Merge tag 'v3.13-rc4' into core/locking

Merge Linux 3.13-rc4, to refresh this rather old tree with the latest fixes.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

15 files changed, 504 insertions, 379 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c540795fb3f2..419491d8e7d2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
+#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
@@ -95,8 +96,6 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
-
 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
 
 /* SECMARK reference count */
@@ -139,12 +138,28 @@ static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
- * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
+ * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.  If the always_check_network
+ * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
  *
  */
 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 {
-        return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
+        return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled.  Returns true
+ * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled.  If the
+ * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
+ * is always considered enabled.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
+{
+        return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 }
 
 /*
@@ -309,8 +324,11 @@ enum {
         Opt_defcontext = 3,
         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
         Opt_labelsupport = 5,
+        Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
 };
 
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS        (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
+
 static const match_table_t tokens = {
         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
@@ -355,6 +373,29 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
         return rc;
 }
 
+static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+        struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+
+        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
+            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
+            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
+                return 1;
+
+        /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
+        if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
+                return 1;
+
+        /*
+         * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
+         * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
+         */
+        if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
+                return 1;
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 {
         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
@@ -388,8 +429,6 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
                 }
         }
 
-        sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
-
         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
@@ -398,15 +437,9 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 
-        if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
-            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
-            sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
-            sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
-                sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
-
-        /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
-        if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
-                sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+        sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+        if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
+                sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
 
         /* Initialize the root inode. */
         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -460,15 +493,18 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
         if (!ss_initialized)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
+        /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
+        BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
+
         tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
-        for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
                 if (tmp & 0x01)
                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
                 tmp >>= 1;
         }
         /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
-        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+        if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
                 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 
         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -515,9 +551,9 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
         }
-        if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
+        if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
-                opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+                opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
         }
 
         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
@@ -614,7 +650,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
                 u32 sid;
 
-                if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+                if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
                         continue;
                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
@@ -685,9 +721,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
                  * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
                  * filesystem type.
                  */
-                rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ?
-                                        "proc" : sb->s_type->name,
-                                        &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+                rc = security_fs_use(sb);
                 if (rc) {
                         printk(KERN_WARNING
                                 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
@@ -1037,7 +1071,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
                         break;
-                case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
+                case SBLABEL_MNT:
                         seq_putc(m, ',');
                         seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
                         continue;
@@ -1649,7 +1683,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
 
-        if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
+        if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
                                              &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
                 if (rc)
@@ -2437,7 +2471,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
                 u32 sid;
                 size_t len;
 
-                if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+                if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
                         continue;
                 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
@@ -2606,7 +2640,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
             (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
                 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
-        else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
+        else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
                                              qstr, &newsid);
@@ -2628,7 +2662,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
                 isec->initialized = 1;
         }
 
-        if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
+        if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if (name)
@@ -2830,7 +2864,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
 
         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
-        if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
+        if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
         if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
@@ -3791,8 +3825,12 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
         u32 nlbl_sid;
         u32 nlbl_type;
 
-        selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
-        selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+        err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+        if (unlikely(err))
+                return -EACCES;
+        err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+        if (unlikely(err))
+                return -EACCES;
 
         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
         if (unlikely(err)) {
@@ -3805,6 +3843,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
         return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
+ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
+ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
+ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
+ *
+ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
+ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
+ * @conn_sid.  If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
+ * of @sk_sid.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
+{
+        int err = 0;
+
+        if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
+                err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+        else
+                *conn_sid = sk_sid;
+
+        return err;
+}
+
 /* socket security operations */
 
 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
@@ -4246,7 +4308,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
 
         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
-        peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+        peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
                 return 0;
 
@@ -4411,7 +4473,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
         int err;
         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
-        u32 newsid;
+        u32 connsid;
         u32 peersid;
 
         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
@@ -4421,16 +4483,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
         if (err)
                 return err;
-        if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
-                req->secid = sksec->sid;
-                req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
-        } else {
-                err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
-                if (err)
-                        return err;
-                req->secid = newsid;
-                req->peer_secid = peersid;
-        }
+        err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
+        if (err)
+                return err;
+        req->secid = connsid;
+        req->peer_secid = peersid;
 
         return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
 }
@@ -4628,7 +4685,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
 
