         const struct av_inherit *av_inherit;
         u32 av_inherit_len;
 };
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 8f612c8becb5..01ec6d2c6b97 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -47,13 +47,7 @@ static char *policycap_names[] = {
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_ENABLE_SECMARK_DEFAULT
-#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 0
-#else
-#define SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE 1
-#endif
-
-int selinux_compat_net = SELINUX_COMPAT_NET_VALUE;
+int selinux_compat_net = 0;
 
 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
 {
@@ -494,7 +488,13 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_compat_net(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
         if (sscanf(page, "%d", &new_value) != 1)
                 goto out;
 
-        selinux_compat_net = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+        if (new_value) {
+                printk(KERN_NOTICE
+                       "SELinux: compat_net is deprecated, please use secmark"
+                       " instead\n");
+                selinux_compat_net = 1;
+        } else
+                selinux_compat_net = 0;
         length = count;
 out:
         free_page((unsigned long) page);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
index 658c2bd17da8..d9dd7a2f6a8a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@ struct context {
         u32 user;
         u32 role;
         u32 type;
+        u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
         struct mls_range range;
         char *str;      /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
-        u32 len;        /* length of string in bytes */
 };
 
 static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 31dce559595a..b79582e4fbfd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
 /*
@@ -39,6 +40,7 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 struct socket_smack {
         char            *smk_out;                       /* outbound label */
         char            *smk_in;                        /* inbound label */
+        int             smk_labeled;                    /* label scheme */
         char            smk_packet[SMK_LABELLEN];       /* TCP peer label */
 };
 
@@ -80,6 +82,16 @@ struct smack_cipso {
 };
 
 /*
+ * An entry in the table identifying hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr {
+        struct smk_netlbladdr   *smk_next;
+        struct sockaddr_in      smk_host;       /* network address */
+        struct in_addr          smk_mask;       /* network mask */
+        char                    *smk_label;     /* label */
+};
+
+/*
  * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
  * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
  * and so that they can be shared.
@@ -127,6 +139,20 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT   XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT
 
 /*
+ * How communications on this socket are treated.
+ * Usually it's determined by the underlying netlabel code
+ * but there are certain cases, including single label hosts
+ * and potentially single label interfaces for which the
+ * treatment can not be known in advance.
+ *
+ * The possibility of additional labeling schemes being
+ * introduced in the future exists as well.
+ */
+#define SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET  0
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET      1
+
+/*
+ * smackfs magic number
  * smackfs macic number
  */
 #define SMACK_MAGIC     0x43415d53 /* "SMAC" */
@@ -141,6 +167,7 @@ struct smack_known {
  * CIPSO defaults.
  */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT         3       /* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_INVALID         -1      /* Not a DOI */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT      250     /* Arbitrary */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATVAL           63      /* Bigger gets harder */
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL            255     /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
@@ -176,7 +203,6 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
  * Shared data.
  */
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
-extern int smack_net_nltype;
 extern char *smack_net_ambient;
 extern char *smack_onlycap;
 
@@ -186,9 +212,10 @@ extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
-extern struct smack_known smack_known_unset;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
 
 extern struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
+extern struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
 extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 247cec3b5a43..2e0b83e77ffe 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -15,15 +15,8 @@
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
-struct smack_known smack_known_unset = {
-        .smk_next       = NULL,
-        .smk_known      = "UNSET",
-        .smk_secid      = 1,
-        .smk_cipso      = NULL,
-};
-
 struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
-        .smk_next       = &smack_known_unset,
+        .smk_next       = NULL,
         .smk_known      = "?",
         .smk_secid      = 2,
         .smk_cipso      = NULL,
@@ -57,7 +50,14 @@ struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
         .smk_cipso      = NULL,
 };
 
-struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_invalid;
+struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
+        .smk_next       = &smack_known_invalid,
+        .smk_known      = "@",
+        .smk_secid      = 7,
+        .smk_cipso      = NULL,
+};
+
+struct smack_known *smack_known = &smack_known_web;
 
 /*
  * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
@@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request)
             strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_star.smk_known) == 0)
                 return -EACCES;
         /*
+         * An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
+         * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
+         * An internet subject can access any object.
+         */
+        if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+            subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
+            strcmp(object_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0 ||
+            strcmp(subject_label, smack_known_web.smk_known) == 0)
+                return 0;
+        /*
          * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
          */
         if (object_label == smack_known_star.smk_known ||
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 848212fd4845..0278bc083044 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1277,6 +1277,7 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 
         ssp->smk_in = csp;
         ssp->smk_out = csp;
+        ssp->smk_labeled = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
         ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
 
         sk->sk_security = ssp;
@@ -1341,45 +1342,69 @@ static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
         struct smack_cipso cipso;
         int rc;
 
