af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.

unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and
it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other"
during stream connects.

However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned
to NULL under the unix_state_lock().

Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead
of the forward mapping.

Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

4 files changed, 14 insertions, 15 deletions

diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index c773635ca3a0..2a5df2b7da83 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ static int cap_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
+static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
                                    struct sock *newsk)
 {
         return 0;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1b798d3df710..e5fb07a3052d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -977,8 +977,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
 
-int security_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other,
-                                 struct sock *newsk)
+int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
 {
         return security_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c82538a4b1a4..6f637d2678ac 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3921,18 +3921,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
         return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
-                                              struct socket *other,
+static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+                                              struct sock *other,
                                               struct sock *newsk)
 {
-        struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security;
-        struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security;
+        struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
+        struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
         struct common_audit_data ad;
         int err;
 
         COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
-        ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
+        ad.u.net.sk = other;
 
         err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
                            sksec_other->sclass,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 489a85afa477..ccb71a044a1a 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2408,22 +2408,22 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 
 /**
  * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
- * @sock: one socket
- * @other: the other socket
+ * @sock: one sock
+ * @other: the other sock
  * @newsk: unused
  *
  * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
  * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
  */
-static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
-                                     struct socket *other, struct sock *newsk)
+static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+                                     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
 {
-        struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock);
-        struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other);
+        struct inode *sp = SOCK_INODE(sock->sk_socket);
+        struct inode *op = SOCK_INODE(other->sk_socket);
         struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
         smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
-        smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+        smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
         return smk_access(smk_of_inode(sp), smk_of_inode(op),
                                  MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 }