diff options
author | Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> | 2014-08-08 17:26:13 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-08-08 18:57:33 -0400 |
commit | 8e7d838103feac320baf9e68d73f954840ac1eea (patch) | |
tree | c9426b2a0b83962a08d0cf48001594e4b8e59541 /kernel/kexec.c | |
parent | 6a2c20e7d8900ed273dc34a9af9bf02fc478e427 (diff) |
kexec: verify the signature of signed PE bzImage
This is the final piece of the puzzle of verifying kernel image signature
during kexec_file_load() syscall.
This patch calls into PE file routines to verify signature of bzImage. If
signature are valid, kexec_file_load() succeeds otherwise it fails.
Two new config options have been introduced. First one is
CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This option enforces that kernel has to be
validly signed otherwise kernel load will fail. If this option is not
set, no signature verification will be done. Only exception will be when
secureboot is enabled. In that case signature verification should be
automatically enforced when secureboot is enabled. But that will happen
when secureboot patches are merged.
Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option
enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not
set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel
does not have support to verify signature of bzImage.
I tested these patches with both "pesign" and "sbsign" signed bzImages.
I used signing_key.priv key and signing_key.x509 cert for signing as
generated during kernel build process (if module signing is enabled).
Used following method to sign bzImage.
pesign
======
- Convert DER format cert to PEM format cert
openssl x509 -in signing_key.x509 -inform DER -out signing_key.x509.PEM -outform
PEM
- Generate a .p12 file from existing cert and private key file
openssl pkcs12 -export -out kernel-key.p12 -inkey signing_key.priv -in
signing_key.x509.PEM
- Import .p12 file into pesign db
pk12util -i /tmp/kernel-key.p12 -d /etc/pki/pesign
- Sign bzImage
pesign -i /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+ -o /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.pesign
-c "Glacier signing key - Magrathea" -s
sbsign
======
sbsign --key signing_key.priv --cert signing_key.x509.PEM --output
/boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+.signed.sbsign /boot/vmlinuz-3.16.0-rc3+
Patch details:
Well all the hard work is done in previous patches. Now bzImage loader
has just call into that code and verify whether bzImage signature are
valid or not.
Also create two config options. First one is CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG.
This option enforces that kernel has to be validly signed otherwise kernel
load will fail. If this option is not set, no signature verification will
be done. Only exception will be when secureboot is enabled. In that case
signature verification should be automatically enforced when secureboot is
enabled. But that will happen when secureboot patches are merged.
Second config option is CONFIG_KEXEC_BZIMAGE_VERIFY_SIG. This option
enables signature verification support on bzImage. If this option is not
set and previous one is set, kernel image loading will fail because kernel
does not have support to verify signature of bzImage.
Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: WANG Chao <chaowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@console-pimps.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/kexec.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/kexec.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index f18c780f9716..0b49a0a58102 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c | |||
@@ -416,6 +416,12 @@ void __weak arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image) | |||
416 | { | 416 | { |
417 | } | 417 | } |
418 | 418 | ||
419 | int __weak arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(struct kimage *image, void *buf, | ||
420 | unsigned long buf_len) | ||
421 | { | ||
422 | return -EKEYREJECTED; | ||
423 | } | ||
424 | |||
419 | /* Apply relocations of type RELA */ | 425 | /* Apply relocations of type RELA */ |
420 | int __weak | 426 | int __weak |
421 | arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(const Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, | 427 | arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(const Elf_Ehdr *ehdr, Elf_Shdr *sechdrs, |
@@ -494,6 +500,15 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, | |||
494 | if (ret) | 500 | if (ret) |
495 | goto out; | 501 | goto out; |
496 | 502 | ||
503 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG | ||
504 | ret = arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig(image, image->kernel_buf, | ||
505 | image->kernel_buf_len); | ||
506 | if (ret) { | ||
507 | pr_debug("kernel signature verification failed.\n"); | ||
508 | goto out; | ||
509 | } | ||
510 | pr_debug("kernel signature verification successful.\n"); | ||
511 | #endif | ||
497 | /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */ | 512 | /* It is possible that there no initramfs is being loaded */ |
498 | if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) { | 513 | if (!(flags & KEXEC_FILE_NO_INITRAMFS)) { |
499 | ret = copy_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf, | 514 | ret = copy_file_from_fd(initrd_fd, &image->initrd_buf, |