Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6

Conflicts:
	drivers/mtd/mtdcore.c

Merged in order that I can apply the Nomadik nand/onenand support patches.

39 files changed, 1389 insertions, 468 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 4c865345caa0..fb363cd81cf6 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -113,6 +113,36 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
           If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config INTEL_TXT
+        bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
+        depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
+        help
+          This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
+          Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
+          Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
+          of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
+          will have no effect.
+
+          Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
+          initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
+          create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
+          helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
+          correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
+          of the kernel itself.
+
+          Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
+          confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
+          it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
+          providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
+
+          See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
+          about Intel(R) TXT.
+          See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
+          See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
+          Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
+
+          If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
         int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
         depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index b56e7f9ecbc2..95ecc06392d7 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS)		+= inode.o
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)          += selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)            += smack/built-in.o
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_AUDIT),y)
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)            += lsm_audit.o
-endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)                     += lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)           += tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG)         += root_plug.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)             += device_cgroup.o
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 88f752e8152c..fce07a7bc825 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -373,6 +373,11 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
 }
@@ -386,6 +391,10 @@ static void cap_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
 }
 
+static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -396,6 +405,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -701,10 +715,26 @@ static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 }
 
+
+
 static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
                                   struct flowi *fl)
 {
 }
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static void cap_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
+static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -792,6 +822,20 @@ static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int cap_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int cap_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
                          unsigned long flags)
@@ -815,6 +859,13 @@ static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int cap_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                     const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                     struct key *key)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -854,7 +905,7 @@ struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
 
 void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_may_access);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
@@ -940,11 +991,14 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_commit);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setuid);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setgid);
@@ -992,6 +1046,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_notifysecctx);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecctx);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecctx);
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
@@ -1020,6 +1077,9 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_post_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
@@ -1038,6 +1098,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_session_to_parent);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e3097c0a1311..fe30751a6cd9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
 }
 
 /**
- * cap_ptrace_may_access - Determine whether the current process may access
+ * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
  *                         another
  * @child: The process to be accessed
  * @mode: The mode of attachment.
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
  * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
  * granted, -ve if denied.
  */
-int cap_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
         int ret = 0;
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 4732f5e5d127..b85e61bcf246 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -249,7 +249,11 @@ void ima_counts_put(struct path *path, int mask)
         struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
         struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
 
-        if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+        /* The inode may already have been freed, freeing the iint
+         * with it. Verify the inode is not NULL before dereferencing
+         * it.
+         */
+        if (!ima_initialized || !inode || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
                 return;
         iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode);
         if (!iint)
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index 747a464943af..74d5447d7df7 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-y := \
+        gc.o \
         key.o \
         keyring.o \
         keyctl.o \
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index c766c68a63bc..792c0a611a6d 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ asmlinkage long compat_sys_keyctl(u32 option,
         case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
                 return keyctl_get_security(arg2, compat_ptr(arg3), arg4);
 
+        case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+                return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
         default:
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..485fc6233c38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/gc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* Key garbage collector
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <keys/keyring-type.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Delay between key revocation/expiry in seconds
+ */
+unsigned key_gc_delay = 5 * 60;
+
+/*
+ * Reaper
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long);
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *);
+static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func, 0, 0);
+static DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector);
+static key_serial_t key_gc_cursor; /* the last key the gc considered */
+static bool key_gc_again;
+static unsigned long key_gc_executing;
+static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+static time_t key_gc_new_timer;
+
+/*
+ * Schedule a garbage collection run
+ * - precision isn't particularly important
+ */
+void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at)
+{
+        unsigned long expires;
+        time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+
+        kenter("%ld", gc_at - now);
+
+        if (gc_at <= now) {
+                schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+        } else if (gc_at < key_gc_next_run) {
+                expires = jiffies + (gc_at - now) * HZ;
+                mod_timer(&key_gc_timer, expires);
+        }
+}
+
+/*
+ * The garbage collector timer kicked off
+ */
+static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data)
+{
+        kenter("");
+        key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX;
+        schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collect pointers from a keyring
+ * - return true if we altered the keyring
+ */
+static bool key_gc_keyring(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+        __releases(key_serial_lock)
+{
+        struct keyring_list *klist;
+        struct key *key;
+        int loop;
+
+        kenter("%x", key_serial(keyring));
+
+        if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
+                goto dont_gc;
+
+        /* scan the keyring looking for dead keys */
+        klist = rcu_dereference(keyring->payload.subscriptions);
+        if (!klist)
+                goto dont_gc;
+
+        for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+                key = klist->keys[loop];
+                if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+                    (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit))
+                        goto do_gc;
+        }
+
+dont_gc:
+        kleave(" = false");
+        return false;
+
+do_gc:
+        key_gc_cursor = keyring->serial;
+        key_get(keyring);
+        spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+        keyring_gc(keyring, limit);
+        key_put(keyring);
+        kleave(" = true");
+        return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Garbage collector for keys
+ * - this involves scanning the keyrings for dead, expired and revoked keys
+ *   that have overstayed their welcome
+ */
+static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+        struct rb_node *rb;
+        key_serial_t cursor;
+        struct key *key, *xkey;
+        time_t new_timer = LONG_MAX, limit, now;
+
+        now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec;
+        kenter("[%x,%ld]", key_gc_cursor, key_gc_new_timer - now);
+
+        if (test_and_set_bit(0, &key_gc_executing)) {
+                key_schedule_gc(current_kernel_time().tv_sec + 1);
+                kleave(" [busy; deferring]");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        limit = now;
+        if (limit > key_gc_delay)
+                limit -= key_gc_delay;
+        else
+                limit = key_gc_delay;
+
+        spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
+
+        if (unlikely(RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&key_serial_tree))) {
+                spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+                clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+                return;
+        }
+
+        cursor = key_gc_cursor;
+        if (cursor < 0)
+                cursor = 0;
+        if (cursor > 0)
+                new_timer = key_gc_new_timer;
+        else
+                key_gc_again = false;
+
+        /* find the first key above the cursor */
+        key = NULL;
+        rb = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+        while (rb) {
+                xkey = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+                if (cursor < xkey->serial) {
+                        key = xkey;
+                        rb = rb->rb_left;
+                } else if (cursor > xkey->serial) {
+                        rb = rb->rb_right;
+                } else {
+                        rb = rb_next(rb);
+                        if (!rb)
+                                goto reached_the_end;
+                        key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+                        break;
+                }
+        }
+
+        if (!key)
+                goto reached_the_end;
+
+        /* trawl through the keys looking for keyrings */
+        for (;;) {
+                if (key->expiry > now && key->expiry < new_timer) {
+                        kdebug("will expire %x in %ld",
+                               key_serial(key), key->expiry - now);
+                        new_timer = key->expiry;
+                }
+
+                if (key->type == &key_type_keyring &&
+                    key_gc_keyring(key, limit))
+                        /* the gc had to release our lock so that the keyring
+                         * could be modified, so we have to get it again */
+                        goto gc_released_our_lock;
+
+                rb = rb_next(&key->serial_node);
+                if (!rb)
+                        goto reached_the_end;
+                key = rb_entry(rb, struct key, serial_node);
+        }
+
+gc_released_our_lock:
+        kdebug("gc_released_our_lock");
+        key_gc_new_timer = new_timer;
+        key_gc_again = true;
+        clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+        schedule_work(&key_gc_work);
+        kleave(" [continue]");
+        return;
+
+        /* when we reach the end of the run, we set the timer for the next one */
+reached_the_end:
+        kdebug("reached_the_end");
+        spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
+        key_gc_new_timer = new_timer;
+        key_gc_cursor = 0;
+        clear_bit(0, &key_gc_executing);
+
+        if (key_gc_again) {
+                /* there may have been a key that expired whilst we were
+                 * scanning, so if we discarded any links we should do another
+                 * scan */
+                new_timer = now + 1;
+                key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+        } else if (new_timer < LONG_MAX) {
+                new_timer += key_gc_delay;
+                key_schedule_gc(new_timer);
+        }
+        kleave(" [end]");
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 9fb679c66b8a..24ba0307b7ad 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -124,11 +124,18 @@ extern struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type,
                                         struct key *dest_keyring,
                                         unsigned long flags);
 
-extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
                                  key_perm_t perm);
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE       0x01
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL      0x02
+#define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK   0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
 
+extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
+extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit);
+extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t expiry_at);
+
 /*
  * check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way
  */
@@ -194,6 +201,7 @@ extern long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t, unsigned);
 extern long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t);
 extern long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer,
                                 size_t buflen);
+extern long keyctl_session_to_parent(void);
 
 /*
  * debugging key validation
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 4a1297d1ada4..e50d264c9ad1 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
                 set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
                 now = current_kernel_time();
                 key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
+                key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
 
                 if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags))
                         awaken = 1;
@@ -642,10 +643,8 @@ struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id)
         goto error;
 
  found:
-        /* pretend it doesn't exist if it's dead */
-        if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0 ||
-            test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
-            key->type == &key_type_dead)
+        /* pretend it doesn't exist if it is awaiting deletion */
+        if (atomic_read(&key->usage) == 0)
                 goto not_found;
 
         /* this races with key_put(), but that doesn't matter since key_put()
@@ -890,6 +889,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
  */
 void key_revoke(struct key *key)
 {
+        struct timespec now;
+        time_t time;
+
         key_check(key);
 
         /* make sure no one's trying to change or use the key when we mark it
@@ -902,6 +904,14 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key)
             key->type->revoke)
                 key->type->revoke(key);
 
+        /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */
+        now = current_kernel_time();
+        time = now.tv_sec;
+        if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) {
+                key->revoked_at = time;
+                key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay);
+        }
+
         up_write(&key->sem);
 
 } /* end key_revoke() */
@@ -958,8 +968,10 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
         for (_n = rb_first(&key_serial_tree); _n; _n = rb_next(_n)) {
                 key = rb_entry(_n, struct key, serial_node);
 
-                if (key->type == ktype)
+                if (key->type == ktype) {
                         key->type = &key_type_dead;
+                        set_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags);
+                }
         }
 
         spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
@@ -984,6 +996,8 @@ void unregister_key_type(struct key_type *ktype)
         spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
         up_write(&key_types_sem);
 
+        key_schedule_gc(0);
+
 } /* end unregister_key_type() */
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_key_type);
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 7f09fb897d2b..2fb28efc5326 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
         }
 
         /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error3;
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
         /* get the destination keyring if specified */
         dest_ref = NULL;
         if (destringid) {
-                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+                                           KEY_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
                         goto error3;
@@ -233,9 +234,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
 long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
 {
         key_ref_t key_ref;
+        unsigned long lflags;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, create, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+        lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -309,7 +312,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
         }
 
         /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -337,10 +340,16 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
         key_ref_t key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
-                goto error;
+                if (ret != -EACCES)
+                        goto error;
+                key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+                if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
+                        ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
+                        goto error;
+                }
         }
 
         key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
@@ -363,7 +372,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -389,13 +398,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
         }
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 0, KEY_LINK);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -423,13 +432,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
         }
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, 0, 0);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -465,7 +474,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
         char *tmpbuf;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
                  * authorisation token handy */
@@ -474,7 +483,8 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
                         if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
                                 key_put(instkey);
                                 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
-                                                          0, 1, 0);
+                                                          KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                                          0);
                                 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
                                         goto okay;
                         }
@@ -558,7 +568,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
         }
 
         /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -567,7 +577,8 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
         /* get the destination keyring if specified */
         dest_ref = NULL;
         if (destringid) {
-                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+                dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
+                                           KEY_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
                         goto error3;
@@ -637,7 +648,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
         long ret;
 
         /* find the key first */
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0, 0);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = -ENOKEY;
                 goto error;
@@ -700,7 +711,8 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
         if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
                 goto error;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                  KEY_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -805,7 +817,8 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
         if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
                 goto error;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                  KEY_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -847,7 +860,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
 
         /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
         if (ringid > 0) {
-                dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 1, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+                dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dkref))
                         return PTR_ERR(dkref);
                 *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1083,7 +1096,8 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
         time_t expiry;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 1, 1, KEY_SETATTR);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
+                                  KEY_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -1101,6 +1115,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
         }
 
         key->expiry = expiry;
+        key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
 
         up_write(&key->sem);
         key_put(key);
@@ -1170,7 +1185,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
         char *context;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, KEY_VIEW);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
                         return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1182,7 +1197,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
                         return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 key_put(instkey);
 
-                key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 1, 0);
+                key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
                 if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
                         return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
         }
@@ -1213,6 +1228,106 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
         return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
+ * parent process
+ * - the keyring must exist and must grant us LINK permission
+ * - implements keyctl(KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT)
+ */
+long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
+{
+        struct task_struct *me, *parent;
+        const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
+        struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+        key_ref_t keyring_r;
+        int ret;
+
+        keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+        if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
+                return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
+
+        /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
+         * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
+         * our parent */
+        ret = -ENOMEM;
+        cred = cred_alloc_blank();
+        if (!cred)
+                goto error_keyring;
+
+        cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
+        keyring_r = NULL;
+
+        me = current;
+        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+        parent = me->real_parent;
+        ret = -EPERM;
+
+        /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
+        if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the parent must be single threaded */
+        if (atomic_read(&parent->signal->count) != 1)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
+         * there's no point */
+        mycred = current_cred();
+        pcred = __task_cred(parent);
+        if (mycred == pcred ||
+            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
+                goto already_same;
+
+        /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
+         * SUID/SGID */
+        if (pcred-> uid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred->euid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred->suid != mycred->euid ||
+            pcred-> gid != mycred->egid ||
+            pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
+            pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
+        if (pcred ->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid ||
+            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* the LSM must permit the replacement of the parent's keyring with the
+         * keyring from this process */
+        ret = security_key_session_to_parent(mycred, pcred,
+                                             key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r));
+        if (ret < 0)
+                goto not_permitted;
+
+        /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
+         * that */
+        oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+
+        /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
+         * restarting */
+        parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
+        cred = NULL;
+        set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
+
+        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        if (oldcred)
+                put_cred(oldcred);
+        return 0;
+
+already_same:
+        ret = 0;
+not_permitted:
+        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        put_cred(cred);
+        return ret;
+
+error_keyring:
+        key_ref_put(keyring_r);
+        return ret;
+}
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * the key control system call
@@ -1298,6 +1413,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
                                            (char __user *) arg3,
                                            (size_t) arg4);
 
