Merge tag 'v3.13' into for-3.15

Linux 3.13

Conflicts:
	include/net/xfrm.h

Simple merge where v3.13 removed 'extern' from definitions and the audit
tree did s/u32/unsigned int/ to the same definitions.

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 217b6855e815..88e9a466940f 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ static void proc_keys_stop(struct seq_file *p, void *v)
 
 static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 {
-        const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
         struct rb_node *_p = v;
         struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node);
         struct timespec now;
@@ -191,15 +190,23 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
         char xbuf[12];
         int rc;
 
+        struct keyring_search_context ctx = {
+                .index_key.type         = key->type,
+                .index_key.description  = key->description,
+                .cred                   = current_cred(),
+                .match                  = lookup_user_key_possessed,
+                .match_data             = key,
+                .flags                  = (KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_STATE_CHECK |
+                                           KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT),
+        };
+
         key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 0);
 
         /* determine if the key is possessed by this process (a test we can
          * skip if the key does not indicate the possessor can view it
          */
         if (key->perm & KEY_POS_VIEW) {
-                skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(key->type, key,
-                                                      lookup_user_key_possessed,
-                                                      true, cred);
+                skey_ref = search_my_process_keyrings(&ctx);
                 if (!IS_ERR(skey_ref)) {
                         key_ref_put(skey_ref);
                         key_ref = make_key_ref(key, 1);
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
          * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
          *   access to __current_cred() safe
          */
-        rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, cred, KEY_VIEW);
+        rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
         if (rc < 0)
                 return 0;