         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
         netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
-        peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+        peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
                 return NF_ACCEPT;
 
@@ -4690,6 +4747,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
                                       u16 family)
 {
+        struct sock *sk;
         u32 sid;
 
         if (!netlbl_enabled())
@@ -4698,8 +4756,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
-        if (skb->sk) {
-                struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+        sk = skb->sk;
+        if (sk) {
+                struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
+
+                if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
+                        /* if the socket is the listening state then this
+                         * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
+                         * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
+                         * not the parent socket.  unfortunately, we can't
+                         * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
+                         * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
+                         * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
+                         * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
+                         * from the initial connection request (in the IP
+                         * layer).  it is far from ideal, but until we get a
+                         * security label in the packet itself this is the
+                         * best we can do. */
+                        return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+                /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
+                sksec = sk->sk_security;
                 sid = sksec->sid;
         } else
                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
@@ -4769,27 +4846,36 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+
+        secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+        peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+        if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+                return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+        sk = skb->sk;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
-         *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
-        if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
+         *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
+         * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
+         *       TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
+         *       is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
+         *       unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
+         *       connection. */
+        if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
+            !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
                 return NF_ACCEPT;
 #endif
-        secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
-        peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
-        if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
-                return NF_ACCEPT;
 
-        /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
-         * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
-         * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
-         * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
-        sk = skb->sk;
         if (sk == NULL) {
+                /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+                 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+                 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
+                 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
                 if (skb->skb_iif) {
                         secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
@@ -4798,7 +4884,45 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
                         secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
                 }
+        } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
+                /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
+                 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet.  In
+                 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
+                 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
+                 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
+                 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
+                 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
+                 * selinux_inet_conn_request().  See also selinux_ip_output()
+                 * for similar problems. */
+                u32 skb_sid;
+                struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+                if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+                        return NF_DROP;
+                /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
+                 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
+                 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
+                 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
+                 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
+                 * pass the packet. */
+                if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+                        switch (family) {
+                        case PF_INET:
+                                if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+                                        return NF_ACCEPT;
+                                break;
+                        case PF_INET6:
+                                if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
+                                        return NF_ACCEPT;
+                        default:
+                                return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+                        }
+                }
+                if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+                        return NF_DROP;
+                secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
         } else {
+                /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
+                 * associated socket. */
                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
@@ -5784,7 +5908,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
-        .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
+        .xfrm_state_alloc =             selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
+        .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =     selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index aa47bcabb5f6..b1dfe1049450 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ struct superblock_security_struct {
         u32 sid;                        /* SID of file system superblock */
         u32 def_sid;                    /* default SID for labeling */
         u32 mntpoint_sid;               /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
-        unsigned int behavior;          /* labeling behavior */
-        unsigned char flags;            /* which mount options were specified */
+        unsigned short behavior;        /* labeling behavior */
+        unsigned short flags;           /* which mount options were specified */
         struct mutex lock;
         struct list_head isec_head;
         spinlock_t isec_lock;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 8fd8e18ea340..fe341ae37004 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -45,14 +45,15 @@
 /* Mask for just the mount related flags */
 #define SE_MNTMASK      0x0f
 /* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+/* BE CAREFUL, these need to be the low order bits for selinux_get_mnt_opts */
 #define CONTEXT_MNT     0x01
 #define FSCONTEXT_MNT   0x02
 #define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04
 #define DEFCONTEXT_MNT  0x08
+#define SBLABEL_MNT     0x10
 /* Non-mount related flags */
-#define SE_SBINITIALIZED        0x10
-#define SE_SBPROC               0x20
-#define SE_SBLABELSUPP  0x40
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED        0x0100
+#define SE_SBPROC               0x0200
 
 #define CONTEXT_STR     "context="
 #define FSCONTEXT_STR   "fscontext="
@@ -68,12 +69,15 @@ extern int selinux_enabled;
 enum {
         POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER,
         POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM,
+        POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_REDHAT1,
+        POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
         __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
 };
 #define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
 
 extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
 
 /*
  * type_datum properties
@@ -172,8 +176,7 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE          7 /* use native label support */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX             7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */
 
-int security_fs_use(const char *fstype, unsigned int *behavior,
-        u32 *sid);
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb);
 
 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
         u32 *sid);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 6713f04e30ba..48c3cc94c168 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -10,29 +10,21 @@
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-                              struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+                              struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
                               struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
-        struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid);
+                             struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+                                     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid);
 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
 int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
-                        struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl);
-
-/*
- * Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
- */
-static inline struct inode_security_struct *get_sock_isec(struct sock *sk)
-{
-        if (!sk->sk_socket)
-                return NULL;
-
-        return SOCK_INODE(sk->sk_socket)->i_security;
-}
+                                      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+                                      const struct flowi *fl);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 extern atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount;
@@ -42,11 +34,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
         return (atomic_read(&selinux_xfrm_refcount) > 0);
 }
 
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct common_audit_data *ad);
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+                              struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
 
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
 {
@@ -64,19 +57,21 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
         return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct common_audit_data *ad)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+                                            struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
         return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+                                              struct common_audit_data *ad,
+                                              u8 proto)
 {
         return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid,
+                                              int ckall)
 {
         *sid = SECSID_NULL;
         return 0;
@@ -85,12 +80,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int
 static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
 {
 }
-#endif
 
-static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
 {
-        int err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
-        BUG_ON(err);
+        *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+        return 0;
 }
+#endif
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index da4b8b233280..6235d052338b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -442,8 +442,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
             sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
                 return 0;
 
-        local_bh_disable();
-        bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+        lock_sock(sk);
 
         /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
          * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
@@ -464,7 +463,6 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
                 sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
 
 socket_connect_return:
-        bh_unlock_sock(sk);
-        local_bh_enable();
+        release_sock(sk);
         return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index c5454c0477c3..03a72c32afd7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
                 break;
         default:
                 BUG();
+                return;
         }
 
         /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
@@ -225,6 +226,7 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
                 break;
         default:
                 BUG();
+                ret = -EINVAL;
         }
         if (ret != 0)
                 goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 855e464e92ef..332ac8a80cf5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] =
         { AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV,     NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
         { AUDIT_TTY_GET,        NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
         { AUDIT_TTY_SET,        NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT   },
+        { AUDIT_GET_FEATURE,    NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ     },
+        { AUDIT_SET_FEATURE,    NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE    },
 };
 
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index ff427733c290..5122affe06a8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@
 /* Policy capability filenames */
 static char *policycap_names[] = {
         "network_peer_controls",
-        "open_perms"
+        "open_perms",
+        "redhat1",
+        "always_check_network"
 };
 
 unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 30f119b1d1ec..820313a04d49 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -213,7 +213,12 @@ netlbl_import_failure:
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
-int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
+/*
+ * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally,
+ * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed
+ * last_e2bit.
+ */
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit)
 {
         struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
         int i;
@@ -223,14 +228,25 @@ int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
 
         n1 = e1->node;
         n2 = e2->node;
+
         while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
                 if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
                         n1 = n1->next;
                         continue;
                 }
-                for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) {
+                for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; )
+                        i--;    /* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
+                if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) {
+                        u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE +
+                                         __fls(n2->maps[i]);
+                        if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit)
+                                return 0;
+                }
+
+                while (i >= 0) {
                         if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i])
                                 return 0;
+                        i--;
                 }
 
                 n1 = n1->next;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 922f8afa89dd..712c8a7b8e8b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -16,7 +16,13 @@
 
 #include <net/netlabel.h>
 
-#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS       ((32 - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32))    \
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE       64
+#else
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE       32
+#endif
+
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS       ((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\
                                         / sizeof(unsigned long))
 #define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE       BITS_PER_LONG
 #define EBITMAP_SIZE            (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
@@ -117,7 +123,7 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 
 int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
 int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
-int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
 int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
 int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
 void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 40de8d3f208e..c85bc1ec040c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -160,8 +160,6 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
 {
         struct level_datum *levdatum;
-        struct ebitmap_node *node;
-        int i;
 
         if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
                 return 0;
@@ -170,19 +168,13 @@ int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
         if (!levdatum)
                 return 0;
 