+        case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
+                return keyctl_session_to_parent();
+
         default:
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
         }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 3dba81c2eba3..8ec02746ca99 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -1000,3 +1000,102 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring)
         }
 
 } /* end keyring_revoke() */
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether a key is dead
+ */
+static bool key_is_dead(struct key *key, time_t limit)
+{
+        return test_bit(KEY_FLAG_DEAD, &key->flags) ||
+                (key->expiry > 0 && key->expiry <= limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect garbage from the contents of a keyring
+ */
+void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit)
+{
+        struct keyring_list *klist, *new;
+        struct key *key;
+        int loop, keep, max;
+
+        kenter("{%x,%s}", key_serial(keyring), keyring->description);
+
+        down_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+        klist = keyring->payload.subscriptions;
+        if (!klist)
+                goto no_klist;
+
+        /* work out how many subscriptions we're keeping */
+        keep = 0;
+        for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--)
+                if (!key_is_dead(klist->keys[loop], limit))
+                        keep++;
+
+        if (keep == klist->nkeys)
+                goto just_return;
+
+        /* allocate a new keyring payload */
+        max = roundup(keep, 4);
+        new = kmalloc(sizeof(struct keyring_list) + max * sizeof(struct key *),
+                      GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!new)
+                goto nomem;
+        new->maxkeys = max;
+        new->nkeys = 0;
+        new->delkey = 0;
+
+        /* install the live keys
+         * - must take care as expired keys may be updated back to life
+         */
+        keep = 0;
+        for (loop = klist->nkeys - 1; loop >= 0; loop--) {
+                key = klist->keys[loop];
+                if (!key_is_dead(key, limit)) {
+                        if (keep >= max)
+                                goto discard_new;
+                        new->keys[keep++] = key_get(key);
+                }
+        }
+        new->nkeys = keep;
+
+        /* adjust the quota */
+        key_payload_reserve(keyring,
+                            sizeof(struct keyring_list) +
+                            KEYQUOTA_LINK_BYTES * keep);
+
+        if (keep == 0) {
+                rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, NULL);
+                kfree(new);
+        } else {
+                rcu_assign_pointer(keyring->payload.subscriptions, new);
+        }
+
+        up_write(&keyring->sem);
+
+        call_rcu(&klist->rcu, keyring_clear_rcu_disposal);
+        kleave(" [yes]");
+        return;
+
+discard_new:
+        new->nkeys = keep;
+        keyring_clear_rcu_disposal(&new->rcu);
+        up_write(&keyring->sem);
+        kleave(" [discard]");
+        return;
+
+just_return:
+        up_write(&keyring->sem);
+        kleave(" [no dead]");
+        return;
+
+no_klist:
+        up_write(&keyring->sem);
+        kleave(" [no_klist]");
+        return;
+
+nomem:
+        up_write(&keyring->sem);
+        kleave(" [oom]");
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 769f9bdfd2b3..9d01021ca0c8 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -91,59 +91,94 @@ __initcall(key_proc_init);
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
 
-static struct rb_node *__key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
 {
+        struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+
+        n = rb_next(n);
         while (n) {
                 struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
-                if (key->user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+                if (key->user->user_ns == user_ns)
                         break;
                 n = rb_next(n);
         }
         return n;
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-        return __key_serial_next(rb_next(n));
+        return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
 }
 
-static struct rb_node *key_serial_first(struct rb_root *r)
+static struct key *find_ge_key(key_serial_t id)
 {
-        struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
-        return __key_serial_next(n);
-}
+        struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+        struct rb_node *n = key_serial_tree.rb_node;
+        struct key *minkey = NULL;
 
-static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
-        return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
+        while (n) {
+                struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+                if (id < key->serial) {
+                        if (!minkey || minkey->serial > key->serial)
+                                minkey = key;
+                        n = n->rb_left;
+                } else if (id > key->serial) {
+                        n = n->rb_right;
+                } else {
+                        minkey = key;
+                        break;
+                }
+                key = NULL;
+        }
 
+        if (!minkey)
+                return NULL;
+
+        for (;;) {
+                if (minkey->user->user_ns == user_ns)
+                        return minkey;
+                n = rb_next(&minkey->serial_node);
+                if (!n)
+                        return NULL;
+                minkey = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+        }
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+        __acquires(key_serial_lock)
 {
-        struct rb_node *_p;
-        loff_t pos = *_pos;
+        key_serial_t pos = *_pos;
+        struct key *key;
 
         spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
 
-        _p = key_serial_first(&key_serial_tree);
-        while (pos > 0 && _p) {
-                pos--;
-                _p = key_serial_next(_p);
-        }
-
-        return _p;
+        if (*_pos > INT_MAX)
+                return NULL;
+        key = find_ge_key(pos);
+        if (!key)
+                return NULL;
+        *_pos = key->serial;
+        return &key->serial_node;
+}
 
+static inline key_serial_t key_node_serial(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+        struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+        return key->serial;
 }
 
 static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
-        (*_pos)++;
-        return key_serial_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+        struct rb_node *n;
 
+        n = key_serial_next(v);
+        if (n)
+                *_pos = key_node_serial(n);
+        return n;
 }
 
 static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+        __releases(key_serial_lock)
 {
         spin_unlock(&key_serial_lock);
 }
@@ -174,11 +209,9 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
         /* come up with a suitable timeout value */
         if (key->expiry == 0) {
                 memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5);
-        }
-        else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
+        } else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) {
                 memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5);
-        }
-        else {
+        } else {
                 timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec;
 
                 if (timo < 60)
@@ -218,9 +251,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
         seq_putc(m, '\n');
 
         rcu_read_unlock();
-
         return 0;
-
 }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
@@ -246,6 +277,7 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
         struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
         return __key_user_next(n);
 }
+
 /*****************************************************************************/
 /*
  * implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users
@@ -253,10 +285,10 @@ static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
 static int proc_key_users_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
         return seq_open(file, &proc_key_users_ops);
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
+        __acquires(key_user_lock)
 {
         struct rb_node *_p;
         loff_t pos = *_pos;
@@ -270,17 +302,16 @@ static void *proc_key_users_start(struct seq_file *p, loff_t *_pos)
         }
 
         return _p;
-
 }
 
 static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
 {
         (*_pos)++;
         return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
-
 }
 
 static void proc_key_users_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
+        __releases(key_user_lock)
 {
         spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 276d27882ce8..5c23afb31ece 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int lookup_user_key_possessed(const struct key *key, const void *target)
  * - don't create special keyrings unless so requested
  * - partially constructed keys aren't found unless requested
  */
-key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, int create, int partial,
+key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,
                           key_perm_t perm)
 {
         struct request_key_auth *rka;
@@ -503,7 +504,7 @@ try_again:
         switch (id) {
         case KEY_SPEC_THREAD_KEYRING:
                 if (!cred->thread_keyring) {
-                        if (!create)
+                        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
                                 goto error;
 
                         ret = install_thread_keyring();
@@ -521,7 +522,7 @@ try_again:
 
         case KEY_SPEC_PROCESS_KEYRING:
                 if (!cred->tgcred->process_keyring) {
-                        if (!create)
+                        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE))
                                 goto error;
 
                         ret = install_process_keyring();
@@ -642,7 +643,14 @@ try_again:
                 break;
         }
 
-        if (!partial) {
+        /* unlink does not use the nominated key in any way, so can skip all
+         * the permission checks as it is only concerned with the keyring */
+        if (lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK) {
+                ret = 0;
+                goto error;
+        }
+
+        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL)) {
                 ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true);
                 switch (ret) {
                 case -ERESTARTSYS:
@@ -660,7 +668,8 @@ try_again:
         }
 
         ret = -EIO;
-        if (!partial && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
+        if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) &&
+            !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags))
                 goto invalid_key;
 
         /* check the permissions */
@@ -702,7 +711,7 @@ long join_session_keyring(const char *name)
         /* only permit this if there's a single thread in the thread group -
          * this avoids us having to adjust the creds on all threads and risking
          * ENOMEM */
-        if (!is_single_threaded(current))
+        if (!current_is_single_threaded())
                 return -EMLINK;
 
         new = prepare_creds();
@@ -760,3 +769,51 @@ error:
         abort_creds(new);
         return ret;
 }
+
+/*
+ * Replace a process's session keyring when that process resumes userspace on
+ * behalf of one of its children
+ */
+void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+{
+        const struct cred *old;
+        struct cred *new;
+
+        if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
+                return;
+
+        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+        new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
+        current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
+        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+        if (!new)
+                return;
+
+        old = current_cred();
+        new->  uid      = old->  uid;
+        new-> euid      = old-> euid;
+        new-> suid      = old-> suid;
+        new->fsuid      = old->fsuid;
+        new->  gid      = old->  gid;
+        new-> egid      = old-> egid;
+        new-> sgid      = old-> sgid;
+        new->fsgid      = old->fsgid;
+        new->user       = get_uid(old->user);
+        new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
+
+        new->securebits = old->securebits;
+        new->cap_inheritable    = old->cap_inheritable;
+        new->cap_permitted      = old->cap_permitted;
+        new->cap_effective      = old->cap_effective;
+        new->cap_bset           = old->cap_bset;
+
+        new->jit_keyring        = old->jit_keyring;
+        new->thread_keyring     = key_get(old->thread_keyring);
+        new->tgcred->tgid       = old->tgcred->tgid;
+        new->tgcred->process_keyring = key_get(old->tgcred->process_keyring);
+
+        security_transfer_creds(new, old);
+
+        commit_creds(new);
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index b611d493c2d8..5e05dc09e2db 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
+static const int zero, one = 1, max = INT_MAX;
+
 ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -20,7 +22,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -28,7 +32,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_maxbytes,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -36,7 +42,9 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_root_maxkeys,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         {
                 .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
@@ -44,7 +52,19 @@ ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
                 .data = &key_quota_root_maxbytes,
                 .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
                 .mode = 0644,
-                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &one,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
+        },
+        {
+                .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+                .procname = "gc_delay",
+                .data = &key_gc_delay,
+                .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned),
+                .mode = 0644,
+                .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1 = (void *) &zero,
+                .extra2 = (void *) &max,
         },
         { .ctl_name = 0 }
 };
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 94b868494b31..500aad0ebd6a 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
         }
 
         switch (a->type) {
+        case LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT:
+                return;
         case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
                 audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d ", a->u.ipc_id);
                 break;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index dc7674fbfc7a..c4c673240c1c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -124,9 +124,9 @@ int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 
 /* Security operations */
 
-int security_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
+int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
-        return security_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+        return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
@@ -684,6 +684,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+}
+
 void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
         security_ops->cred_free(cred);
@@ -699,6 +704,11 @@ void security_commit_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
         security_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
 }
 
+void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+}
+
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
         return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
@@ -709,6 +719,11 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+        return security_ops->kernel_module_request();
+}
+
 int security_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
 {
         return security_ops->task_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
@@ -959,6 +974,24 @@ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
 
+int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
+
+int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
+
+int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
 int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
@@ -1112,6 +1145,24 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
         security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
 }
 
+int security_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+        return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
+
+void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create);
+
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
+
 #endif  /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1218,6 +1269,13 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
         return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
 }
 
+int security_key_session_to_parent(const struct cred *cred,
+                                   const struct cred *parent_cred,
+                                   struct key *key)
+{
+        return security_ops->key_session_to_parent(cred, parent_cred, key);
+}
+
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index b2ab60859832..1ed0f076aadc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  * @tclass: target security class
  * @av: access vector
  */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
+static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
 {
         const char **common_pts = NULL;
         u32 common_base = 0;
@@ -492,23 +492,35 @@ out:
         return node;
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv6_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab,
-                                       struct in6_addr *addr, __be16 port,
-                                       char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_pre_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_pre_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-        if (!ipv6_addr_any(addr))
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI6", name1, addr);
-        if (port)
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+        audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ",
+                         ad->selinux_audit_data.denied ? "denied" : "granted");
+        avc_dump_av(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass,
+                        ad->selinux_audit_data.audited);
+        audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
 }
 
