SELinux: Fix SA selection semantics

Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.

With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:

1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:

allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }

2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:

allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

4 files changed, 68 insertions, 73 deletions

diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 0148d1518dd1..558795b237d6 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -886,12 +886,6 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
         return 1;
 }
 
-static int dummy_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-                                struct xfrm_policy *xp)
-{
-        return 1;
-}
-
 static int dummy_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -1126,7 +1120,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
-        set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_flow_state_match);
         set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5bbd599a4471..956137baf3e7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2889,7 +2889,8 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 }
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
-static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
+                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
@@ -2907,6 +2908,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad
         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
         ret = 0;
 
+        if (proto)
+                *proto = ih->protocol;
+
         switch (ih->protocol) {
         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
@@ -2950,7 +2954,8 @@ out:
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
-static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
+                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
         u8 nexthdr;
         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
@@ -2971,6 +2976,9 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad
         if (offset < 0)
                 goto out;
 
+        if (proto)
+                *proto = nexthdr;
+
         switch (nexthdr) {
         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
@@ -3007,13 +3015,13 @@ out:
 #endif /* IPV6 */
 
 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
-                             char **addrp, int *len, int src)
+                             char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
 {
         int ret = 0;
 
         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
         case PF_INET:
-                ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
+                ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
                 if (ret || !addrp)
                         break;
                 *len = 4;
@@ -3023,7 +3031,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
         case PF_INET6:
-                ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
+                ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
                 if (ret || !addrp)
                         break;
                 *len = 16;
@@ -3494,7 +3502,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
         ad.u.net.family = family;
 
-        err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
+        err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
         if (err)
                 goto out;
 
@@ -3820,6 +3828,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
         struct avc_audit_data ad;
         struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+        u8 proto;
 
         sk = skb->sk;
         if (!sk)
@@ -3831,7 +3840,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
         ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
 
-        err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0);
+        err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
         if (err)
                 goto out;
 
@@ -3845,7 +3854,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
         if (err)
                 goto out;
 
-        err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+        err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
 out:
         return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
 }
@@ -4764,7 +4773,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
-        .xfrm_flow_state_match =        selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match,
         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
 #endif
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 27502365d706..ebd7246a4be5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
                         struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-                        struct xfrm_policy *xp);
-
 
 /*
  * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
@@ -38,7 +35,7 @@ static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
                         struct avc_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 #else
@@ -49,7 +46,7 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 8fef74271f22..9b777140068f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -115,71 +115,40 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
                         struct flowi *fl)
 {
         u32 state_sid;
-        u32 pol_sid;
-        int err;
+        int rc;
 
-        if (xp->security) {
-                if (!x->security)
-                        /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
-                        return 0;
-                else
-                        state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
-                pol_sid = xp->security->ctx_sid;
-        } else
+        if (!xp->security)
                 if (x->security)
                         /* unlabeled policy and labeled SA can't match */
                         return 0;
                 else
                         /* unlabeled policy and unlabeled SA match all flows */
                         return 1;
-
-        err = avc_has_perm(state_sid, pol_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-                          NULL);
-
-        if (err)
-                return 0;
-
-        err = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-                          NULL)? 0:1;
-
-        return err;
-}
-
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a particular outgoing flow
- * can use a given security association.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct flowi *fl, struct xfrm_state *xfrm,
-                                  struct xfrm_policy *xp)
-{
-        int rc = 0;
-        u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
-
-        if (!xp->security)
-                if (!xfrm->security)
-                        return 1;
-                else
-                        return 0;
         else
-                if (!xfrm->security)
+                if (!x->security)
+                        /* unlabeled SA and labeled policy can't match */
                         return 0;
+                else
+                        if (!selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+                                /* Not a SELinux-labeled SA */
+                                return 0;
 
-        /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-        if ((ctx = xfrm->security)) {
-                if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
-                        return 0;
+        state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
 
-                sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-        }
+        if (fl->secid != state_sid)
+                return 0;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
                           ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
                           NULL)? 0:1;
 
+        /*
+         * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
+         * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
+         * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
+         * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
+         */
+
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -481,6 +450,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
                 }
         }
 
+        /*
+         * This check even when there's no association involved is
+         * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+         * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+         * explicitly allowed by policy.
+         */
+
         rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
                           ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 
@@ -492,10 +468,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * If we have no security association, then we need to determine
  * whether the socket is allowed to send to an unlabelled destination.
  * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
- * checked in xfrm_policy_lookup hook.
+ * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                        struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         struct dst_entry *dst;
         int rc = 0;
@@ -514,6 +490,27 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
                 }
         }
 
+        switch (proto) {
+        case IPPROTO_AH:
+        case IPPROTO_ESP:
+        case IPPROTO_COMP:
+                /*
+                 * We should have already seen this packet once before
+                 * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
+                 * unlabeled check.
+                 */
+                goto out;
+        default:
+                break;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * This check even when there's no association involved is
+         * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
+         * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
+         * explicitly allowed by policy.
+         */
+
         rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
                           ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 out: