Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates for 3.4 from James Morris:
 "The main addition here is the new Yama security module from Kees Cook,
  which was discussed at the Linux Security Summit last year.  Its
  purpose is to collect miscellaneous DAC security enhancements in one
  place.  This also marks a departure in policy for LSM modules, which
  were previously limited to being standalone access control systems.
  Chromium OS is using Yama, and I believe there are plans for Ubuntu,
  at least.

  This patchset also includes maintenance updates for AppArmor, TOMOYO
  and others."

Fix trivial conflict in <net/sock.h> due to the jumo_label->static_key
rename.

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
  AppArmor: Fix location of const qualifier on generated string tables
  TOMOYO: Return error if fails to delete a domain
  AppArmor: add const qualifiers to string arrays
  AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy
  TOMOYO: Return appropriate value to poll().
  AppArmor: Move path failure information into aa_get_name and rename
  AppArmor: Update dfa matching routines.
  AppArmor: Minor cleanup of d_namespace_path to consolidate error handling
  AppArmor: Retrieve the dentry_path for error reporting when path lookup fails
  AppArmor: Add const qualifiers to generated string tables
  AppArmor: Fix oops in policy unpack auditing
  AppArmor: Fix error returned when a path lookup is disconnected
  KEYS: testing wrong bit for KEY_FLAG_REVOKED
  TOMOYO: Fix mount flags checking order.
  security: fix ima kconfig warning
  AppArmor: Fix the error case for chroot relative path name lookup
  AppArmor: fix mapping of META_READ to audit and quiet flags
  AppArmor: Fix underflow in xindex calculation
  AppArmor: Fix dropping of allowed operations that are force audited
  AppArmor: Add mising end of structure test to caps unpacking
  ...

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index da15a79b1441..39a68ddf38bd 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -936,6 +936,19 @@ void vm_stat_account(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long flags,
 #endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
 
 /*
+ * If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as
+ * low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr
+ */
+static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min(unsigned long hint)
+{
+        hint &= PAGE_MASK;
+        if (((void *)hint != NULL) &&
+            (hint < mmap_min_addr))
+                return PAGE_ALIGN(mmap_min_addr);
+        return hint;
+}
+
+/*
  * The caller must hold down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem).
  */
 
@@ -1235,7 +1248,7 @@ munmap_back:
          */
         if (accountable_mapping(file, vm_flags)) {
                 charged = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-                if (security_vm_enough_memory(charged))
+                if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, charged))
                         return -ENOMEM;
                 vm_flags |= VM_ACCOUNT;
         }
@@ -2180,7 +2193,7 @@ unsigned long do_brk(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len)
         if (mm->map_count > sysctl_max_map_count)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
-        if (security_vm_enough_memory(len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+        if (security_vm_enough_memory_mm(mm, len >> PAGE_SHIFT))
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
         /* Can we just expand an old private anonymous mapping? */