aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/kernel/module.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>2014-03-12 21:41:30 -0400
committerRusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>2014-03-12 21:41:51 -0400
commit66cc69e34e86a231fbe68d8918c6119e3b7549a3 (patch)
treec1ea795511e9ed8ab83fda895f0151000b166629 /kernel/module.c
parentcff26a51da5d206d3baf871e75778da44710219d (diff)
Fix: module signature vs tracepoints: add new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE
Users have reported being unable to trace non-signed modules loaded within a kernel supporting module signature. This is caused by tracepoint.c:tracepoint_module_coming() refusing to take into account tracepoints sitting within force-loaded modules (TAINT_FORCED_MODULE). The reason for this check, in the first place, is that a force-loaded module may have a struct module incompatible with the layout expected by the kernel, and can thus cause a kernel crash upon forced load of that module on a kernel with CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y. Tracepoints, however, specifically accept TAINT_OOT_MODULE and TAINT_CRAP, since those modules do not lead to the "very likely system crash" issue cited above for force-loaded modules. With kernels having CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y (signed modules), a non-signed module is tainted re-using the TAINT_FORCED_MODULE taint flag. Unfortunately, this means that Tracepoints treat that module as a force-loaded module, and thus silently refuse to consider any tracepoint within this module. Since an unsigned module does not fit within the "very likely system crash" category of tainting, add a new TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE taint flag to specifically address this taint behavior, and accept those modules within Tracepoints. We use the letter 'X' as a taint flag character for a module being loaded that doesn't know how to sign its name (proposed by Steven Rostedt). Also add the missing 'O' entry to trace event show_module_flags() list for the sake of completeness. Signed-off-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> NAKed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> CC: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> CC: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/module.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/module.c4
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index efa1e6031950..c1acb0c5b637 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -1013,6 +1013,8 @@ static size_t module_flags_taint(struct module *mod, char *buf)
1013 buf[l++] = 'F'; 1013 buf[l++] = 'F';
1014 if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_CRAP)) 1014 if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_CRAP))
1015 buf[l++] = 'C'; 1015 buf[l++] = 'C';
1016 if (mod->taints & (1 << TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE))
1017 buf[l++] = 'X';
1016 /* 1018 /*
1017 * TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD: could be added. 1019 * TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD: could be added.
1018 * TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, TAINT_BAD_PAGE don't 1020 * TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, TAINT_BAD_PAGE don't
@@ -3214,7 +3216,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
3214 pr_notice_once("%s: module verification failed: signature " 3216 pr_notice_once("%s: module verification failed: signature "
3215 "and/or required key missing - tainting " 3217 "and/or required key missing - tainting "
3216 "kernel\n", mod->name); 3218 "kernel\n", mod->name);
3217 add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); 3219 add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
3218 } 3220 }
3219#endif 3221#endif
3220 3222