CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials

Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management.  This uses RCU to manage the
credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks.
A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to
access or modify its own credentials.

A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect
of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to
execve().

With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be
changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified
and committed using something like the following sequence of events:

	struct cred *new = prepare_creds();
	int ret = blah(new);
	if (ret < 0) {
		abort_creds(new);
		return ret;
	}
	return commit_creds(new);

There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active
credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing
COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter
the keys in a keyring in use by another task.

To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in
the task_struct, are declared const.  The purpose of this is compile-time
discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers.  Once a set of
credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be
modified, except under special circumstances:

  (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented.

  (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced.

The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit
using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be
added by a later patch).

This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux
testsuite.

This patch makes several logical sets of alteration:

 (1) execve().

     This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the
     security code rather than altering the current creds directly.

 (2) Temporary credential overrides.

     do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and
     temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst
     preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex
     on the thread being dumped.

     This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the
     credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering
     the task's objective credentials.

 (3) LSM interface.

     A number of functions have been changed, added or removed:

     (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check()
     (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set()

     	 Removed in favour of security_capset().

     (*) security_capset(), ->capset()

     	 New.  This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old
     	 creds and the proposed capability sets.  It should fill in the new
     	 creds or return an error.  All pointers, barring the pointer to the
     	 new creds, are now const.

     (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds()

     	 Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be
     	 killed if it's an error.

     (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security()

     	 Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds().

     (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free()

     	 New.  Free security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare()

     	 New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security.

     (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit()

     	 New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new
     	 security by commit_creds().

     (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid()

     	 Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid().

     (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid()

     	 Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid().  This is used by
     	 cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with
     	 setuid() changes.  Changes are made to the new credentials, rather
     	 than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid().

     (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init()

     	 Removed.  Instead the task being reparented to init is referred
     	 directly to init's credentials.

	 NOTE!  This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no
	 longer records the sid of the thread that forked it.

     (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc()
     (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission()

     	 Changed.  These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to
     	 refer to the security context.

 (4) sys_capset().

     This has been simplified and uses less locking.  The LSM functions it
     calls have been merged.

 (5) reparent_to_kthreadd().

     This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using
     commit_thread() to point that way.

 (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid()

     __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds
     beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable
     user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if
     successful.

     switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be
     folded into that.  commit_creds() should take care of protecting
     __sigqueue_alloc().

 (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups.

     The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and
     abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying
     it.

     security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section.  This
     guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished.

     The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds().

     Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into
     commit_creds().

     The get functions all simply access the data directly.

 (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl().

     security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't
     want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly
     rather than through an argument.

     Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even
     if it doesn't end up using it.

 (9) Keyrings.

     A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code:

     (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have
     	 all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly.
     	 They may want separating out again later.

     (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer
     	 rather than a task pointer to specify the security context.

     (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new
     	 thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread
     	 keyring.

     (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend
     	 the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them.

     (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of
     	 credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for
     	 process or session keyrings (they're shared).

(10) Usermode helper.

     The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its
     subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer.  This set
     of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process
     after it has been cloned.

     call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and
     call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used.  A
     special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided
     specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call.

     call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the
     supplied keyring as the new session keyring.

(11) SELinux.

     SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM
     interface changes mentioned above:

     (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the
     	 current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock
     	 that covers getting the ptracer's SID.  Whilst this lock ensures that
     	 the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid
     	 until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the
     	 lock.

(12) is_single_threaded().

     This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into
     a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now
     wants to use it too.

     The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs
     with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough.  We really want
     to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD).

(13) nfsd.