-static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
-                                       __be16 port, char *name1, char *name2)
+/**
+ * avc_audit_post_callback - SELinux specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab: the audit buffer
+ * @a: audit_data
+ */
+static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
-        if (addr)
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%pI4", name1, &addr);
-        if (port)
-                audit_log_format(ab, " %s=%d", name2, ntohs(port));
+        struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+        audit_log_format(ab, " ");
+        avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data.ssid,
+                           ad->selinux_audit_data.tsid,
+                           ad->selinux_audit_data.tclass);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -532,13 +544,10 @@ static inline void avc_print_ipv4_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, __be32 addr,
  */
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *a)
+               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct common_audit_data *a)
 {
-        struct task_struct *tsk = current;
-        struct inode *inode = NULL;
+        struct common_audit_data stack_data;
         u32 denied, audited;
-        struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
         denied = requested & ~avd->allowed;
         if (denied) {
                 audited = denied;
@@ -551,144 +560,20 @@ void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                 if (!(audited & avd->auditallow))
                         return;
         }
-
-        ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_AVC);
-        if (!ab)
-                return;         /* audit_panic has been called */
-        audit_log_format(ab, "avc:  %s ", denied ? "denied" : "granted");
-        avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, audited);
-        audit_log_format(ab, " for ");
-        if (a && a->tsk)
-                tsk = a->tsk;
-        if (tsk && tsk->pid) {
-                audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", tsk->pid);
-                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, tsk->comm);
-        }
-        if (a) {
-                switch (a->type) {
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC:
-                        audit_log_format(ab, " key=%d", a->u.ipc_id);
-                        break;
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP:
-                        audit_log_format(ab, " capability=%d", a->u.cap);
-                        break;
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS:
-                        if (a->u.fs.path.dentry) {
-                                struct dentry *dentry = a->u.fs.path.dentry;
-                                if (a->u.fs.path.mnt) {
-                                        audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-                                                         &a->u.fs.path);
-                                } else {
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-                                        audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-                                }
-                                inode = dentry->d_inode;
-                        } else if (a->u.fs.inode) {
-                                struct dentry *dentry;
-                                inode = a->u.fs.inode;
-                                dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
-                                if (dentry) {
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
-                                        audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, dentry->d_name.name);
-                                        dput(dentry);
-                                }
-                        }
-                        if (inode)
-                                audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
-                                                 inode->i_sb->s_id,
-                                                 inode->i_ino);
-                        break;
-                case AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET:
-                        if (a->u.net.sk) {
-                                struct sock *sk = a->u.net.sk;
-                                struct unix_sock *u;
-                                int len = 0;
-                                char *p = NULL;
-
-                                switch (sk->sk_family) {
-                                case AF_INET: {
-                                        struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-
-                                        avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->rcv_saddr,
-                                                            inet->sport,
-                                                            "laddr", "lport");
-                                        avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, inet->daddr,
-                                                            inet->dport,
-                                                            "faddr", "fport");
-                                        break;
-                                }
-                                case AF_INET6: {
-                                        struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
-                                        struct ipv6_pinfo *inet6 = inet6_sk(sk);
-
-                                        avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->rcv_saddr,
-                                                            inet->sport,
-                                                            "laddr", "lport");
-                                        avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &inet6->daddr,
-                                                            inet->dport,
-                                                            "faddr", "fport");
-                                        break;
-                                }
-                                case AF_UNIX:
-                                        u = unix_sk(sk);
-                                        if (u->dentry) {
-                                                struct path path = {
-                                                        .dentry = u->dentry,
-                                                        .mnt = u->mnt
-                                                };
-                                                audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=",
-                                                                 &path);
-                                                break;
-                                        }
-                                        if (!u->addr)
-                                                break;
-                                        len = u->addr->len-sizeof(short);
-                                        p = &u->addr->name->sun_path[0];
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " path=");
-                                        if (*p)
-                                                audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
-                                        else
-                                                audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
-                                        break;
-                                }
-                        }
-
-                        switch (a->u.net.family) {
-                        case AF_INET:
-                                avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.saddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.sport,
-                                                    "saddr", "src");
-                                avc_print_ipv4_addr(ab, a->u.net.v4info.daddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.dport,
-                                                    "daddr", "dest");
-                                break;
-                        case AF_INET6:
-                                avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.saddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.sport,
-                                                    "saddr", "src");
-                                avc_print_ipv6_addr(ab, &a->u.net.v6info.daddr,
-                                                    a->u.net.dport,
-                                                    "daddr", "dest");
-                                break;
-                        }
-                        if (a->u.net.netif > 0) {
-                                struct net_device *dev;
-
-                                /* NOTE: we always use init's namespace */
-                                dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net,
-                                                       a->u.net.netif);
-                                if (dev) {
-                                        audit_log_format(ab, " netif=%s",
-                                                         dev->name);
-                                        dev_put(dev);
-                                }
-                        }
-                        break;
-                }
+        if (!a) {
+                a = &stack_data;
+                memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
+                a->type = LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT;
         }
-        audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-        avc_dump_query(ab, ssid, tsid, tclass);
-        audit_log_end(ab);
+        a->selinux_audit_data.tclass = tclass;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.requested = requested;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.ssid = ssid;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.tsid = tsid;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.audited = audited;
+        a->selinux_audit_data.denied = denied;
+        a->lsm_pre_audit = avc_audit_pre_callback;
+        a->lsm_post_audit = avc_audit_post_callback;
+        common_lsm_audit(a);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -824,18 +709,16 @@ out:
 }
 
 /**
- * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
- * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ * avc_flush - Flush the cache
  */
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+static void avc_flush(void)
 {
-        struct avc_callback_node *c;
-        int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
-        unsigned long flag;
-        struct avc_node *node;
         struct hlist_head *head;
         struct hlist_node *next;
+        struct avc_node *node;
         spinlock_t *lock;
+        unsigned long flag;
+        int i;
 
         for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
                 head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
@@ -852,6 +735,18 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
         }
+}
+
+/**
+ * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @seqno: policy sequence number
+ */
+int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+{
+        struct avc_callback_node *c;
+        int rc = 0, tmprc;
+
+        avc_flush();
 
         for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
                 if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
@@ -956,7 +851,7 @@ out:
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-                 u32 requested, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata)
+                 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
 {
         struct av_decision avd;
         int rc;
@@ -970,3 +865,11 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
 {
         return avc_cache.latest_notif;
 }
+
+void avc_disable(void)
+{
+        avc_flush();
+        synchronize_rcu();
+        if (avc_node_cachep)
+                kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
index c73aeaa008e8..c0a454aee1e0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/exports.c
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -63,3 +63,9 @@ void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
         atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_secmark_refcount_dec);
+
+bool selinux_is_enabled(void)
+{
+        return selinux_enabled;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(selinux_is_enabled);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 8d8b69c5664e..417f7c994522 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@
  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
- *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
- *              Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *      Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  *
@@ -448,6 +448,10 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
             sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
                 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 
+        /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
+        if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
+                sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
         /* Initialize the root inode. */
         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 
@@ -1479,14 +1483,14 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
                                const struct cred *cred,
                                int cap, int audit)
 {
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         struct av_decision avd;
         u16 sclass;
         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
         int rc;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
         ad.tsk = tsk;
         ad.u.cap = cap;
 
@@ -1525,12 +1529,14 @@ static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
                           struct inode *inode,
                           u32 perms,
-                          struct avc_audit_data *adp)
+                          struct common_audit_data *adp)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid;
 
+        validate_creds(cred);
+
         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
                 return 0;
 
@@ -1539,7 +1545,7 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 
         if (!adp) {
                 adp = &ad;
-                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
         }
 
@@ -1555,9 +1561,9 @@ static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
                                   u32 av)
 {
         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
@@ -1577,11 +1583,11 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 {
         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
         int rc;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
 
         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
@@ -1612,7 +1618,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
         u32 sid, newsid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int rc;
 
         dsec = dir->i_security;
@@ -1621,7 +1627,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         sid = tsec->sid;
         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1665,7 +1671,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         u32 av;
         int rc;
@@ -1673,7 +1679,7 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
         dsec = dir->i_security;
         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
         av = DIR__SEARCH;
@@ -1708,7 +1714,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         u32 av;
         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
@@ -1719,7 +1725,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
@@ -1761,7 +1767,7 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
                                struct super_block *sb,
                                u32 perms,
-                               struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                               struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
@@ -1855,12 +1861,12 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 
 /* Hook functions begin here. */
 
-static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
+static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
                                      unsigned int mode)
 {
         int rc;
 
-        rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -2101,7 +2107,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
         int rc;
 
@@ -2139,7 +2145,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                         return rc;
         }
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
 
         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
@@ -2232,7 +2238,7 @@ extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                                             struct files_struct *files)
 {
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
         struct tty_struct *tty;
         struct fdtable *fdt;
@@ -2266,7 +2272,7 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
 
         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
 
         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
         for (;;) {
@@ -2515,7 +2521,7 @@ out:
 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int rc;
 
         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
@@ -2526,7 +2532,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
                 return 0;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
 }
@@ -2534,9 +2540,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
 }
@@ -2711,12 +2717,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+        unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
+
+        /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
+        if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
+                ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
+                              ATTR_FORCE);
+                if (!ia_valid)
+                        return 0;
+        }
 
-        if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
-                return 0;
-
-        if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
-                               ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
+        if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
+                        ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
@@ -2756,7 +2768,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
         int rc = 0;
 
@@ -2770,7 +2782,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
                 return -EPERM;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
@@ -2915,6 +2927,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
                 return rc;
 
         isec->sid = newsid;
+        isec->initialized = 1;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2939,11 +2952,6 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 
-        if (!mask) {
-                /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
-                return 0;
-        }
-
         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
@@ -2954,10 +2962,20 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
+        struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+        struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+        struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+        u32 sid = current_sid();
+
         if (!mask)
                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
                 return 0;
 
+        if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
+            fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+                /* No change since dentry_open check. */
+                return 0;
+
         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -3220,12 +3238,29 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 }
 
 /*
+ * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+        tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+        if (!tsec)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        cred->security = tsec;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/*
  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
  */
 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-        cred->security = NULL;
+
+        BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
+        cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
         kfree(tsec);
 }
 
@@ -3249,6 +3284,17 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 }
 
 /*
+ * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
+
+        *tsec = *old_tsec;
+}
+
+/*
  * set the security data for a kernel service
  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
  */
@@ -3292,6 +3338,11 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(void)
+{
+        return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST);
+}
+
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
@@ -3409,7 +3460,7 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
@@ -3490,7 +3541,7 @@ out:
 
 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
 {
         u8 nexthdr;
         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
@@ -3561,7 +3612,7 @@ out:
 
 #endif /* IPV6 */
 
-static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
+static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
 {
         char *addrp;
@@ -3643,7 +3694,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
                            u32 perms)
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid;
         int err = 0;
 
@@ -3653,7 +3704,7 @@ static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
                 goto out;
         sid = task_sid(task);
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
         err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 
@@ -3740,7 +3791,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
                 char *addrp;
                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-                struct avc_audit_data ad;
+                struct common_audit_data ad;
                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
                 unsigned short snum;
@@ -3769,7 +3820,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
                                                       snum, &sid);
                                 if (err)
                                         goto out;
-                                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+                                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
                                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
                                 ad.u.net.family = family;
                                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
@@ -3802,7 +3853,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
                 if (err)
                         goto out;
 
-                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
                 ad.u.net.family = family;
 
@@ -3836,7 +3887,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
-                struct avc_audit_data ad;
+                struct common_audit_data ad;
                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
                 unsigned short snum;
@@ -3861,7 +3912,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
 
-                AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+                COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
@@ -3951,13 +4002,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int err;
 
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -3983,13 +4034,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 {
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         int err;
 
         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
 
         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
@@ -4002,7 +4053,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 
 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
                                     u32 peer_sid,
-                                    struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                    struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         int err;
         u32 if_sid;
@@ -4030,10 +4081,10 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
         u32 peer_sid;
         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4071,7 +4122,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
         u8 secmark_active;
         u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4095,7 +4146,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
                 return 0;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
@@ -4309,6 +4360,59 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
         fl->secid = req->secid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
+{
+        u32 sid = current_sid();
+
+        /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
+         * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
+         * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
+         * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
+         * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
+         * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
+
+        return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+                            NULL);
+}
+
+static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+        /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
+         * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
+         * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
+         * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
+         * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
+         * protocols were being used */
+
+        /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
+         * the sockcreate SID here */
+
+        sksec->sid = current_sid();
+        sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
+}
+
+static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+{
+        struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+        u32 sid = current_sid();
+        int err;
+
+        err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+                           TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
+        if (err)
+                return err;
+        err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+                           TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+        if (err)
+                return err;
+
+        sksec->sid = sid;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
         int err = 0;
@@ -4353,7 +4457,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
         int err;
         char *addrp;
         u32 peer_sid;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u8 secmark_active;
         u8 netlbl_active;
         u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4370,7 +4474,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
                 return NF_DROP;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
@@ -4458,7 +4562,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
         u8 proto;
 
@@ -4466,7 +4570,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
                 return NF_ACCEPT;
         sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
@@ -4490,7 +4594,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
         u32 secmark_perm;
         u32 peer_sid;
         struct sock *sk;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         char *addrp;
         u8 secmark_active;
         u8 peerlbl_active;
@@ -4549,7 +4653,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
         }
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
         ad.u.net.family = family;
         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
@@ -4619,13 +4723,13 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 {
         int err;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
 
         err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
         if (err)
                 return err;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
         ad.u.cap = capability;
 
         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
@@ -4684,12 +4788,12 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
                         u32 perms)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = ipc_perms->security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
@@ -4709,7 +4813,7 @@ static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4719,7 +4823,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4739,12 +4843,12 @@ static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
@@ -4783,7 +4887,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4804,7 +4908,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
                         return rc;
         }
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
@@ -4828,14 +4932,14 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
         int rc;
 
         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
         msec = msg->security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
@@ -4850,7 +4954,7 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4860,7 +4964,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 
         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4880,12 +4984,12 @@ static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
@@ -4942,7 +5046,7 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
         int rc;
 
@@ -4952,7 +5056,7 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 
         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -4972,12 +5076,12 @@ static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
 {
         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
-        struct avc_audit_data ad;
+        struct common_audit_data ad;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
 
         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
 
-        AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
+        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
 
         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
@@ -5195,7 +5299,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 
                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
                 error = -EPERM;
-                if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+                if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
                         if (error)
                                 goto abort_change;
@@ -5252,6 +5356,32 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
         kfree(secdata);
 }
 
+/*
+ *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *      called with inode->i_mutex locked
+ */
+static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        int len = 0;
+        len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
+                                                ctx, true);
+        if (len < 0)
+                return len;
+        *ctxlen = len;
+        return 0;
+}
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 
 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
@@ -5323,7 +5453,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .name =                         "selinux",
 
-        .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
+        .ptrace_access_check =          selinux_ptrace_access_check,
         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
         .capset =                       selinux_capset,
@@ -5396,10 +5526,13 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
 
         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
+        .cred_alloc_blank =             selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_transfer =                selinux_cred_transfer,
         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
+        .kernel_module_request =        selinux_kernel_module_request,
         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
@@ -5448,6 +5581,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
+        .inode_notifysecctx =           selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
+        .inode_setsecctx =              selinux_inode_setsecctx,
+        .inode_getsecctx =              selinux_inode_getsecctx,
 
         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
@@ -5477,6 +5613,9 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
+        .tun_dev_create =               selinux_tun_dev_create,
+        .tun_dev_post_create =          selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
+        .tun_dev_attach =               selinux_tun_dev_attach,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
@@ -5691,6 +5830,9 @@ int selinux_disable(void)
         selinux_disabled = 1;
         selinux_enabled = 0;
 