-        ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&l->cat, node, i) {
-                if (i > p->p_cats.nprim)
-                        return 0;
-                if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i)) {
-                        /*
-                         * Category may not be associated with
-                         * sensitivity.
-                         */
-                        return 0;
-                }
-        }
-
-        return 1;
+        /*
+         * Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in
+         * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
+         * p->p_cats.nprim.
+         */
+        return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
+                                p->p_cats.nprim);
 }
 
 int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
index 03bed52a8052..e93648774137 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline int mls_level_eq(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
 static inline int mls_level_dom(struct mls_level *l1, struct mls_level *l2)
 {
         return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
-                ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+                ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0));
 }
 
 #define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index c8adde3aff8f..f6195ebde3c9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -3203,9 +3203,8 @@ static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
 
 static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
 {
-        size_t nel;
         __le32 buf[1];
-        int rc;
+        int rc, nel;
         struct policy_data pd;
 
         pd.p = p;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index b4feecc3fe01..d106733ad987 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
 
 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
+int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 
@@ -1812,6 +1813,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
                                                   POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
         selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
                                                   POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
+        selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+                                                  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
 }
 
 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
@@ -2323,17 +2326,14 @@ out:
 
 /**
  * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
- * @fstype: filesystem type
- * @behavior: labeling behavior
- * @sid: SID for filesystem (superblock)
+ * @sb: superblock in question
  */
-int security_fs_use(
-        const char *fstype,
-        unsigned int *behavior,
-        u32 *sid)
+int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 {
         int rc = 0;
         struct ocontext *c;
+        struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
+        const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
 
         read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
 
@@ -2345,21 +2345,21 @@ int security_fs_use(
         }
 
         if (c) {
-                *behavior = c->v.behavior;
+                sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
                 if (!c->sid[0]) {
                         rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
                                                    &c->sid[0]);
                         if (rc)
                                 goto out;
                 }
-                *sid = c->sid[0];
+                sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
         } else {
-                rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, sid);
+                rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
                 if (rc) {
-                        *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+                        sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
                         rc = 0;
                 } else {
-                        *behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+                        sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
                 }
         }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index d03081886214..0462cb3ff0a7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@
 atomic_t selinux_xfrm_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 /*
- * Returns true if an LSM/SELinux context
+ * Returns true if the context is an LSM/SELinux context.
  */
 static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_ctx(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 }
 
 /*
- * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux
+ * Returns true if the xfrm contains a security blob for SELinux.
  */
 static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
@@ -74,48 +74,111 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
- * a xfrm policy rule.
+ * Allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates it using the supplied security
+ * xfrm_user_sec_ctx context.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+                                   struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 {
         int rc;
-        u32 sel_sid;
+        const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+        u32 str_len;
 
-        /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-        if (ctx) {
-                if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
-                        return -EINVAL;
-
-                sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-        } else
-                /*
-                 * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
-                 * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
-                 * would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
-                 */
-                return 0;
+        if (ctxp == NULL || uctx == NULL ||
+            uctx->ctx_doi != XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM ||
+            uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
+        if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!ctx)
+                return -ENOMEM;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-                          NULL);
+        ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+        ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+        ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+        memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
+        ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
+        rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid);
+        if (rc)
+                goto err;
 
-        if (rc == -EACCES)
-                return -ESRCH;
+        rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+                          SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
+        if (rc)
+                goto err;
 
+        *ctxp = ctx;
+        atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+        return 0;
+
+err:
+        kfree(ctx);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /*
+ * Free the xfrm_sec_ctx structure.
+ */
+static void selinux_xfrm_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+        if (!ctx)
+                return;
+
+        atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+        kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authorize the deletion of a labeled SA or policy rule.
+ */
+static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
+{
+        const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
+
+        if (!ctx)
+                return 0;
+
+        return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+                            SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
+                            NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use a xfrm policy
+ * rule.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+{
+        int rc;
+
+        /* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
+         * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
+        if (!ctx)
+                return 0;
+
+        /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+        if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+                          SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
+        return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
+}
+
+/*
  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
  * the given policy, flow combo.
  */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-                        const struct flowi *fl)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+                                      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+                                      const struct flowi *fl)
 {
         u32 state_sid;
-        int rc;
 
         if (!xp->security)
                 if (x->security)
@@ -138,187 +201,111 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
         if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
                 return 0;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-                          NULL)? 0:1;
-
-        /*
-         * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
-         * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
-         * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
-         * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
-         */
-
-        return rc;
+        /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
+         * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
+         * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
+        return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+                            SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+                            NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
 