     The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the
     credentials it is going to use.  It really needs to pass the credentials
     down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches
     in this series have been applied.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 140 insertions, 146 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index f20cbd681ba6..c71bba78872f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -156,20 +156,20 @@ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
         return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
 }
 
-/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
-
-static int cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
+/*
+ * initialise the security for the init task
+ */
+static void cred_init_security(void)
 {
+        struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!tsec)
-                return -ENOMEM;
+                panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
 
-        tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+        tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
         cred->security = tsec;
-
-        return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1379,6 +1379,19 @@ static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
 }
 
 /*
+ * Check permission between a pair of credentials
+ * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
+ */
+static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
+                         const struct cred *target,
+                         u32 perms)
+{
+        u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
+
+        return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
  * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
  * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
@@ -1820,24 +1833,19 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
-static int selinux_capset_check(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
-                                const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-                                const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+                          const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+                          const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+                          const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
         int error;
 
-        error = secondary_ops->capset_check(effective, inheritable, permitted);
+        error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+                                      effective, inheritable, permitted);
         if (error)
                 return error;
 
-        return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETCAP);
-}
-
-static void selinux_capset_set(const kernel_cap_t *effective,
-                               const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
-                               const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
-{
-        secondary_ops->capset_set(effective, inheritable, permitted);
+        return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap, int audit)
@@ -2244,16 +2252,23 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
 }
 
-static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
+static int selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
+        struct cred *new;
         u32 sid;
         int rc;
 
-        secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+        rc = secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
+        if (rc < 0)
+                return rc;
 
-        tsec = current_security();
+        new = prepare_creds();
+        if (!new)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        tsec = new->security;
 
         bsec = bprm->security;
         sid = bsec->sid;
@@ -2268,7 +2283,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
                                         PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
                         if (rc) {
                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
-                                return;
+                                goto out;
                         }
                 }
 
@@ -2292,12 +2307,16 @@ static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
                                 if (rc) {
                                         bsec->unsafe = 1;
-                                        return;
+                                        goto out;
                                 }
                         }
                 }
                 tsec->sid = sid;
         }
+
+out:
+        commit_creds(new);
+        return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3021,6 +3040,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+        int rc = 0;
 
 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
@@ -3029,9 +3049,9 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
                  * This has an additional check.
                  */
-                int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
+                rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
                 if (rc)
-                        return rc;
+                        goto error;
         }
 #endif
 
@@ -3048,7 +3068,9 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 
                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
         }
-        return 0;
+
+error:
+        return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
@@ -3090,8 +3112,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                 rc = 0;
                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
-                        rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
-                                           PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
+                        rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
@@ -3104,8 +3125,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
                          * modified content.  This typically should only
                          * occur for text relocations.
                          */
-                        rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file,
-                                           FILE__EXECMOD);
+                        rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
                 }
                 if (rc)
                         return rc;
@@ -3211,6 +3231,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
         struct inode *inode;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+
         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
         fsec = file->f_security;
         isec = inode->i_security;
@@ -3247,38 +3268,41 @@ static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
         return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
 }
 
-static int selinux_cred_alloc_security(struct cred *cred)
+/*
+ * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ */
+static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
-        int rc;
-
-        tsec1 = current_security();
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
+        cred->security = NULL;
+        kfree(tsec);
+}
 
-        rc = cred_alloc_security(cred);
-        if (rc)
-                return rc;
-        tsec2 = cred->security;
+/*
+ * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
+ */
+static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+                                gfp_t gfp)
+{
+        const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
+        struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 
-        tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
-        tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
+        old_tsec = old->security;
 
-        /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
-        tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
-        tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
-        tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
-        tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
+        tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
+        if (!tsec)
+                return -ENOMEM;
 
+        new->security = tsec;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
+ * commit new credentials
  */
-static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
-        cred->security = NULL;
-        kfree(tsec);
+        secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -3292,9 +3316,10 @@ static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
+static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+                                   int flags)
 {
-        return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
+        return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
@@ -3368,7 +3393,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim
         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
-           upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
+           upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
                 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
 
@@ -3422,13 +3447,12 @@ static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
                               unsigned long arg2,
                               unsigned long arg3,
                               unsigned long arg4,
-                              unsigned long arg5,
-                              long *rc_p)
+                              unsigned long arg5)
 {
         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
            the state of the current process. */
-        return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
+        return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
@@ -3436,18 +3460,6 @@ static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
 }
 
-static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
-{
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
-        secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
-
-        tsec = p->cred->security;
-        tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
-        tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
-        return;
-}
-
 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
                                   struct inode *inode)
 {
@@ -5325,7 +5337,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 {
         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
         struct task_struct *tracer;
-        u32 sid = 0;
+        struct cred *new;
+        u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
         int error;
         char *str = value;
 
