diff options
| author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-04-22 20:32:51 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2013-04-22 20:32:51 -0400 |
| commit | 6e0895c2ea326cc4bb11e8fa2f654628d5754c31 (patch) | |
| tree | 7089303ac11a12edc43a8c4fa1b23974e10937ea /security/capability.c | |
| parent | 55fbbe46e9eb3cbe6c335503f5550855a1128dce (diff) | |
| parent | 60d509fa6a9c4653a86ad830e4c4b30360b23f0e (diff) | |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmsmac/mac80211_if.c
include/net/scm.h
net/batman-adv/routing.c
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
The e{uid,gid} --> {uid,gid} credentials fix conflicted with the
cleanup in net-next to now pass cred structs around.
The be2net driver had a bug fix in 'net' that overlapped with the VLAN
interface changes by Patrick McHardy in net-next.
An IGB conflict existed because in 'net' the build_skb() support was
reverted, and in 'net-next' there was a comment style fix within that
code.
Several batman-adv conflicts were resolved by making sure that all
calls to batadv_is_my_mac() are changed to have a new bat_priv first
argument.
Eric Dumazet's TS ECR fix in TCP in 'net' conflicted with the F-RTO
rewrite in 'net-next', mostly overlapping changes.
Thanks to Stephen Rothwell and Antonio Quartulli for help with several
of these merge resolutions.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/capability.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index 579775088967..6783c3e6c88e 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c | |||
| @@ -737,6 +737,11 @@ static int cap_tun_dev_open(void *security) | |||
| 737 | { | 737 | { |
| 738 | return 0; | 738 | return 0; |
| 739 | } | 739 | } |
| 740 | |||
| 741 | static void cap_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) | ||
| 742 | { | ||
| 743 | } | ||
| 744 | |||
| 740 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ | 745 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ |
| 741 | 746 | ||
| 742 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | 747 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
| @@ -1071,6 +1076,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) | |||
| 1071 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open); | 1076 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open); |
| 1072 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue); | 1077 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue); |
| 1073 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach); | 1078 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach); |
| 1079 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, skb_owned_by); | ||
| 1074 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ | 1080 | #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ |
| 1075 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM | 1081 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
| 1076 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security); | 1082 | set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security); |