-/*
- * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
- * incoming packet.
- */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
+static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-        struct sec_path *sp;
+        struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
+        struct xfrm_state *x;
 
-        *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+        if (dst == NULL)
+                return SECSID_NULL;
+        x = dst->xfrm;
+        if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+                return SECSID_NULL;
 
-        if (skb == NULL)
-                return 0;
+        return x->security->ctx_sid;
+}
+
+static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
+                                        u32 *sid, int ckall)
+{
+        u32 sid_session = SECSID_NULL;
+        struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
 
-        sp = skb->sp;
         if (sp) {
-                int i, sid_set = 0;
+                int i;
 
-                for (i = sp->len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+                for (i = sp->len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
                         struct xfrm_state *x = sp->xvec[i];
                         if (selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
                                 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 
-                                if (!sid_set) {
-                                        *sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-                                        sid_set = 1;
-
+                                if (sid_session == SECSID_NULL) {
+                                        sid_session = ctx->ctx_sid;
                                         if (!ckall)
-                                                break;
-                                } else if (*sid != ctx->ctx_sid)
+                                                goto out;
+                                } else if (sid_session != ctx->ctx_sid) {
+                                        *sid = SECSID_NULL;
                                         return -EINVAL;
+                                }
                         }
                 }
         }
 
+out:
+        *sid = sid_session;
         return 0;
 }
 
 /*
- * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
- * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
  */
-static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
-        struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx, u32 sid)
+int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
 {
-        int rc = 0;
-        const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = NULL;
-        char *ctx_str = NULL;
-        u32 str_len;
-
-        BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
-
-        if (!uctx)
-                goto not_from_user;
-
-        if (uctx->ctx_alg != XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX)
-                return -EINVAL;
-
-        str_len = uctx->ctx_len;
-        if (str_len >= PAGE_SIZE)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
-                              str_len + 1,
-                              GFP_KERNEL);
-
-        if (!ctx)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        ctx->ctx_doi = uctx->ctx_doi;
-        ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
-        ctx->ctx_alg = uctx->ctx_alg;
-
-        memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
-               uctx+1,
-               str_len);
-        ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = 0;
-        rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str,
-                                     str_len,
-                                     &ctx->ctx_sid);
-
-        if (rc)
-                goto out;
-
-        /*
-         * Does the subject have permission to set security context?
-         */
-        rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-                          SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
-        if (rc)
-                goto out;
-
-        return rc;
-
-not_from_user:
-        rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
-        if (rc)
-                goto out;
-
-        *ctxp = ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) +
-                              str_len,
-                              GFP_ATOMIC);
-
-        if (!ctx) {
-                rc = -ENOMEM;
-                goto out;
+        if (skb == NULL) {
+                *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+                return 0;
         }
+        return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
+}
 
-        ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
-        ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
-        ctx->ctx_sid = sid;
-        ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
-        memcpy(ctx->ctx_str,
-               ctx_str,
-               str_len);
+int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+        int rc;
 
-        goto out2;
+        rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
+        if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
+                *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
 
-out:
-        *ctxp = NULL;
-        kfree(ctx);
-out2:
-        kfree(ctx_str);
         return rc;
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
- * xfrm_policy.
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to xfrm_policy.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
                               struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
 {
-        int err;
-
-        BUG_ON(!uctx);
-
-        err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0);
-        if (err == 0)
-                atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-
-        return err;
+        return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(ctxp, uctx);
 }
 
-
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
- * new for policy cloning.
+ * LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to new
+ * for policy cloning.
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
                               struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
 {
         struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
 
-        if (old_ctx) {
-                new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
-                                  GFP_ATOMIC);
-                if (!new_ctx)
-                        return -ENOMEM;
+        if (!old_ctx)
+                return 0;
+
+        new_ctx = kmemdup(old_ctx, sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+                          GFP_ATOMIC);
+        if (!new_ctx)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+        atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+        *new_ctxp = new_ctx;
 
-                memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
-                memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
-                atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-                *new_ctxp = new_ctx;
-        }
         return 0;
 }
 