@@ -5372,86 +5385,75 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
                         return error;
         }
 
+        new = prepare_creds();
+        if (!new)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
            performed during the actual operation (execve,
            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
-           operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
+           operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
-        tsec = p->cred->security;
-        if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+        tsec = new->security;
+        if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
-        else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+        } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
-        else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+        } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
                 if (error)
-                        return error;
+                        goto abort_change;
                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
-        } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+        } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
-        else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
-                struct av_decision avd;
-
+        } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+                error = -EINVAL;
                 if (sid == 0)
-                        return -EINVAL;
-                /*
-                 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
-                 *  - Single threaded processes.
-                 *  - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
-                 *    more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
-                 */
-                if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
-                        struct task_struct *g, *t;
-                        struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
-                        read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-                        do_each_thread(g, t) {
-                                if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
-                                        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
-                                        error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
-                                        if (!error)
-                                                goto boundary_ok;
-
-                                        return error;
-                                }
-                        } while_each_thread(g, t);
-                        read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+                        goto abort_change;
+
+                /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
+                error = -EPERM;
+                if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
+                        error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+                        if (error)
+                                goto abort_change;
                 }
-boundary_ok:
 
                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
                 if (error)
-                        return error;
+                        goto abort_change;
 
                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
+                ptsid = 0;
                 task_lock(p);
-                rcu_read_lock();
                 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
-                if (tracer != NULL) {
-                        u32 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
-                        rcu_read_unlock();
-                        error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
-                                                     SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-                                                     PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
-                        if (!error)
-                                tsec->sid = sid;
-                        task_unlock(p);
-                        avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
-                                  PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
+                if (tracer)
+                        ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
+                task_unlock(p);
+
+                if (tracer) {
+                        error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+                                             PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
                         if (error)
-                                return error;
-                } else {
-                        rcu_read_unlock();
-                        tsec->sid = sid;
-                        task_unlock(p);
+                                goto abort_change;
                 }
-        } else
-                return -EINVAL;
 
+                tsec->sid = sid;
+        } else {
+                error = -EINVAL;
+                goto abort_change;
+        }
+
+        commit_creds(new);
         return size;
+
+abort_change:
+        abort_creds(new);
+        return error;
 }
 
 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
@@ -5471,23 +5473,21 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 
-static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
+static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
                              unsigned long flags)
 {
-        const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
+        const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
 
         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
         if (!ksec)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
-        rcu_read_lock();
-        __tsec = __task_cred(tsk)->security;
-        if (__tsec->keycreate_sid)
-                ksec->sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
+        tsec = cred->security;
+        if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
+                ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
         else
-                ksec->sid = __tsec->sid;
-        rcu_read_unlock();
+                ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
 
         k->security = ksec;
         return 0;
@@ -5502,8 +5502,8 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
 }
 
 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
-                            struct task_struct *ctx,
-                            key_perm_t perm)
+                                  const struct cred *cred,
+                                  key_perm_t perm)
 {
         struct key *key;
         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
@@ -5515,7 +5515,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
         if (perm == 0)
                 return 0;
 
-        sid = task_sid(ctx);
+        sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
         ksec = key->security;
@@ -5545,8 +5545,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
-        .capset_check =                 selinux_capset_check,
-        .capset_set =                   selinux_capset_set,
+        .capset =                       selinux_capset,
         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
@@ -5621,10 +5620,11 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
 
         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
-        .cred_alloc_security =          selinux_cred_alloc_security,
         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
+        .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
+        .cred_commit =                  selinux_cred_commit,
         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
-        .task_post_setuid =             selinux_task_post_setuid,
+        .task_fix_setuid =              selinux_task_fix_setuid,
         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
@@ -5641,7 +5641,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
-        .task_reparent_to_init =        selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
 
         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
@@ -5737,8 +5736,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 
 static __init int selinux_init(void)
 {
-        struct task_security_struct *tsec;
-
         if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
                 selinux_enabled = 0;
                 return 0;
@@ -5752,10 +5749,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
 
         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
-        if (cred_alloc_security(current->cred))
-                panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
-        tsec = current->cred->security;
-        tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+        cred_init_security();
 
         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),