Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates for 3.4 from James Morris:
 "The main addition here is the new Yama security module from Kees Cook,
  which was discussed at the Linux Security Summit last year.  Its
  purpose is to collect miscellaneous DAC security enhancements in one
  place.  This also marks a departure in policy for LSM modules, which
  were previously limited to being standalone access control systems.
  Chromium OS is using Yama, and I believe there are plans for Ubuntu,
  at least.

  This patchset also includes maintenance updates for AppArmor, TOMOYO
  and others."

Fix trivial conflict in <net/sock.h> due to the jumo_label->static_key
rename.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
  AppArmor: Fix location of const qualifier on generated string tables
  TOMOYO: Return error if fails to delete a domain
  AppArmor: add const qualifiers to string arrays
  AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy
  TOMOYO: Return appropriate value to poll().
  AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename
  AppArmor: Update dfa matching routines.
  AppArmor: Minor cleanup of d_namespace_path to consolidate error handling
  AppArmor: Retrieve the dentry_path for error reporting when path lookup fails
  AppArmor: Add const qualifiers to generated string tables
  AppArmor: Fix oops in policy unpack auditing
  AppArmor: Fix error returned when a path lookup is disconnected
  KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED
  TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.
  security: fix ima kconfig warning
  AppArmor: Fix the error case for chroot relative path name lookup
  AppArmor: fix mapping of META_READ to audit and quiet flags
  AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation
  AppArmor: Fix dropping of allowed operations that are force audited
  AppArmor: Add mising end of structure test to caps unpacking
  ...

38 files changed, 856 insertions, 191 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 51bd5a0b69ae..ccc61f8006b2 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig
 source security/smack/Kconfig
 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/yama/Kconfig
 
 source security/integrity/Kconfig
 
@@ -196,6 +197,7 @@ choice
         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+        default DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA if SECURITY_YAMA
         default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
         help
@@ -214,6 +216,9 @@ choice
         config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
                 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
 
+        config DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
+                bool "Yama" if SECURITY_YAMA=y
+
         config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
                 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
 
@@ -225,6 +230,7 @@ config DEFAULT_SECURITY
         default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
         default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
         default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+        default "yama" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_YAMA
         default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
 
 endmenu
diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
index a5e502f8a05b..c26c81e92571 100644
--- a/security/Makefile
+++ b/security/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)	+= selinux
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)         += smack
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)        += tomoyo
 subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)      += apparmor
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)          += yama
 
 # always enable default capabilities
 obj-y                                   += commoncap.o
@@ -21,6 +22,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)		+= smack/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT)                     += lsm_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)           += tomoyo/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)         += apparmor/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)             += yama/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE)             += device_cgroup.o
 
 # Object integrity file lists
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 2dafe50a2e25..806bd19af7f2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
 # to
 #    [1] = "dac_override",
 quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
         sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
         -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
         echo "};" >> $@
@@ -28,25 +28,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
 #    [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
 #
 # and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
-# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h  Thi is
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h  This is
 # required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
 # ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
 # Transforms lines from
 #    #define RLIMIT_STACK               3       /* max stack size */
 # to
 # RLIMIT_STACK, 
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+#    #define RLIMIT_FSIZE        1   /* Maximum filesize */
+#    #define RLIMIT_STACK               3       /* max stack size */
+# to
+# #define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "fsize stack"
 quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN     $@
-cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
+        > $@ ;\
         sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
             -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
         echo "};" >> $@ ;\
-        echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+        echo "static const int rlim_map[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" >> $@ ;\
         sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
-        echo "};" >> $@
+        echo "};" >> $@ ; \
+        echo -n '\#define AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+        sed -r -n 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+).*/\L\1/p' $< | \
+            tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
 
 $(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
 $(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
-$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
+$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
+                            $(src)/Makefile
         $(call cmd,make-caps)
-$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
+$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
+                      $(src)/Makefile
         $(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index e39df6d43779..16c15ec6f670 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -18,12 +18,14 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
 
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
+#include "include/resource.h"
 
 /**
  * aa_simple_write_to_buffer - common routine for getting policy from user
@@ -142,38 +144,166 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = {
         .llseek = default_llseek,
 };
 
-/** Base file system setup **/
+static int aa_fs_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+        struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file = seq->private;
+
+        if (!fs_file)
+                return 0;
 
-static struct dentry *aa_fs_dentry __initdata;
+        switch (fs_file->v_type) {
+        case AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
+                seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.boolean ? "yes" : "no");
+                break;
+        case AA_FS_TYPE_STRING:
+                seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", fs_file->v.string);
+                break;
+        case AA_FS_TYPE_U64:
+                seq_printf(seq, "%#08lx\n", fs_file->v.u64);
+                break;
+        default:
+                /* Ignore unpritable entry types. */
+                break;
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
 
-static void __init aafs_remove(const char *name)
+static int aa_fs_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
-        struct dentry *dentry;
+        return single_open(file, aa_fs_seq_show, inode->i_private);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
+        .owner          = THIS_MODULE,
+        .open           = aa_fs_seq_open,
+        .read           = seq_read,
+        .llseek         = seq_lseek,
+        .release        = single_release,
+};
+
+/** Base file system setup **/
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
+        AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "create read write exec append mmap_exec " \
+                                  "link lock"),
+        { }
+};
 