@@ -327,8 +314,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
  */
 void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-        atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-        kfree(ctx);
+        selinux_xfrm_free(ctx);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -336,31 +322,58 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
  */
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 {
-        const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-
-        if (!ctx)
-                return 0;
+        return selinux_xfrm_delete(ctx);
+}
 
-        return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-                            SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
-                            NULL);
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state, populates it using
+ * the supplied security context, and assigns it to the xfrm_state.
+ */
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
+                             struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+{
+        return selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(&x->security, uctx);
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers sec_ctx spec to
- * xfrm_state.
+ * LSM hook implementation that allocates a xfrm_sec_state and populates based
+ * on a secid.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx,
-                u32 secid)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
+                                     struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
 {
-        int err;
+        int rc;
+        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
+        char *ctx_str = NULL;
+        int str_len;
+
+        if (!polsec)
+                return 0;
+
+        if (secid == 0)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+        if (rc)
+                return rc;
 
-        BUG_ON(!x);
+        ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*ctx) + str_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+        if (!ctx) {
+                rc = -ENOMEM;
+                goto out;
+        }
 
-        err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
-        if (err == 0)
-                atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-        return err;
+        ctx->ctx_doi = XFRM_SC_DOI_LSM;
+        ctx->ctx_alg = XFRM_SC_ALG_SELINUX;
+        ctx->ctx_sid = secid;
+        ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
+        memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, ctx_str, str_len);
+
+        x->security = ctx;
+        atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
+out:
+        kfree(ctx_str);
+        return rc;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -368,24 +381,15 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uct
  */
 void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-        atomic_dec(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
-        kfree(x->security);
+        selinux_xfrm_free(x->security);
 }
 
- /*
-  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
-  */
+/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled SAs.
+ */
 int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
-        const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
-        struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-
-        if (!ctx)
-                return 0;
-
-        return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
-                            SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
-                            NULL);
+        return selinux_xfrm_delete(x->security);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -395,14 +399,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
  * we need to check for unlabelled access since this may not have
  * gone thru the IPSec process.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                struct common_audit_data *ad)
+int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+                              struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
-        int i, rc = 0;
-        struct sec_path *sp;
-        u32 sel_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
-
-        sp = skb->sp;
+        int i;
+        struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+        u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
         if (sp) {
                 for (i = 0; i < sp->len; i++) {
@@ -410,23 +412,17 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
                         if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
                                 struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-                                sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+                                peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
                                 break;
                         }
                 }
         }
 
-        /*
-         * This check even when there's no association involved is
-         * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
-         * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
-         * explicitly allowed by policy.
-         */
-
-        rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
-
-        return rc;
+        /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+         * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+         * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+        return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+                            SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -436,49 +432,38 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
  * If we do have a authorizable security association, then it has already been
  * checked in the selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook above.
  */
-int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
-                                        struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
+int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+                                struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto)
 {
         struct dst_entry *dst;
-        int rc = 0;
-
-        dst = skb_dst(skb);
-
-        if (dst) {
-                struct dst_entry *dst_test;
-
-                for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != NULL;
-                     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
-                        struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
-
-                        if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
-                                goto out;
-                }
-        }
 
         switch (proto) {
         case IPPROTO_AH:
         case IPPROTO_ESP:
         case IPPROTO_COMP:
-                /*
-                 * We should have already seen this packet once before
-                 * it underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the
-                 * unlabeled check.
-                 */
-                goto out;
+                /* We should have already seen this packet once before it
+                 * underwent xfrm(s). No need to subject it to the unlabeled
+                 * check. */
+                return 0;
         default:
                 break;
         }
 
-        /*
-         * This check even when there's no association involved is
-         * intended, according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a
-         * process can't engage in non-ipsec communication unless
-         * explicitly allowed by policy.
-         */
+        dst = skb_dst(skb);
+        if (dst) {
+                struct dst_entry *iter;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(isec_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
-out:
-        return rc;
+                for (iter = dst; iter != NULL; iter = iter->child) {
+                        struct xfrm_state *x = iter->xfrm;
+
+                        if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
+                                return 0;
+                }
+        }
+
+        /* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
+         * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
+         * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
+        return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+                            SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 }