ipv6: protect skb->sk accesses from recursive dereference inside the stack

We should not consult skb->sk for output decisions in xmit recursion
levels > 0 in the stack. Otherwise local socket settings could influence
the result of e.g. tunnel encapsulation process.

ipv6 does not conform with this in three places:

1) ip6_fragment: we do consult ipv6_npinfo for frag_size

2) sk_mc_loop in ipv6 uses skb->sk and checks if we should
   loop the packet back to the local socket

3) ip6_skb_dst_mtu could query the settings from the user socket and
   force a wrong MTU

Furthermore:
In sk_mc_loop we could potentially land in WARN_ON(1) if we use a
PF_PACKET socket ontop of an IPv6-backed vxlan device.

Reuse xmit_recursion as we are currently only interested in protecting
tunnel devices.

Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
index 7e80b61b51ff..36cf0ab685a0 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
@@ -542,7 +542,8 @@ int ip6_fragment(struct sk_buff *skb, int (*output)(struct sk_buff *))
 {
         struct sk_buff *frag;
         struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb);
-        struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk ? inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
+        struct ipv6_pinfo *np = skb->sk && !dev_recursion_level() ?
+                                inet6_sk(skb->sk) : NULL;
         struct ipv6hdr *tmp_hdr;
         struct frag_hdr *fh;
         unsigned int mtu, hlen, left, len;