-        switch (smack_net_nltype) {
-        case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4:
-                nlsp->domain = smack;
-                nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+        nlsp->domain = smack;
+        nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
 
-                rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
-                if (rc == 0) {
-                        nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
-                        smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
-                } else {
-                        nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
-                        smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
-                }
-                break;
-        default:
-                break;
+        rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
+        if (rc == 0) {
+                nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
+                smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
+        } else {
+                nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
+                smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
         }
 }
 
 /**
  * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
  * @sk: the socket
+ * @labeled: socket label scheme
  *
  * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
  * secattr and attach it to the socket.
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or an error code
  */
-static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk)
+static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
 {
         struct socket_smack *ssp;
         struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
-        int rc;
+        int rc = 0;
 
         ssp = sk->sk_security;
-        netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-        smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
-        rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
-        netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+        /*
+         * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
+         * packet labeling based on the label.
+         * The case of a single label host is different, because
+         * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
+         * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
+         * label.
+         */
+        local_bh_disable();
+        bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+        if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
+            labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+                netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+        else {
+                netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+                smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
+                rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, &secattr);
+                netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+        }
+
+        bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+        local_bh_enable();
+        /*
+         * Remember the label scheme used so that it is not
+         * necessary to do the netlabel setting if it has not
+         * changed the next time through.
+         *
+         * The -EDESTADDRREQ case is an indication that there's
+         * a single level host involved.
+         */
+        if (rc == 0)
+                ssp->smk_labeled = labeled;
 
         return rc;
 }
@@ -1432,7 +1457,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
                 ssp->smk_in = sp;
         else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
                 ssp->smk_out = sp;
-                rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+                rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
                 if (rc != 0)
                         printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
                                __func__, -rc);
@@ -1462,7 +1487,108 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
         /*
          * Set the outbound netlbl.
          */
-        return smack_netlabel(sock->sk);
+        return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
+ * @sip: the object end
+ *
+ * looks for host based access restrictions
+ *
+ * This version will only be appropriate for really small
+ * sets of single label hosts. Because of the masking
+ * it cannot shortcut out on the first match. There are
+ * numerious ways to address the problem, but none of them
+ * have been applied here.
+ *
+ * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+ */
+static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+        struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
+        char *bestlabel = NULL;
+        struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+        struct in_addr *liap;
+        struct in_addr *miap;
+        struct in_addr bestmask;
+
+        if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        bestmask.s_addr = 0;
+
+        for (snp = smack_netlbladdrs; snp != NULL; snp = snp->smk_next) {
+                liap = &snp->smk_host.sin_addr;
+                miap = &snp->smk_mask;
+                /*
+                 * If the addresses match after applying the list entry mask
+                 * the entry matches the address. If it doesn't move along to
+                 * the next entry.
+                 */
+                if ((liap->s_addr & miap->s_addr) !=
+                    (siap->s_addr & miap->s_addr))
+                        continue;
+                /*
+                 * If the list entry mask identifies a single address
+                 * it can't get any more specific.
+                 */
+                if (miap->s_addr == 0xffffffff)
+                        return snp->smk_label;
+                /*
+                 * If the list entry mask is less specific than the best
+                 * already found this entry is uninteresting.
+                 */
+                if ((miap->s_addr | bestmask.s_addr) == bestmask.s_addr)
+                        continue;
+                /*
+                 * This is better than any entry found so far.
+                 */
+                bestmask.s_addr = miap->s_addr;
+                bestlabel = snp->smk_label;
+        }
+
+        return bestlabel;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @sap: the other end
+ * @addrlen: size of sap
+ *
+ * Verifies that a connection may be possible
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
+                                int addrlen)
+{
+        struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+        char *hostsp;
+        int rc;
+
+        if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
+                return 0;
+
+        if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        hostsp = smack_host_label((struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+        if (hostsp == NULL) {
+                if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
+                        return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+        if (rc != 0)
+                return rc;
+
+        if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+                return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
+        return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2101,8 +2227,14 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
         if (newsmack == NULL)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
+        /*
+         * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
+         */
+        if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+                return -EPERM;
+
         new = prepare_creds();
-        if (!new)
+        if (new == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
         new->security = newsmack;
         commit_creds(new);
@@ -2144,6 +2276,49 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @msghdr: the message
+ * @size: the size of the message
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
+ * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
+ * label host.
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+                                int size)
+{
+        struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+        struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+        char *hostsp;
+        int rc;
+
+        /*
+         * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
+         */
+        if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
+                return 0;
+
+        hostsp = smack_host_label(sip);
+        if (hostsp == NULL) {
+                if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET)
+                        return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE);
+        if (rc != 0)
+                return rc;
+
+        if (ssp->smk_labeled != SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+                return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET);
+
+        return 0;
+
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat
  *      pair to smack
  * @sap: netlabel secattr
@@ -2154,44 +2329,66 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 static void smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap, char *sip)
 {
         char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+        char *sp;
         int pcat;
 