-        dentry = lookup_one_len(name, aa_fs_dentry, strlen(name));
-        if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
-                securityfs_remove(dentry);
-                dput(dentry);
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
+        AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat",        1),
+        AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv",       1),
+        AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_onexec",     1),
+        AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_profile",    1),
+        { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
+        AA_FS_DIR("domain",                     aa_fs_entry_domain),
+        AA_FS_DIR("file",                       aa_fs_entry_file),
+        AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability",            VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
+        AA_FS_DIR("rlimit",                     aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
+        { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
+        AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
+        AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
+        AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
+        AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
+        { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry =
+        AA_FS_DIR("apparmor", aa_fs_entry_apparmor);
+
+/**
+ * aafs_create_file - create a file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to build an entry for (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
+ *
+ * Use aafs_remove_file to remove entries created with this fn.
+ */
+static int __init aafs_create_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file,
+                                   struct dentry *parent)
+{
+        int error = 0;
+
+        fs_file->dentry = securityfs_create_file(fs_file->name,
+                                                 S_IFREG | fs_file->mode,
+                                                 parent, fs_file,
+                                                 fs_file->file_ops);
+        if (IS_ERR(fs_file->dentry)) {
+                error = PTR_ERR(fs_file->dentry);
+                fs_file->dentry = NULL;
         }
+        return error;
 }
 
 /**
- * aafs_create - create an entry in the apparmor filesystem
- * @name: name of the entry (NOT NULL)
- * @mask: file permission mask of the file
- * @fops: file operations for the file (NOT NULL)
+ * aafs_create_dir - recursively create a directory entry in the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to build (NOT NULL)
+ * @parent: the parent dentry in the securityfs
  *
- * Used aafs_remove to remove entries created with this fn.
+ * Use aafs_remove_dir to remove entries created with this fn.
  */
-static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mask,
-                              const struct file_operations *fops)
+static int __init aafs_create_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir,
+                                  struct dentry *parent)
 {
-        struct dentry *dentry;
+        int error;
+        struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file;
 
-        dentry = securityfs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | mask, aa_fs_dentry,
-                                        NULL, fops);
+        fs_dir->dentry = securityfs_create_dir(fs_dir->name, parent);
+        if (IS_ERR(fs_dir->dentry)) {
+                error = PTR_ERR(fs_dir->dentry);
+                fs_dir->dentry = NULL;
+                goto failed;
+        }
 
-        return IS_ERR(dentry) ? PTR_ERR(dentry) : 0;
+        for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+                if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR)
+                        error = aafs_create_dir(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+                else
+                        error = aafs_create_file(fs_file, fs_dir->dentry);
+                if (error)
+                        goto failed;
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+
+failed:
+        return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_remove_file - drop a single file entry in the apparmor securityfs
+ * @fs_file: aa_fs_entry to detach from the securityfs (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init aafs_remove_file(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file)
+{
+        if (!fs_file->dentry)
+                return;
+
+        securityfs_remove(fs_file->dentry);
+        fs_file->dentry = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aafs_remove_dir - recursively drop a directory entry from the securityfs
+ * @fs_dir: aa_fs_entry (and all child entries) to detach (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void __init aafs_remove_dir(struct aa_fs_entry *fs_dir)
+{
+        struct aa_fs_entry *fs_file;
+
+        for (fs_file = fs_dir->v.files; fs_file->name; ++fs_file) {
+                if (fs_file->v_type == AA_FS_TYPE_DIR)
+                        aafs_remove_dir(fs_file);
+                else
+                        aafs_remove_file(fs_file);
+        }
+
+        aafs_remove_file(fs_dir);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -183,14 +313,7 @@ static int __init aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mask,
  */
 void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
 {
-        if (aa_fs_dentry) {
-                aafs_remove(".remove");
-                aafs_remove(".replace");
-                aafs_remove(".load");
-
-                securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry);
-                aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
-        }
+        aafs_remove_dir(&aa_fs_entry);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -207,25 +330,13 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
         if (!apparmor_initialized)
                 return 0;
 
-        if (aa_fs_dentry) {
+        if (aa_fs_entry.dentry) {
                 AA_ERROR("%s: AppArmor securityfs already exists\n", __func__);
                 return -EEXIST;
         }
 
-        aa_fs_dentry = securityfs_create_dir("apparmor", NULL);
-        if (IS_ERR(aa_fs_dentry)) {
-                error = PTR_ERR(aa_fs_dentry);
-                aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
-                goto error;
-        }
-
-        error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load);
-        if (error)
-                goto error;
-        error = aafs_create(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace);
-        if (error)
-                goto error;
-        error = aafs_create(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove);
+        /* Populate fs tree. */
+        error = aafs_create_dir(&aa_fs_entry, NULL);
         if (error)
                 goto error;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index f3fafedd798a..5ff67776a5ad 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
-const char *op_table[] = {
+const char *const op_table[] = {
         "null",
 
         "sysctl",
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ const char *op_table[] = {
         "profile_remove"
 };
 
-const char *audit_mode_names[] = {
+const char *const audit_mode_names[] = {
         "normal",
         "quiet_denied",
         "quiet",
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ const char *audit_mode_names[] = {
         "all"
 };
 
-static char *aa_audit_type[] = {
+static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
         "AUDIT",
         "ALLOWED",
         "DENIED",
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static char *aa_audit_type[] = {
         "STATUS",
         "ERROR",
         "KILLED"
+        "AUTO"
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index c1e18ba5bdc0..7c69599a69e1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -372,13 +372,12 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         state = profile->file.start;
 
         /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */
-        error = aa_get_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
-                            &name);
+        error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, &buffer,
+                             &name, &info);
         if (error) {
                 if (profile->flags &
                     (PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | PFLAG_UNCONFINED))
                         error = 0;
-                info = "Exec failed name resolution";
                 name = bprm->filename;
                 goto audit;
         }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index 7312db741219..3022c0f4f0db 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -173,8 +173,6 @@ static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old)
         if (old & 0x40) /* AA_EXEC_MMAP */
                 new |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 
-        new |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
-
         return new;
 }
 
@@ -212,6 +210,7 @@ static struct file_perms compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
                 perms.quiet = map_old_perms(dfa_other_quiet(dfa, state));
                 perms.xindex = dfa_other_xindex(dfa, state);
         }
+        perms.allow |= AA_MAY_META_READ;
 
         /* change_profile wasn't determined by ownership in old mapping */
         if (ACCEPT_TABLE(dfa)[state] & 0x80000000)
@@ -279,22 +278,16 @@ int aa_path_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
         int error;
 
         flags |= profile->path_flags | (S_ISDIR(cond->mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0);
-        error = aa_get_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name);
+        error = aa_path_name(path, flags, &buffer, &name, &info);
         if (error) {
                 if (error == -ENOENT && is_deleted(path->dentry)) {
                         /* Access to open files that are deleted are
                          * give a pass (implicit delegation)
                          */
                         error = 0;
+                        info = NULL;
                         perms.allow = request;
-                } else if (error == -ENOENT)
-                        info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
-                else if (error == -ESTALE)
-                        info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
-                else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
-                        info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
-                else
-                        info = "Failed name lookup";
+                }
         } else {
                 aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, profile->file.start, name, cond,
                              &perms);
@@ -365,12 +358,14 @@ int aa_path_link(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *old_dentry,
         lperms = nullperms;
 
         /* buffer freed below, lname is pointer in buffer */
-        error = aa_get_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname);
+        error = aa_path_name(&link, profile->path_flags, &buffer, &lname,
+                             &info);
         if (error)
                 goto audit;
 
         /* buffer2 freed below, tname is pointer in buffer2 */
-        error = aa_get_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname);
+        error = aa_path_name(&target, profile->path_flags, &buffer2, &tname,
+                             &info);
         if (error)
                 goto audit;
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index df3649560818..40aedd9f73ea 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -19,6 +19,19 @@
 
 #include "match.h"
 
+/*
+ * Class of mediation types in the AppArmor policy db
+ */
+#define AA_CLASS_ENTRY          0
+#define AA_CLASS_UNKNOWN        1
+#define AA_CLASS_FILE           2
+#define AA_CLASS_CAP            3
+#define AA_CLASS_NET            4
+#define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS        5
+#define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN         6
+
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST           AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
+
 /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
 extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
 extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
@@ -81,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
                                                   unsigned int start)
 {
         /* the null transition only needs the string's null terminator byte */
-        return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, "", 1);
+        return aa_dfa_next(dfa, start, 0);
 }
 
 static inline bool mediated_filesystem(struct inode *inode)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
index cb1e93a114d7..7ea4769fab3f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -15,6 +15,50 @@
 #ifndef __AA_APPARMORFS_H
 #define __AA_APPARMORFS_H
 
+enum aa_fs_type {
+        AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
+        AA_FS_TYPE_STRING,
+        AA_FS_TYPE_U64,
+        AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS,
+        AA_FS_TYPE_DIR,
+};
+
+struct aa_fs_entry;
+
+struct aa_fs_entry {
+        const char *name;
+        struct dentry *dentry;
+        umode_t mode;
+        enum aa_fs_type v_type;
+        union {
+                bool boolean;
+                char *string;
+                unsigned long u64;
+                struct aa_fs_entry *files;
+        } v;
+        const struct file_operations *file_ops;
+};
+
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops;
+
+#define AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN(_name, _value) \
+        { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+          .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_BOOLEAN, .v.boolean = (_value), \
+          .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_STRING(_name, _value) \
+        { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+          .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_STRING, .v.string = (_value), \
+          .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_U64(_name, _value) \
+        { .name = (_name), .mode = 0444, \
+          .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_U64, .v.u64 = (_value), \
+          .file_ops = &aa_fs_seq_file_ops }
+#define AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(_name, _mode, _fops) \
+        { .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_FOPS, \
+          .mode = (_mode), .file_ops = (_fops) }
+#define AA_FS_DIR(_name, _value) \
+        { .name = (_name), .v_type = AA_FS_TYPE_DIR, .v.files = (_value) }
+
 extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
 
 #endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 1951786d32e9..4ba78c203af1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -25,11 +25,9 @@
 
 struct aa_profile;
 
-extern const char *audit_mode_names[];
+extern const char *const audit_mode_names[];
 #define AUDIT_MAX_INDEX 5
 
-#define AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO 0   /* auto choose audit message type */
-
 enum audit_mode {
         AUDIT_NORMAL,           /* follow normal auditing of accesses */
         AUDIT_QUIET_DENIED,     /* quiet all denied access messages */
@@ -45,10 +43,11 @@ enum audit_type {
         AUDIT_APPARMOR_HINT,
         AUDIT_APPARMOR_STATUS,
         AUDIT_APPARMOR_ERROR,
-        AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL
+        AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL,
+        AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO
 };
 
-extern const char *op_table[];
+extern const char *const op_table[];
 enum aa_ops {
         OP_NULL,
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index ab8c6d87f758..f98fd4701d80 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static inline u16 dfa_map_xindex(u16 mask)
                 index |= AA_X_NAME;
         } else if (old_index == 3) {
                 index |= AA_X_NAME | AA_X_CHILD;
-        } else {
+        } else if (old_index) {
                 index |= AA_X_TABLE;
                 index |= old_index - 4;
         }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index a4a863997bd5..775843e7f984 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
                               const char *str, int len);
 unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
                           const char *str);
+unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+                         const char c);
+
 void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref);
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/path.h b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
index 27b327a7fae5..286ac75dc88b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/path.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/path.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum path_flags {
         PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED = 0x10000, /* mediate deleted paths */
 };
 
-int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name);
+int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer,
+                 const char **name, const char **info);
 
 #endif /* __AA_PATH_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index aeda5cf56904..bda4569fdd83 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #include "file.h"
 #include "resource.h"
 
-extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
+extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
 #define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
 
 #define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile) \
@@ -129,6 +129,17 @@ struct aa_namespace {
         struct list_head sub_ns;
 };
 
+/* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
+ * dfa: dfa pattern match
+ * start: set of start states for the different classes of data
+ */
+struct aa_policydb {
+        /* Generic policy DFA specific rule types will be subsections of it */
+        struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+        unsigned int start[AA_CLASS_LAST + 1];
+
+};
+
 /* struct aa_profile - basic confinement data
  * @base - base components of the profile (name, refcount, lists, lock ...)
  * @parent: parent of profile
@@ -143,6 +154,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
  * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
  * @path_flags: flags controlling path generation behavior
  * @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
+ * @policy: general match rules governing policy
  * @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
  * @caps: capabilities for the profile
  * @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
@@ -179,6 +191,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
         u32 path_flags;
         int size;
 
+        struct aa_policydb policy;
         struct aa_file_rules file;
         struct aa_caps caps;
         struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
index 02baec732bb5..d3f4cf027957 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/resource.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <linux/resource.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
 struct aa_profile;
 
 /* struct aa_rlimit - rlimit settings for the profile
@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ struct aa_rlimit {
         struct rlimit limits[RLIM_NLIMITS];
 };
 
+extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[];
+
 int aa_map_resource(int resource);
 int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *,
                       unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 94de6b4907c8..90971a8c3789 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -335,12 +335,12 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_dfa_next_state - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
+ * aa_dfa_match - traverse @dfa to find state @str stops at
  * @dfa: the dfa to match @str against  (NOT NULL)
  * @start: the state of the dfa to start matching in
  * @str: the null terminated string of bytes to match against the dfa (NOT NULL)
  *
- * aa_dfa_next_state will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
+ * aa_dfa_match will match @str against the dfa and return the state it
  * finished matching in. The final state can be used to look up the accepting
  * label, or as the start state of a continuing match.
  *
@@ -349,5 +349,79 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
                           const char *str)
 {
-        return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, start, str, strlen(str));
+        u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+        u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+        u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+        u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+        unsigned int state = start, pos;
+
+        if (state == 0)
+                return 0;
+
+        /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+        if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+                /* Equivalence class table defined */
+                u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+                /* default is direct to next state */
+                while (*str) {
+                        pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+                        if (check[pos] == state)
+                                state = next[pos];
+                        else
+                                state = def[state];
+                }
+        } else {
+                /* default is direct to next state */
+                while (*str) {
+                        pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+                        if (check[pos] == state)
+                                state = next[pos];
+                        else
+                                state = def[state];
+                }
+        }
+
+        return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_dfa_next - step one character to the next state in the dfa
+ * @dfa: the dfa to tranverse (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: the state to start in
+ * @c: the input character to transition on
+ *
+ * aa_dfa_match will step through the dfa by one input character @c
+ *
+ * Returns: state reach after input @c
+ */
+unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+                          const char c)
+{
+        u16 *def = DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa);
+        u32 *base = BASE_TABLE(dfa);
+        u16 *next = NEXT_TABLE(dfa);
+        u16 *check = CHECK_TABLE(dfa);
+        unsigned int pos;
+
+        /* current state is <state>, matching character *str */
+        if (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC]) {
+                /* Equivalence class table defined */
+                u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
+                /* default is direct to next state */
+
+                pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c];
+                if (check[pos] == state)
+                        state = next[pos];
+                else
+                        state = def[state];
+        } else {
+                /* default is direct to next state */
+                pos = base[state] + (u8) c;
+                if (check[pos] == state)
+                        state = next[pos];
+                else
+                        state = def[state];
+        }
+
+        return state;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index 9d070a7c3ffc..2daeea4f9266 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -83,31 +83,29 @@ static int d_namespace_path(struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
                 struct path root;
                 get_fs_root(current->fs, &root);
                 res = __d_path(path, &root, buf, buflen);
-                if (res && !IS_ERR(res)) {
-                        /* everything's fine */
-                        *name = res;
-                        path_put(&root);
-                        goto ok;
-                }
                 path_put(&root);
-                connected = 0;
+        } else {
+                res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen);
+                if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+                        connected = 0;
         }
 
-        res = d_absolute_path(path, buf, buflen);
-
-        *name = res;
         /* handle error conditions - and still allow a partial path to
          * be returned.
          */
-        if (IS_ERR(res)) {
-                error = PTR_ERR(res);
-                *name = buf;
-                goto out;
-        }
-        if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+        if (!res || IS_ERR(res)) {
                 connected = 0;
+                res = dentry_path_raw(path->dentry, buf, buflen);
+                if (IS_ERR(res)) {
+                        error = PTR_ERR(res);
+                        *name = buf;
+                        goto out;
+                };
+        } else if (!our_mnt(path->mnt))
+                connected = 0;
+
+        *name = res;
 
-ok:
         /* Handle two cases:
          * 1. A deleted dentry && profile is not allowing mediation of deleted
          * 2. On some filesystems, newly allocated dentries appear to the
@@ -138,7 +136,7 @@ ok:
                         /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
                          * with '/'
                          */
-                        error = -ESTALE;
+                        error = -EACCES;
                         if (*res == '/')
                                 *name = res + 1;
                 }
@@ -159,7 +157,7 @@ out:
  * Returns: %0 else error on failure
  */
 static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
-                              int size, char **name)
+                              int size, char **name, const char **info)
 {
         int adjust = (flags & PATH_IS_DIR) ? 1 : 0;
         int error = d_namespace_path(path, buffer, size - adjust, name, flags);
@@ -171,15 +169,27 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
                  */
                 strcpy(&buffer[size - 2], "/");
 
+        if (info && error) {
+                if (error == -ENOENT)
+                        *info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
+                else if (error == -ESTALE)
+                        *info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
+                else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+                        *info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
+                else
+                        *info = "Failed name lookup";
+        }
+
         return error;
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_get_name - compute the pathname of a file
+ * aa_path_name - compute the pathname of a file
  * @path: path the file  (NOT NULL)
  * @flags: flags controlling path name generation
  * @buffer: buffer that aa_get_name() allocated  (NOT NULL)
  * @name: Returns - the generated path name if !error (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: Returns - information on why the path lookup failed (MAYBE NULL)
  *
  * @name is a pointer to the beginning of the pathname (which usually differs
  * from the beginning of the buffer), or NULL.  If there is an error @name
@@ -192,7 +202,8 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
  *
  * Returns: %0 else error code if could retrieve name
  */
-int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name)
+int aa_path_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name,
+                 const char **info)
 {
         char *buf, *str = NULL;
         int size = 256;
@@ -206,7 +217,7 @@ int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name)
                 if (!buf)
                         return -ENOMEM;
 
-                error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str);
+                error = get_name_to_buffer(path, flags, buf, size, &str, info);
                 if (error != -ENAMETOOLONG)
                         break;
 
@@ -214,6 +225,7 @@ int aa_get_name(struct path *path, int flags, char **buffer, const char **name)
                 size <<= 1;
                 if (size > aa_g_path_max)
                         return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+                *info = NULL;
         }
         *buffer = buf;
         *name = str;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 4f0eadee78b8..906414383022 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
 /* root profile namespace */
 struct aa_namespace *root_ns;
 
-const char *profile_mode_names[] = {
+const char *const profile_mode_names[] = {
         "enforce",
         "complain",
         "kill",
@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 
         aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
         aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
+        aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 
         aa_put_profile(profile->replacedby);
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 741dd13e089b..25fd51edc8da 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
  * @new: profile if it has been allocated (MAYBE NULL)
  * @name: name of the profile being manipulated (MAYBE NULL)
  * @info: any extra info about the failure (MAYBE NULL)
- * @e: buffer position info (NOT NULL)
+ * @e: buffer position info
  * @error: error code
  *
  * Returns: %0 or error
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *name,
         struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
         struct common_audit_data sa;
         COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
-        sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
+        if (e)
+                sa.aad.iface.pos = e->pos - e->start;
         sa.aad.iface.target = new;
         sa.aad.name = name;
         sa.aad.info = info;
@@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
 {
         struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
         const char *name = NULL;
-        int error = -EPROTO;
+        int i, error = -EPROTO;
         kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
         u32 tmp;
 
@@ -554,11 +555,35 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
                         goto fail;
                 if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[1]), NULL))
                         goto fail;
+                if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+                        goto fail;
         }
 
         if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
                 goto fail;
 
+        if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
+                /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
+                profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
+                if (IS_ERR(profile->policy.dfa)) {
+                        error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa);
+                        profile->policy.dfa = NULL;
+                        goto fail;
+                }
+                if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start"))
+                        /* default start state */
+                        profile->policy.start[0] = DFA_START;
+                /* setup class index */
+                for (i = AA_CLASS_FILE; i <= AA_CLASS_LAST; i++) {
+                        profile->policy.start[i] =
+                                aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
+                                            profile->policy.start[0],
+                                            i);
+                }
+                if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL))
+                        goto fail;
+        }
+
         /* get file rules */
         profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
         if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index a4136c10b1c6..72c25a4f2cfd 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -23,6 +23,11 @@
  */
 #include "rlim_names.h"
 
+struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_rlimit[] = {
+        AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_FS_RLIMIT_MASK),
+        { }
+};
+
 /* audit callback for resource specific fields */
 static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 {
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 2f680eb02b59..5bb21b1c448c 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -358,6 +358,10 @@ static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return 0;
 }
 
+static void cap_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+}
+
 static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
         return 0;
@@ -954,6 +958,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 7ce191ea29a0..0cf4b53480a7 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index 4f554f20dc97..35664fe6daa1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ config IMA
         select CRYPTO_HMAC
         select CRYPTO_MD5
         select CRYPTO_SHA1
-        select TCG_TPM if !S390 && !UML
-        select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM
+        select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM && !UML
+        select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
         help
           The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
           Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
index 2ad942fb1e23..21e96bf188df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
@@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
                 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
                 audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
         }
-        audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+        audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
         audit_log_end(ab);
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index d45061d02fee..d8edff209bf3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+        {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
         {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
@@ -417,7 +418,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
         if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
                 result = -EINVAL;
 
-        audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !!result);
+        audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
         audit_log_end(ab);
         return result;
 }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0b3f5d72af1c..6523599e9ac0 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -388,11 +388,24 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
         keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
+
+                /* Root is permitted to invalidate certain special keyrings */
+                if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+                        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, 0);
+                        if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref))
+                                goto error;
+                        if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR,
+                                     &key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref)->flags))
+                                goto clear;
+                        goto error_put;
+                }
+
                 goto error;
         }
 
+clear:
         ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
-
+error_put:
         key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
 error:
         return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 1068cb1939b3..be7ecb2018dd 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -657,7 +657,8 @@ try_again:
                         goto error;
 
                 down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
-                if (cred->request_key_auth->flags & KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) {
+                if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
+                             &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) {
                         key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
                         key = NULL;
                 } else {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d7542493454d..bf619ffc9a4d 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR       2
 
@@ -187,25 +189,11 @@ int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
         return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
 }
 
-int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
-{
-        WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL);
-        return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
-        WARN_ON(mm == NULL);
         return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
 }
 
-int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages)
-{
-        /* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL,
-           for this specific case that is fine */
-        return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
@@ -729,6 +717,11 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
 }
 
+void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+        security_ops->task_free(task);
+}
+
 int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 {
         return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 6a3683e28426..304929909375 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@
 #include <linux/syslog.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index e8af5b0ba80f..cd667b4089a5 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
 #include "smack.h"
 
 #define task_security(task)     (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
index 5ca47ea3049f..7ef9fa3e37e0 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c
@@ -446,11 +446,11 @@ void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
  * tomoyo_poll_log - Wait for an audit log.
  *
  * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
- * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
  *
  * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM when ready to read an audit log.
  */
-int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
         if (tomoyo_log_count)
                 return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c
index c47d3ce6c733..8656b16eef7b 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ static int tomoyo_write_task(struct tomoyo_acl_param *param)
  *
  * @domainname: The name of domain.
  *
- * Returns 0.
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
  *
  * Caller holds tomoyo_read_lock().
  */
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
         name.name = domainname;
         tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
         if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&tomoyo_policy_lock))
-                return 0;
+                return -EINTR;
         /* Is there an active domain? */
         list_for_each_entry_rcu(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
                 /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
@@ -1164,15 +1164,16 @@ static int tomoyo_write_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
         bool is_select = !is_delete && tomoyo_str_starts(&data, "select ");
         unsigned int profile;
         if (*data == '<') {
+                int ret = 0;
                 domain = NULL;
                 if (is_delete)
-                        tomoyo_delete_domain(data);
+                        ret = tomoyo_delete_domain(data);
                 else if (is_select)
                         domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data);
                 else
                         domain = tomoyo_assign_domain(data, false);
                 head->w.domain = domain;
-                return 0;
+                return ret;
         }
         if (!domain)
                 return -EINVAL;
@@ -2111,7 +2112,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
         struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
         spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
         list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_query_list, list) {
-                if (ptr->serial != serial || ptr->answer)
+                if (ptr->serial != serial)
                         continue;
                 domain = ptr->domain;
                 break;
@@ -2130,28 +2131,13 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid
  *
  * Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode.
  */
-static int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+static unsigned int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
-        struct list_head *tmp;
-        bool found = false;
-        u8 i;
-        for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
-                spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
-                list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
-                        struct tomoyo_query *ptr =
-                                list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
-                        if (ptr->answer)
-                                continue;
-                        found = true;
-                        break;
-                }
-                spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
-                if (found)
-                        return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
-                if (i)
-                        break;
-                poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait);
-        }
+        if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
+                return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
+        poll_wait(file, &tomoyo_query_wait, wait);
+        if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list))
+                return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2175,8 +2161,6 @@ static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
         spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
         list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
                 struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
-                if (ptr->answer)
-                        continue;
                 if (pos++ != head->r.query_index)
                         continue;
                 len = ptr->query_len;
@@ -2194,8 +2178,6 @@ static void tomoyo_read_query(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
         spin_lock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
         list_for_each(tmp, &tomoyo_query_list) {
                 struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
-                if (ptr->answer)
-                        continue;
                 if (pos++ != head->r.query_index)
                         continue;
                 /*
@@ -2243,8 +2225,10 @@ static int tomoyo_write_answer(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
                 struct tomoyo_query *ptr = list_entry(tmp, typeof(*ptr), list);
                 if (ptr->serial != serial)
                         continue;
-                if (!ptr->answer)
-                        ptr->answer = answer;
+                ptr->answer = answer;
+                /* Remove from tomoyo_query_list. */
+                if (ptr->answer)
+                        list_del_init(&ptr->list);
                 break;
         }
         spin_unlock(&tomoyo_query_list_lock);
@@ -2477,18 +2461,17 @@ int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
  * tomoyo_poll_control - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
  *
  * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
- * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
  *
- * Waits for read readiness.
- * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/query is handled by /usr/sbin/tomoyo-queryd and
- * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/audit is handled by /usr/sbin/tomoyo-auditd.
+ * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
+ * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
  */
-int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
         struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
-        if (!head->poll)
-                return -ENOSYS;
-        return head->poll(file, wait);
+        if (head->poll)
+                return head->poll(file, wait) | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
+        return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h
index 9512222d5581..30fd98369700 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/common.h
+++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h
@@ -788,7 +788,7 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_param {
 struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
         void (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
         int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
-        int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+        unsigned int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
         /* Exclusive lock for this structure.   */
         struct mutex io_sem;
         char __user *read_user_buf;
@@ -981,8 +981,8 @@ int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path,
                             unsigned long number);
 int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, struct path *path,
                      const char *target);
-int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
-int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
+unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait);
 int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
                                   int addr_len);
 int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
index bee09d062057..fe00cdfd0267 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c
@@ -199,30 +199,32 @@ int tomoyo_mount_permission(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) {
                 type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_REMOUNT];
                 flags &= ~MS_REMOUNT;
-        }
-        if (flags & MS_MOVE) {
-                type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE];
-                flags &= ~MS_MOVE;
-        }
-        if (flags & MS_BIND) {
+        } else if (flags & MS_BIND) {
                 type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_BIND];
                 flags &= ~MS_BIND;
-        }
-        if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) {
-                type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE];
-                flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE;
-        }
-        if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) {
+        } else if (flags & MS_SHARED) {
+                if (flags & (MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+                        return -EINVAL;
+                type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED];
+                flags &= ~MS_SHARED;
+        } else if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) {
+                if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+                        return -EINVAL;
                 type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_PRIVATE];
                 flags &= ~MS_PRIVATE;
-        }
-        if (flags & MS_SLAVE) {
+        } else if (flags & MS_SLAVE) {
+                if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_UNBINDABLE))
+                        return -EINVAL;
                 type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SLAVE];
                 flags &= ~MS_SLAVE;
-        }
-        if (flags & MS_SHARED) {
-                type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_SHARED];
-                flags &= ~MS_SHARED;
+        } else if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) {
+                if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE))
+                        return -EINVAL;
+                type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MAKE_UNBINDABLE];
+                flags &= ~MS_UNBINDABLE;
+        } else if (flags & MS_MOVE) {
+                type = tomoyo_mounts[TOMOYO_MOUNT_MOVE];
+                flags &= ~MS_MOVE;
         }
         if (!type)
                 type = "<NULL>";
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
index 482b2a5f48f0..8592f2fc6ebb 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c
@@ -157,9 +157,10 @@ static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
  * tomoyo_poll - poll() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
  *
  * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
- * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table".
+ * @wait: Pointer to "poll_table". Maybe NULL.
  *
- * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write,
+ * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise.
  */
 static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..51d6709d8bbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+config SECURITY_YAMA
+        bool "Yama support"
+        depends on SECURITY
+        select SECURITYFS
+        select SECURITY_PATH
+        default n
+        help
+          This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
+          system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
+          access controls. Currently available is ptrace scope restriction.
+          Further information can be found in Documentation/security/Yama.txt.
+
+          If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/yama/Makefile b/security/yama/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8b5e06588456
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) := yama.o
+
+yama-y := yama_lsm.o
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..573723843a04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/*
+ * Yama Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Canonical, Ltd.
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+
+static int ptrace_scope = 1;
+
+/* describe a ptrace relationship for potential exception */
+struct ptrace_relation {
+        struct task_struct *tracer;
+        struct task_struct *tracee;
+        struct list_head node;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(ptracer_relations);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ptracer_relations_lock);
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptracer_add - add/replace an exception for this tracer/tracee pair
+ * @tracer: the task_struct of the process doing the ptrace
+ * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
+ *
+ * Each tracee can have, at most, one tracer registered. Each time this
+ * is called, the prior registered tracer will be replaced for the tracee.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if relationship was added, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptracer_add(struct task_struct *tracer,
+                            struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+        int rc = 0;
+        struct ptrace_relation *added;
+        struct ptrace_relation *entry, *relation = NULL;
+
+        added = kmalloc(sizeof(*added), GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!added)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+        list_for_each_entry(entry, &ptracer_relations, node)
+                if (entry->tracee == tracee) {
+                        relation = entry;
+                        break;
+                }
+        if (!relation) {
+                relation = added;
+                relation->tracee = tracee;
+                list_add(&relation->node, &ptracer_relations);
+        }
+        relation->tracer = tracer;
+
+        spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+        if (added != relation)
+                kfree(added);
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptracer_del - remove exceptions related to the given tasks
+ * @tracer: remove any relation where tracer task matches
+ * @tracee: remove any relation where tracee task matches
+ */
+static void yama_ptracer_del(struct task_struct *tracer,
+                             struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+        struct ptrace_relation *relation, *safe;
+
+        spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+        list_for_each_entry_safe(relation, safe, &ptracer_relations, node)
+                if (relation->tracee == tracee ||
+                    (tracer && relation->tracer == tracer)) {
+                        list_del(&relation->node);
+                        kfree(relation);
+                }
+        spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_task_free - check for task_pid to remove from exception list
+ * @task: task being removed
+ */
+static void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+        yama_ptracer_del(task, task);
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_task_prctl - check for Yama-specific prctl operations
+ * @option: operation
+ * @arg2: argument
+ * @arg3: argument
+ * @arg4: argument
+ * @arg5: argument
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -ve on error.  -ENOSYS is returned when Yama
+ * does not handle the given option.
+ */
+static int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+                           unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
+{
+        int rc;
+        struct task_struct *myself = current;
+
+        rc = cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+        if (rc != -ENOSYS)
+                return rc;
+
+        switch (option) {
+        case PR_SET_PTRACER:
+                /* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader
+                 * before calling _add() or _del() on it, since we want
+                 * process-level granularity of control. The tracer group
+                 * leader checking is handled later when walking the ancestry
+                 * at the time of PTRACE_ATTACH check.
+                 */
+                rcu_read_lock();
+                if (!thread_group_leader(myself))
+                        myself = rcu_dereference(myself->group_leader);
+                get_task_struct(myself);
+                rcu_read_unlock();
+
+                if (arg2 == 0) {
+                        yama_ptracer_del(NULL, myself);
+                        rc = 0;
+                } else if (arg2 == PR_SET_PTRACER_ANY) {
+                        rc = yama_ptracer_add(NULL, myself);
+                } else {
+                        struct task_struct *tracer;
+
+                        rcu_read_lock();
+                        tracer = find_task_by_vpid(arg2);
+                        if (tracer)
+                                get_task_struct(tracer);
+                        else
+                                rc = -EINVAL;
+                        rcu_read_unlock();
+
+                        if (tracer) {
+                                rc = yama_ptracer_add(tracer, myself);
+                                put_task_struct(tracer);
+                        }
+                }
+
+                put_task_struct(myself);
+                break;
+        }
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * task_is_descendant - walk up a process family tree looking for a match
+ * @parent: the process to compare against while walking up from child
+ * @child: the process to start from while looking upwards for parent
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if child is a descendant of parent, 0 if not.
+ */
+static int task_is_descendant(struct task_struct *parent,
+                              struct task_struct *child)
+{
+        int rc = 0;
+        struct task_struct *walker = child;
+
+        if (!parent || !child)
+                return 0;
+
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        if (!thread_group_leader(parent))
+                parent = rcu_dereference(parent->group_leader);
+        while (walker->pid > 0) {
+                if (!thread_group_leader(walker))
+                        walker = rcu_dereference(walker->group_leader);
+                if (walker == parent) {
+                        rc = 1;
+                        break;
+                }
+                walker = rcu_dereference(walker->real_parent);
+        }
+        rcu_read_unlock();
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ptracer_exception_found - tracer registered as exception for this tracee
+ * @tracer: the task_struct of the process attempting ptrace
+ * @tracee: the task_struct of the process to be ptraced
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if tracer has is ptracer exception ancestor for tracee.
+ */
+static int ptracer_exception_found(struct task_struct *tracer,
+                                   struct task_struct *tracee)
+{
+        int rc = 0;
+        struct ptrace_relation *relation;
+        struct task_struct *parent = NULL;
+        bool found = false;
+
+        spin_lock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+        rcu_read_lock();
+        if (!thread_group_leader(tracee))
+                tracee = rcu_dereference(tracee->group_leader);
+        list_for_each_entry(relation, &ptracer_relations, node)
+                if (relation->tracee == tracee) {
+                        parent = relation->tracer;
+                        found = true;
+                        break;
+                }
+
+        if (found && (parent == NULL || task_is_descendant(parent, tracer)))
+                rc = 1;
+        rcu_read_unlock();
+        spin_unlock_bh(&ptracer_relations_lock);
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptrace_access_check - validate PTRACE_ATTACH calls
+ * @child: task that current task is attempting to ptrace
+ * @mode: ptrace attach mode
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+                                    unsigned int mode)
+{
+        int rc;
+
+        /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama.  We should
+         * only tighten restrictions further.
+         */
+        rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+        if (rc)
+                return rc;
+
+        /* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
+        if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH &&
+            ptrace_scope &&
+            !task_is_descendant(current, child) &&
+            !ptracer_exception_found(current, child) &&
+            !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+                rc = -EPERM;
+
+        if (rc) {
+                char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
+                printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "ptrace of non-child"
+                        " pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
+                        child->pid,
+                        get_task_comm(name, current),
+                        current->pid);
+        }
+
+        return rc;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
+        .name =                 "yama",
+
+        .ptrace_access_check =  yama_ptrace_access_check,
+        .task_prctl =           yama_task_prctl,
+        .task_free =            yama_task_free,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static int zero;
+static int one = 1;
+
+struct ctl_path yama_sysctl_path[] = {
+        { .procname = "kernel", },
+        { .procname = "yama", },
+        { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table yama_sysctl_table[] = {
+        {
+                .procname       = "ptrace_scope",
+                .data           = &ptrace_scope,
+                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+                .mode           = 0644,
+                .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+                .extra1         = &zero,
+                .extra2         = &one,
+        },
+        { }
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+static __init int yama_init(void)
+{
+        if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
+                return 0;
+
+        printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
+
+        if (register_security(&yama_ops))
+                panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+        if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
+                panic("Yama: sysctl registration failed.\n");
+#endif
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(yama_init);