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authorTony Jones <tonyj@suse.de>2011-04-27 09:10:49 -0400
committerJiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>2011-04-27 09:11:03 -0400
commitf562988350361bf4118dd3c3e192dff763b493d9 (patch)
tree37acb6cfdb47681f38e0aa68d20ffd2934710666 /kernel/auditsc.c
parent80e8ff562ad775758634a58e7ea998e011519d98 (diff)
audit: acquire creds selectively to reduce atomic op overhead
Commit c69e8d9c01db ("CRED: Use RCU to access another task's creds and to release a task's own creds") added calls to get_task_cred and put_cred in audit_filter_rules. Profiling with a large number of audit rules active on the exit chain shows that we are spending upto 48% in this routine for syscall intensive tests, most of which is in the atomic ops. 1. The code should be accessing tsk->cred rather than tsk->real_cred. 2. Since tsk is current (or tsk is being created by copy_process) access to tsk->cred without rcu read lock is possible. At the request of the audit maintainer, a new flag has been added to audit_filter_rules in order to make this explicit and guide future code. Signed-off-by: Tony Jones <tonyj@suse.de> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/auditsc.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c27
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b33513a08beb..00d79df03e76 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -443,17 +443,25 @@ static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
443 443
444/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ 444/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
445/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 445/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
446 * otherwise. */ 446 * otherwise.
447 *
448 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
449 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
450 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
451 */
447static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, 452static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
448 struct audit_krule *rule, 453 struct audit_krule *rule,
449 struct audit_context *ctx, 454 struct audit_context *ctx,
450 struct audit_names *name, 455 struct audit_names *name,
451 enum audit_state *state) 456 enum audit_state *state,
457 bool task_creation)
452{ 458{
453 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tsk); 459 const struct cred *cred;
454 int i, j, need_sid = 1; 460 int i, j, need_sid = 1;
455 u32 sid; 461 u32 sid;
456 462
463 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
464
457 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { 465 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
458 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; 466 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
459 int result = 0; 467 int result = 0;
@@ -637,10 +645,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
637 break; 645 break;
638 } 646 }
639 647
640 if (!result) { 648 if (!result)
641 put_cred(cred);
642 return 0; 649 return 0;
643 }
644 } 650 }
645 651
646 if (ctx) { 652 if (ctx) {
@@ -656,7 +662,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
656 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; 662 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
657 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; 663 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
658 } 664 }
659 put_cred(cred);
660 return 1; 665 return 1;
661} 666}
662 667
@@ -671,7 +676,8 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
671 676
672 rcu_read_lock(); 677 rcu_read_lock();
673 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { 678 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
674 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, &state)) { 679 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
680 &state, true)) {
675 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 681 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
676 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); 682 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
677 rcu_read_unlock(); 683 rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -705,7 +711,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
705 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 711 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
706 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && 712 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
707 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, 713 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
708 &state)) { 714 &state, false)) {
709 rcu_read_unlock(); 715 rcu_read_unlock();
710 ctx->current_state = state; 716 ctx->current_state = state;
711 return state; 717 return state;
@@ -743,7 +749,8 @@ void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
743 749
744 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 750 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
745 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit && 751 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
746 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state)) { 752 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n,
753 &state, false)) {
747 rcu_read_unlock(); 754 rcu_read_unlock();
748 ctx->current_state = state; 755 ctx->current_state = state;
749 return; 756 return;