selinux: fast status update interface (/selinux/status)

This patch provides a new /selinux/status entry which allows applications
read-only mmap(2).
This region reflects selinux_kernel_status structure in kernel space.
  struct selinux_kernel_status
  {
          u32     length;         /* length of this structure */
          u32     sequence;       /* sequence number of seqlock logic */
          u32     enforcing;      /* current setting of enforcing mode */
          u32     policyload;     /* times of policy reloaded */
          u32     deny_unknown;   /* current setting of deny_unknown */
  };

When userspace object manager caches access control decisions provided
by SELinux, it needs to invalidate the cache on policy reload and setenforce
to keep consistency.
However, the applications need to check the kernel state for each accesses
on userspace avc, or launch a background worker process.
In heuristic, frequency of invalidation is much less than frequency of
making access control decision, so it is annoying to invoke a system call
to check we don't need to invalidate the userspace cache.
If we can use a background worker thread, it allows to receive invalidation
messages from the kernel. But it requires us an invasive coding toward the
base application in some cases; E.g, when we provide a feature performing
with SELinux as a plugin module, it is unwelcome manner to launch its own
worker thread from the module.

If we could map /selinux/status to process memory space, application can
know updates of selinux status; policy reload or setenforce.

A typical application checks selinux_kernel_status::sequence when it tries
to reference userspace avc. If it was changed from the last time when it
checked userspace avc, it means something was updated in the kernel space.
Then, the application can reset userspace avc or update current enforcing
mode, without any system call invocations.
This sequence number is updated according to the seqlock logic, so we need
to wait for a while if it is odd number.

Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
--
 security/selinux/include/security.h |   21 ++++++
 security/selinux/selinuxfs.c        |   56 +++++++++++++++
 security/selinux/ss/Makefile        |    2 +-
 security/selinux/ss/services.c      |    3 +
 security/selinux/ss/status.c        |  129 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

3 files changed, 133 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
index 15d4e62917de..974e11c7cf54 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/Makefile
@@ -5,5 +5,5 @@
 EXTRA_CFLAGS += -Isecurity/selinux -Isecurity/selinux/include
 obj-y := ss.o
 
-ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o
+ss-y := ebitmap.o hashtab.o symtab.o sidtab.o avtab.o policydb.o services.o conditional.o mls.o status.o
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 9ea2feca3cd4..494ff527c174 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1791,6 +1791,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
                 selinux_complete_init();
                 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
                 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+                selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
                 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
                 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
                 return 0;
@@ -1870,6 +1871,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 
         avc_ss_reset(seqno);
         selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+        selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
         selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
         selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 
@@ -2374,6 +2376,7 @@ out:
         if (!rc) {
                 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
                 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+                selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
                 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
         }
         return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5d9b225f8568
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/*
+ * mmap based event notifications for SELinux
+ *
+ * Author: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 NEC corporation
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * The selinux_status_page shall be exposed to userspace applications
+ * using mmap interface on /selinux/status.
+ * It enables to notify applications a few events that will cause reset
+ * of userspace access vector without context switching.
+ *
+ * The selinux_kernel_status structure on the head of status page is
+ * protected from concurrent accesses using seqlock logic, so userspace
+ * application should reference the status page according to the seqlock
+ * logic.
+ *
+ * Typically, application checks status->sequence at the head of access
+ * control routine. If it is odd-number, kernel is updating the status,
+ * so please wait for a moment. If it is changed from the last sequence
+ * number, it means something happen, so application will reset userspace
+ * avc, if needed.
+ * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
+ * changed without any system call invocations.
+ */
+static struct page *selinux_status_page = NULL;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
+
+/*
+ * selinux_kernel_status_page
+ *
+ * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
+ * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
+ */
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+{
+        struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+        struct page                    *result = NULL;
+
+        mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+        if (!selinux_status_page)
+        {
+                selinux_status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+                if (selinux_status_page)
+                {
+                        status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+                        status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
+                        status->sequence = 0;
+                        status->enforcing = selinux_enforcing;
+                        /*
+                         * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
+                         * a positive value on the status->policyload,
+                         * although it may not be 1, but never zero.
+                         * So, application can know it was updated.
+                         */
+                        status->policyload = 0;
+                        status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+                }
+        }
+        result = selinux_status_page;
+        mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+
+        return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_setenforce
+ *
+ * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
+{
+        struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+        mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+        if (selinux_status_page)
+        {
+                status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+                status->sequence++;
+                smp_wmb();
+
+                status->enforcing = enforcing;
+
+                smp_wmb();
+                status->sequence++;
+        }
+        mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * selinux_status_update_policyload
+ *
+ * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
+ * setting of deny_unknown.
+ */
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno)
+{
+        struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
+
+        mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
+        if (selinux_status_page)
+        {
+                status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+
+                status->sequence++;
+                smp_wmb();
+
+                status->policyload = seqno;
+                status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+                smp_wmb();
+                status->sequence++;
+        }
+        mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+}