-        if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) == 0) {
+        if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
                 /*
+                 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
                  * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
                  * behaving the way we expect it to.
                  *
+                 * Get the categories, if any
                  * Without guidance regarding the smack value
                  * for the packet fall back on the network
                  * ambient value.
                  */
-                strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
+                memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
+                if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
+                        for (pcat = -1;;) {
+                                pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
+                                        sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
+                                if (pcat < 0)
+                                        break;
+                                smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
+                        }
+                /*
+                 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
+                 * we are already done. WeeHee.
+                 */
+                if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
+                        memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+                        return;
+                }
+                /*
+                 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
+                 * a direct mapping.
+                 */
+                smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
                 return;
         }
-        /*
-         * Get the categories, if any
-         */
-        memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
-        if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
-                for (pcat = -1;;) {
-                        pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
-                                                          pcat + 1);
-                        if (pcat < 0)
-                                break;
-                        smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
-                }
-        /*
-         * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
-         * we are already done. WeeHee.
-         */
-        if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
-                memcpy(sip, smack, SMK_MAXLEN);
+        if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
+                /*
+                 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+                 */
+                sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+                /*
+                 * This has got to be a bug because it is
+                 * impossible to specify a fallback without
+                 * specifying the label, which will ensure
+                 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
+                 * secid is from a fallback.
+                 */
+                BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
+                strncpy(sip, sp, SMK_MAXLEN);
                 return;
         }
         /*
-         * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not a direct mapping.
+         * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+         * for the packet fall back on the network
+         * ambient value.
          */
-        smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack, sip);
+        strncpy(sip, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
         return;
 }
 
@@ -2207,6 +2404,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
         struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
         char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+        char *csp;
         int rc;
 
         if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
@@ -2215,21 +2413,24 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         /*
          * Translate what netlabel gave us.
          */
-        memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
         netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
         rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
-        if (rc == 0)
+        if (rc == 0) {
                 smack_from_secattr(&secattr, smack);
-        else
-                strncpy(smack, smack_net_ambient, SMK_MAXLEN);
+                csp = smack;
+        } else
+                csp = smack_net_ambient;
+
         netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
         /*
          * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
          * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
          * This is the simplist possible security model
          * for networking.
          */
-        rc = smk_access(smack, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
+        rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE);
         if (rc != 0)
                 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
         return rc;
@@ -2298,7 +2499,6 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
         /*
          * Translate what netlabel gave us.
          */
-        memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
         netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
         rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
         if (rc == 0)
@@ -2341,7 +2541,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
         ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = current_security();
         ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
 
-        rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
+        rc = smack_netlabel(sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
         if (rc != 0)
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
                        __func__, -rc);
@@ -2367,7 +2567,6 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         if (skb == NULL)
                 return -EACCES;
 
-        memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
         netlbl_secattr_init(&skb_secattr);
         rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &skb_secattr);
         if (rc == 0)
@@ -2732,6 +2931,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .unix_may_send =                smack_unix_may_send,
 
         .socket_post_create =           smack_socket_post_create,
+        .socket_connect =               smack_socket_connect,
+        .socket_sendmsg =               smack_socket_sendmsg,
         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
@@ -2783,7 +2984,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
         /*
          * Initialize locks
          */
-        spin_lock_init(&smack_known_unset.smk_cipsolock);
         spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
         spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
         spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 247dc9ebbc71..bf107a389ac1 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
@@ -38,7 +39,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
         SMK_DOI         = 5,    /* CIPSO DOI */
         SMK_DIRECT      = 6,    /* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
         SMK_AMBIENT     = 7,    /* internet ambient label */
-        SMK_NLTYPE      = 8,    /* label scheme to use by default */
+        SMK_NETLBLADDR  = 8,    /* single label hosts */
         SMK_ONLYCAP     = 9,    /* the only "capable" label */
 };
 
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_list_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
 
