Merge tag 'omap-for-v3.10/timer-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tmlind/linux-omap into next/drivers

From Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>:

Clean-up for omap2+ timers from Jon Hunter <jon-hunter@ti.com>:

This series consists mainly of clean-ups for clockevents and
clocksource timers on OMAP2+ devices. The most significant change
in functionality comes from the 5th patch which is changing the
selection of the clocksource timer for OMAP3 and AM335x devices
when gptimers are used for clocksource.

Note that this series depends on 7185684 (ARM: OMAP: use
consistent error checking) in RMK's tree and 960cba6 (ARM:
OMAP5: timer: Update the clocksource name as per clock data)
in omap-for-v3.10/fixes-non-critical. So this branch is based
on a merge of 7185684 and omap-for-v3.10/fixes-non-critical
to avoid non-trivial merge conflicts.

* tag 'omap-for-v3.10/timer-signed' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tmlind/linux-omap:
  ARM: OMAP4+: Fix sparse warning in system timers
  ARM: OMAP2+: Store ID of system timers in timer structure
  ARM: OMAP3: Update clocksource timer selection
  ARM: OMAP2+: Simplify system timers definitions
  ARM: OMAP2+: Simplify system timer clock definitions
  ARM: OMAP2+: Remove hard-coded test on timer ID
  ARM: OMAP2+: Display correct system timer name
  ARM: OMAP2+: fix typo "CONFIG_BRIDGE_DVFS"
  ARM: OMAP1: remove "config MACH_OMAP_HTCWIZARD"
  ARM: OMAP: dpll: enable bypass clock only when attempting dpll bypass
  ARM: OMAP2+: powerdomain: avoid testing whether an unsigned char is less than 0
  ARM: OMAP2+: hwmod: Remove unused _HWMOD_WAKEUP_ENABLED flag
  ARM: OMAP2+: am335x: Change the wdt1 func clk src to per_32k clk
  ARM: OMAP2+: AM33xx: hwmod: Add missing sysc definition to wdt1 entry

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>

6 files changed, 27 insertions, 11 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 51e485ca9935..60bc027c61c3 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ void do_exit(long code)
         /*
          * Make sure we are holding no locks:
          */
-        debug_check_no_locks_held();
+        debug_check_no_locks_held(tsk);
         /*
          * We can do this unlocked here. The futex code uses this flag
          * just to verify whether the pi state cleanup has been done
diff --git a/kernel/lockdep.c b/kernel/lockdep.c
index 259db207b5d9..8a0efac4f99d 100644
--- a/kernel/lockdep.c
+++ b/kernel/lockdep.c
@@ -4088,7 +4088,7 @@ void debug_check_no_locks_freed(const void *mem_from, unsigned long mem_len)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debug_check_no_locks_freed);
 
-static void print_held_locks_bug(void)
+static void print_held_locks_bug(struct task_struct *curr)
 {
         if (!debug_locks_off())
                 return;
@@ -4097,21 +4097,22 @@ static void print_held_locks_bug(void)
 
         printk("\n");
         printk("=====================================\n");
-        printk("[ BUG: %s/%d still has locks held! ]\n",
-               current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
+        printk("[ BUG: lock held at task exit time! ]\n");
         print_kernel_ident();
         printk("-------------------------------------\n");
-        lockdep_print_held_locks(current);
+        printk("%s/%d is exiting with locks still held!\n",
+                curr->comm, task_pid_nr(curr));
+        lockdep_print_held_locks(curr);
+
         printk("\nstack backtrace:\n");
         dump_stack();
 }
 
-void debug_check_no_locks_held(void)
+void debug_check_no_locks_held(struct task_struct *task)
 {
-        if (unlikely(current->lockdep_depth > 0))
-                print_held_locks_bug();
+        if (unlikely(task->lockdep_depth > 0))
+                print_held_locks_bug(task);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(debug_check_no_locks_held);
 
 void debug_show_all_locks(void)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
index c1c3dc1c6023..bea15bdf82b0 100644
--- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
         int nr;
         int rc;
         struct task_struct *task, *me = current;
+        int init_pids = thread_group_leader(me) ? 1 : 2;
 
         /* Don't allow any more processes into the pid namespace */
         disable_pid_allocation(pid_ns);
@@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ void zap_pid_ns_processes(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
          */
         for (;;) {
                 set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE);
-                if (pid_ns->nr_hashed == 1)
+                if (pid_ns->nr_hashed == init_pids)
                         break;
                 schedule();
         }
diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
index 2fb8cb88df8d..7f32fe0e52cd 100644
--- a/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
+++ b/kernel/time/tick-broadcast.c
@@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ static void tick_broadcast_start_periodic(struct clock_event_device *bc)
  */
 int tick_check_broadcast_device(struct clock_event_device *dev)
 {
-        if ((tick_broadcast_device.evtdev &&
+        if ((dev->features & CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_DUMMY) ||
+            (tick_broadcast_device.evtdev &&
              tick_broadcast_device.evtdev->rating >= dev->rating) ||
              (dev->features & CLOCK_EVT_FEAT_C3STOP))
                 return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c
index e81978e8c03b..8e635a18ab52 100644
--- a/kernel/user.c
+++ b/kernel/user.c
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
         .owner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
         .group = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
         .proc_inum = PROC_USER_INIT_INO,
+        .may_mount_sysfs = true,
+        .may_mount_proc = true,
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);
 
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index b14f4d342043..a54f26f82eb2 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
@@ -61,6 +61,15 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
         kgid_t group = new->egid;
         int ret;
 
+        /*
+         * Verify that we can not violate the policy of which files
+         * may be accessed that is specified by the root directory,
+         * by verifing that the root directory is at the root of the
+         * mount namespace which allows all files to be accessed.
+         */
+        if (current_chrooted())
+                return -EPERM;
+
         /* The creator needs a mapping in the parent user namespace
          * or else we won't be able to reasonably tell userspace who
          * created a user_namespace.
@@ -87,6 +96,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
 
         set_cred_user_ns(new, ns);
 
+        update_mnt_policy(ns);
+
         return 0;
 }