+        /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
+        avc_disable();
+
         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
         security_ops = secondary_ops;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
index 8377a4ba3b95..abedcd704dae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_inherit.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
+   S_(SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, socket, 0x00400000UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_IPC, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_SEM, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
    S_(SECCLASS_MSGQ, ipc, 0x00000200UL)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
index 31df1d7c1aee..2b683ad83d21 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, "syslog_read")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, "syslog_mod")
    S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE, "syslog_console")
+   S_(SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, "module_request")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__CHOWN, "chown")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE, "dac_override")
    S_(SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH, "dac_read_search")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index d645192ee950..0546d616ccac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -423,6 +423,28 @@
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG               0x00080000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG               0x00100000UL
 #define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND              0x00200000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL                         0x00000001UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__READ                          0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE                         0x00000004UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE                        0x00000008UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR                       0x00000010UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR                       0x00000020UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK                          0x00000040UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM                   0x00000080UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO                     0x00000100UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND                        0x00000200UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND                          0x00000400UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT                       0x00000800UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN                        0x00001000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT                        0x00002000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT                        0x00004000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT                        0x00008000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN                      0x00010000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM                      0x00020000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO                        0x00040000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG                      0x00080000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG                      0x00100000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND                     0x00200000UL
 #define PROCESS__FORK                             0x00000001UL
 #define PROCESS__TRANSITION                       0x00000002UL
 #define PROCESS__SIGCHLD                          0x00000004UL
@@ -508,6 +530,7 @@
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ                       0x00000002UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD                        0x00000004UL
 #define SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE                    0x00000008UL
+#define SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST                    0x00000010UL
 #define CAPABILITY__CHOWN                         0x00000001UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_OVERRIDE                  0x00000002UL
 #define CAPABILITY__DAC_READ_SEARCH               0x00000004UL
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index d12ff1a9c0aa..e94e82f73818 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
 #include <linux/in6.h>
 #include <linux/path.h>
 #include <asm/system.h>
@@ -36,48 +37,6 @@ struct inode;
 struct sock;
 struct sk_buff;
 
-/* Auxiliary data to use in generating the audit record. */
-struct avc_audit_data {
-        char    type;
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_FS   1
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_NET  2
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_CAP  3
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_IPC  4
-        struct task_struct *tsk;
-        union   {
-                struct {
-                        struct path path;
-                        struct inode *inode;
-                } fs;
-                struct {
-                        int netif;
-                        struct sock *sk;
-                        u16 family;
-                        __be16 dport;
-                        __be16 sport;
-                        union {
-                                struct {
-                                        __be32 daddr;
-                                        __be32 saddr;
-                                } v4;
-                                struct {
-                                        struct in6_addr daddr;
-                                        struct in6_addr saddr;
-                                } v6;
-                        } fam;
-                } net;
-                int cap;
-                int ipc_id;
-        } u;
-};
-
-#define v4info fam.v4
-#define v6info fam.v6
-
-/* Initialize an AVC audit data structure. */
-#define AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(_d,_t) \
-        { memset((_d), 0, sizeof(struct avc_audit_data)); (_d)->type = AVC_AUDIT_DATA_##_t; }
-
 /*
  * AVC statistics
  */
@@ -98,7 +57,9 @@ void __init avc_init(void);
 
 void avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-               struct av_decision *avd, int result, struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+               struct av_decision *avd,
+               int result,
+               struct common_audit_data *a);
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
@@ -108,7 +69,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                  u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-                 struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+                 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
 
 u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 
@@ -127,13 +88,13 @@ int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                      u32 events, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
                      u16 tclass, u32 perms);
 
-/* Shows permission in human readable form */
-void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av);
-
 /* Exported to selinuxfs */
 int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
 extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
 
+/* Attempt to free avc node cache */
+void avc_disable(void);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats);
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
index 21ec786611d4..7ab9299bfb6b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/class_to_string.h
@@ -77,3 +77,4 @@
     S_(NULL)
     S_(NULL)
     S_("kernel_service")
+    S_("tun_socket")
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/flask.h b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
index 882f27d66fac..f248500a1e3c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/flask.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/flask.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #define SECCLASS_PEER                                    68
 #define SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2                             69
 #define SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE                          74
+#define SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET                              75
 
 /*
  * Security identifier indices for initial entities
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index b4b5b9b2f0be..8d7384280a7a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
                                 u16 family,
-                                struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
                                      int level,
                                      int optname);
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
                                               struct sk_buff *skb,
                                               u16 family,
-                                              struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                              struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 289e24b39e3e..13128f9a3e5a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad);
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
@@ -57,13 +57,13 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 2e984413c7b2..e68823741ad5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
                                 u16 family,
-                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         int rc;
         u32 nlbl_sid;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 500e6f78e115..ff17820d35ec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
  *
  *  Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
  *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ *  Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
  * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
@@ -279,6 +284,95 @@ mls_ops:
 }
 
 /*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+        struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+        char **permission_names = args;
+
+        BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+        permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+                                    struct context *tcontext,
+                                    u16 tclass,
+                                    u32 permissions,
+                                    const char *reason)
+{
+        struct common_datum *common_dat;
+        struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+        struct audit_buffer *ab;
+        char *tclass_name;
+        char *scontext_name = NULL;
+        char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+        char *permission_names[32];
+        int index, length;
+        bool need_comma = false;
+
+        if (!permissions)
+                return;
+
+        tclass_name = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
+        tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+        common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+        /* init permission_names */
+        if (common_dat &&
+            hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
+                        dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+                        dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+        if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+                                     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+                                     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+                goto out;
+
+        /* audit a message */
+        ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
+                             GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+        if (!ab)
+                goto out;
+
+        audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+                         "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+                         reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+        for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+                u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+                if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+                        continue;
+
+                audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+                                 need_comma ? "," : "",
+                                 permission_names[index]
+                                 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+                need_comma = true;
+        }
+        audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+        /* release scontext/tcontext */
+        kfree(tcontext_name);
+        kfree(scontext_name);
+
+        return;
+}
+
+/*
  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
  * on boundary constraint.
  */
@@ -347,28 +441,12 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
         }
 
         if (masked) {
-                struct audit_buffer *ab;
-                char *stype_name
-                        = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[source->value - 1];
-                char *ttype_name
-                        = policydb.p_type_val_to_name[target->value - 1];
-                char *tclass_name
-                        = policydb.p_class_val_to_name[tclass - 1];
-
                 /* mask violated permissions */
                 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 
-                /* notice to userspace via audit message */
-                ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
-                                     GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
-                if (!ab)
-                        return;
-
-                audit_log_format(ab, "av boundary violation: "
-                                 "source=%s target=%s tclass=%s",
-                                 stype_name, ttype_name, tclass_name);
-                avc_dump_av(ab, tclass, masked);
-                audit_log_end(ab);
+                /* audit masked permissions */
+                security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+                                        tclass, masked, "bounds");
         }
 }
 
@@ -480,7 +558,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
                 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
                     !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
                                           constraint->expr)) {
-                        avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(constraint->permissions);
+                        avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
                 }
                 constraint = constraint->next;
         }
@@ -499,8 +577,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
                                 break;
                 }
                 if (!ra)
-                        avd->allowed = (avd->allowed) & ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
-                                                        PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
+                        avd->allowed &= ~(PROCESS__TRANSITION |
+                                          PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION);
         }
 
         /*
@@ -687,6 +765,26 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
                 }
                 index = type->bounds;
         }
+
+        if (rc) {
+                char *old_name = NULL;
+                char *new_name = NULL;
+                int length;
+
+                if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+                                              &old_name, &length) &&
+                    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+                                              &new_name, &length)) {
+                        audit_log(current->audit_context,
+                                  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+                                  "op=security_bounded_transition "
+                                  "result=denied "
+                                  "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+                                  old_name, new_name);
+                }
+                kfree(new_name);
+                kfree(old_name);
+        }
 out:
         read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 72b18452e1a1..f3cb9ed731a9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * gone thru the IPSec process.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         int i, rc = 0;
         struct sec_path *sp;
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                        struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+                                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         struct dst_entry *dst;
         int rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 243bec175be0..c6e9acae72e4 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
 {
         memset(a, 0, sizeof(*a));
         a->a.type = type;
-        a->a.function = func;
+        a->a.smack_audit_data.function = func;
 }
 
 static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 513dc1aa16dd..0f9ac8146900 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -240,8 +240,9 @@ static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
 static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
         struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
-        struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
-        audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s", ad->function,
+        struct smack_audit_data *sad = &ad->smack_audit_data;
+        audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
+                         ad->smack_audit_data.function,
                          sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
         audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
@@ -274,11 +275,11 @@ void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
         if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
                 return;
 
-        if (a->function == NULL)
-                a->function = "unknown";
+        if (a->smack_audit_data.function == NULL)
+                a->smack_audit_data.function = "unknown";
 
         /* end preparing the audit data */
-        sad = &a->lsm_priv.smack_audit_data;
+        sad = &a->smack_audit_data;
         smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
         sad->subject = subject_label;
         sad->object  = object_label;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0023182078c7..acae7ef4092d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  */
 
 /**
- * smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
  * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
  *
@@ -99,13 +99,13 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
  */
-static int smack_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
         int rc;
         struct smk_audit_info ad;
         char *sp, *tsp;
 
-        rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(ctp, mode);
+        rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
         if (rc != 0)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -1080,6 +1080,22 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
  */
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        cred->security = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
  * @cred: the credentials in question
  *
@@ -1117,6 +1133,18 @@ static void smack_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        new->security = old->security;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
  * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
  * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
@@ -1638,6 +1666,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 
         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
                 nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+                nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
                 return 0;
         }
         /*
@@ -2464,7 +2493,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
         /*
          * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
          */
-        if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != PF_INET)
+        if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
                 return 0;
 
         return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
@@ -3029,10 +3058,31 @@ static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 {
 }
 
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+        return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+        int len = 0;
+        len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+
+        if (len < 0)
+                return len;
+        *ctxlen = len;
+        return 0;
+}
+
 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .name =                         "smack",
 
-        .ptrace_may_access =            smack_ptrace_may_access,
+        .ptrace_access_check =          smack_ptrace_access_check,
         .ptrace_traceme =               smack_ptrace_traceme,
         .syslog =                       smack_syslog,
 
@@ -3073,9 +3123,11 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .file_send_sigiotask =          smack_file_send_sigiotask,
         .file_receive =                 smack_file_receive,
 
+        .cred_alloc_blank =             smack_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_free =                    smack_cred_free,
         .cred_prepare =                 smack_cred_prepare,
         .cred_commit =                  smack_cred_commit,
+        .cred_transfer =                smack_cred_transfer,
         .kernel_act_as =                smack_kernel_act_as,
         .kernel_create_files_as =       smack_kernel_create_files_as,
         .task_setpgid =                 smack_task_setpgid,
@@ -3155,6 +3207,9 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .secid_to_secctx =              smack_secid_to_secctx,
         .secctx_to_secid =              smack_secctx_to_secid,
         .release_secctx =               smack_release_secctx,
+        .inode_notifysecctx =           smack_inode_notifysecctx,
+        .inode_setsecctx =              smack_inode_setsecctx,
+        .inode_getsecctx =              smack_inode_getsecctx,
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index fdd1f4b8c448..3c8bd8ee0b95 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1285,6 +1285,36 @@ static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
 }
 
 /**
+ * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+{
+        struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+        struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+        name.name = domainname;
+        tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+        down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+        /* Is there an active domain? */
+        list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+                /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
+                if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+                        continue;
+                if (domain->is_deleted ||
+                    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+                        continue;
+                domain->is_deleted = true;
+                break;
+        }
+        up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/**
  * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
  *
  * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 6d6ba09af457..31df541911f7 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -339,8 +339,6 @@ const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
 const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
 /* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
 const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
-/* Delete a domain. */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *data);
 /* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
 int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
 /*
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index 1d8b16960576..fcf52accce2b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -717,38 +717,6 @@ int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
         return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete);
 }
 
-/* Domain create/delete handler. */
-
-/**
- * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
- *
- * @domainname: The name of domain.
- *
- * Returns 0.
- */
-int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
-{
-        struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
-        struct tomoyo_path_info name;
-
-        name.name = domainname;
-        tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
-        down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-        /* Is there an active domain? */
-        list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
-                /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
-                if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
-                        continue;
-                if (domain->is_deleted ||
-                    tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
-                        continue;
-                domain->is_deleted = true;
-                break;
-        }
-        up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
-        return 0;
-}
-
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain.
  *
@@ -818,13 +786,11 @@ struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
 /**
  * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
  *
- * @bprm:           Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
- * @next_domain:    Pointer to pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
  *
  * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
  */
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-                            struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain)
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         /*
          * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
@@ -946,9 +912,11 @@ int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
                 tomoyo_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false,
                                        TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED);
  out:
+        if (!domain)
+                domain = old_domain;
+        bprm->cred->security = domain;
         tomoyo_free(real_program_name);
         tomoyo_free(symlink_program_name);
-        *next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain;
         tomoyo_free(tmp);
         return retval;
 }
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
index 3194d09fe0f4..9548a0984cc4 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@
 #include "tomoyo.h"
 #include "realpath.h"
 
+static int tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *new, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        new->security = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                                gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -25,6 +31,15 @@ static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
         return 0;
 }
 
+static void tomoyo_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+        /*
+         * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
+         * we don't need to duplicate.
+         */
+        new->security = old->security;
+}
+
 static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         int rc;
@@ -61,14 +76,8 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
          * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
          * using current domain.
          */
-        if (!domain) {
-                struct tomoyo_domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
-                int retval = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
-
-                if (!retval)
-                        bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
-                return retval;
-        }
+        if (!domain)
+                return tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm);
         /*
          * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
          * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
@@ -268,7 +277,9 @@ static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
  */
 static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
         .name                = "tomoyo",
+        .cred_alloc_blank    = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
         .cred_prepare        = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_transfer       = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
         .bprm_set_creds      = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
         .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
index 0fd588a629cf..cd6ba0bf7069 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
@@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
                             struct path *path2);
 int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
                                     struct file *filp);
-int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-                            struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain);
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
 
 /* Index numbers for Access Controls. */