 /*
  * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
@@ -57,12 +59,6 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
 char *smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 
 /*
- * This is the default packet marking scheme for network traffic.
- * It can be reset via smackfs/nltype
- */
-int smack_net_nltype = NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4;
-
-/*
  * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
  * smack label is contained directly in the category set.
  * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
@@ -79,6 +75,13 @@ int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
  */
 char *smack_onlycap;
 
+/*
+ * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
+ * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
+ * can write to the specified label.
+ */
+struct smk_netlbladdr *smack_netlbladdrs;
+
 static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
 struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
 
@@ -104,6 +107,24 @@ struct smk_list_entry *smack_list;
 #define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
 #define SMK_LOADLEN   (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
 
+/**
+ * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
+ * @nap: structure to fill
+ */
+static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
+{
+        nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+        nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+        nap->secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing single label host rules
+ * "1.2.3.4 X"
+ * "192.168.138.129/32 abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvw"
+ */
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN       9
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX       42
 
 /*
  * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
@@ -344,13 +365,11 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
 {
         int rc;
         struct cipso_v4_doi *doip;
-        struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+        struct netlbl_audit nai;
 
-        audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
-        audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-        audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+        smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
 
-        rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info);
+        rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
         if (rc != 0)
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
                        __func__, __LINE__, rc);
@@ -365,11 +384,19 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
         for (rc = 1; rc < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; rc++)
                 doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
 
-        rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add_map(doip, NULL, &audit_info);
+        rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(doip, &nai);
         if (rc != 0) {
-                printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
+                printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d cipso add rc = %d\n",
                        __func__, __LINE__, rc);
                 kfree(doip);
+                return;
+        }
+        rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(doip->doi, NULL, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+        if (rc != 0) {
+                printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d map add rc = %d\n",
+                       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+                kfree(doip);
+                return;
         }
 }
 
@@ -379,20 +406,19 @@ static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
 static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
 {
         int rc;
-        struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+        struct netlbl_audit nai;
 
-        audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
-        audit_info.sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-        audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current_security());
+        smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
 
         if (oldambient != NULL) {
-                rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
+                rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
                 if (rc != 0)
                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
                                __func__, __LINE__, rc);
         }
 
-        rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_add_map(smack_net_ambient, &audit_info);
+        rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
+                                      NULL, NULL, &nai);
         if (rc != 0)
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
                        __func__, __LINE__, rc);
@@ -603,6 +629,201 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_cipso_ops = {
         .release        = seq_release,
 };
 
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
+ */
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+        if (*pos == SEQ_READ_FINISHED)
+                return NULL;
+
+        return smack_netlbladdrs;
+}
+
+static void *netlbladdr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+        struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = ((struct smk_netlbladdr *) v)->smk_next;
+
+        if (skp == NULL)
+                *pos = SEQ_READ_FINISHED;
+
+        return skp;
+}
+/*
+#define BEMASK  0x80000000
+*/
+#define BEMASK  0x00000001
+#define BEBITS  (sizeof(__be32) * 8)
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int netlbladdr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+        struct smk_netlbladdr *skp = (struct smk_netlbladdr *) v;
+        unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
+        __be32 bebits;
+        int maskn = 0;
+
+        for (bebits = BEMASK; bebits != 0; maskn++, bebits <<= 1)
+                if ((skp->smk_mask.s_addr & bebits) == 0)
+                        break;
+
+        seq_printf(s, "%u.%u.%u.%u/%d %s\n",
+                hp[0], hp[1], hp[2], hp[3], maskn, skp->smk_label);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static void netlbladdr_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+        /* No-op */
+}
+
+static struct seq_operations netlbladdr_seq_ops = {
+        .start = netlbladdr_seq_start,
+        .stop  = netlbladdr_seq_stop,
+        .next  = netlbladdr_seq_next,
+        .show  = netlbladdr_seq_show,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_netlbladdr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our netlbladdr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_netlbladdr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+        return seq_open(file, &netlbladdr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one netlbladdr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+                                size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+        struct smk_netlbladdr *skp;
+        struct sockaddr_in newname;
+        char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
+        char *sp;
+        char data[SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX];
+        char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+        int rc;
+        struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+        struct in_addr mask;
+        unsigned int m;
+        __be32 bebits = BEMASK;
+        __be32 nsa;
+
+        /*
+         * Must have privilege.
+         * No partial writes.
+         * Enough data must be present.
+         * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
+         * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
+         */
+        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+        if (*ppos != 0)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN || count > SMK_NETLBLADDRMAX)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+                return -EFAULT;
+
+        data[count] = '\0';
+
+        rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%d %s",
+                &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
+        if (rc != 6) {
+                rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
+                        &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
+                if (rc != 5)
+                        return -EINVAL;
+                m = BEBITS;
+        }
+        if (m > BEBITS)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        sp = smk_import(smack, 0);
+        if (sp == NULL)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        for (mask.s_addr = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+                mask.s_addr |= bebits;
+                bebits <<= 1;
+        }
+        /*
+         * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+         * quite rare and small in any case.
+         */
+        mutex_lock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+        nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+        for (skp = smack_netlbladdrs; skp != NULL; skp = skp->smk_next)
+                if (skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr == nsa &&
+                    skp->smk_mask.s_addr == mask.s_addr)
+                        break;
+
+        smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
+
+        if (skp == NULL) {
+                skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
+                if (skp == NULL)
+                        rc = -ENOMEM;
+                else {
+                        rc = 0;
+                        skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+                        skp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
+                        skp->smk_next = smack_netlbladdrs;
+                        skp->smk_label = sp;
+                        smack_netlbladdrs = skp;
+                }
+        } else {
+                rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
+                        &skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
+                        PF_INET, &audit_info);
+                skp->smk_label = sp;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Now tell netlabel about the single label nature of
+         * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
+         */
+
+        if (rc == 0)
+                rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
+                        &skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+                        smack_to_secid(skp->smk_label), &audit_info);
+
+        if (rc == 0)
+                rc = count;
+
+        mutex_unlock(&smk_netlbladdr_lock);
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_netlbladdr_ops = {
+        .open           = smk_open_netlbladdr,
+        .read           = seq_read,
+        .llseek         = seq_lseek,
+        .write          = smk_write_netlbladdr,
+        .release        = seq_release,
+};
+
 /**
  * smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
  * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
@@ -891,110 +1112,6 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
         .write          = smk_write_onlycap,
 };
 
-struct option_names {
-        int     o_number;
-        char    *o_name;
-        char    *o_alias;
-};
-
-static struct option_names netlbl_choices[] = {
-        { NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO,
-                NETLBL_NLTYPE_RIPSO_NAME,       "ripso" },
-        { NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
-                NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME,     "cipsov4" },
-        { NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4,
-                NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4_NAME,     "cipso" },
-        { NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6,
-                NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV6_NAME,     "cipsov6" },
-        { NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED,
-                NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED_NAME,   "unlabeled" },
-};
-
-/**
- * smk_read_nltype - read() for /smack/nltype
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to put the result
- * @count: maximum to send along
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t smk_read_nltype(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
-                               size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-        char bound[40];
-        ssize_t rc;
-        int i;
-
-        if (count < SMK_LABELLEN)
-                return -EINVAL;
-
-        if (*ppos != 0)
-                return 0;
-
-        sprintf(bound, "unknown");
-
-        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
-                if (smack_net_nltype == netlbl_choices[i].o_number) {
-                        sprintf(bound, "%s", netlbl_choices[i].o_name);
-                        break;
-                }
-
-        rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, bound, strlen(bound));
-
-        return rc;
-}
-
-/**
- * smk_write_nltype - write() for /smack/nltype
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to get the data from
- * @count: bytes sent
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
- */
-static ssize_t smk_write_nltype(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
-                                size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
-        char bound[40];
-        char *cp;
-        int i;
-
-        if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
-                return -EPERM;
-
-        if (count >= 40)
-                return -EINVAL;
-
-        if (copy_from_user(bound, buf, count) != 0)
-                return -EFAULT;
-
-        bound[count] = '\0';
-        cp = strchr(bound, ' ');
-        if (cp != NULL)
-                *cp = '\0';
-        cp = strchr(bound, '\n');
-        if (cp != NULL)
-                *cp = '\0';
-
-        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(netlbl_choices); i++)
-                if (strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_name) == 0 ||
-                    strcmp(bound, netlbl_choices[i].o_alias) == 0) {
-                        smack_net_nltype = netlbl_choices[i].o_number;
-                        return count;
-                }
-        /*
-         * Not a valid choice.
-         */
-        return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations smk_nltype_ops = {
-        .read           = smk_read_nltype,
-        .write          = smk_write_nltype,
-};
-
 /**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the /smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
@@ -1021,8 +1138,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
                         {"direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
                 [SMK_AMBIENT]   =
                         {"ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
-                [SMK_NLTYPE]    =
-                        {"nltype", &smk_nltype_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+                [SMK_NETLBLADDR] =
+                        {"netlabel", &smk_netlbladdr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
                 [SMK_ONLYCAP]   =
                         {"onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
                 /* last one */ {""}