diff options
author | Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> | 2009-04-13 10:56:14 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-04-13 11:32:28 -0400 |
commit | 0ad30b8fd5fe798aae80df6344b415d8309342cc (patch) | |
tree | a62ffb310ab370df11a8fe2ba2995e952b6522be /include | |
parent | d3ab02a7c51fcbceafe999a515cc8bc4f0d0cfee (diff) |
add some long-missing capabilities to fs_mask
When POSIX capabilities were introduced during the 2.1 Linux
cycle, the fs mask, which represents the capabilities which having
fsuid==0 is supposed to grant, did not include CAP_MKNOD and
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. However, before capabilities the privilege
to call these did in fact depend upon fsuid==0.
This patch introduces those capabilities into the fsmask,
restoring the old behavior.
See the thread starting at http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/3/11/157 for
reference.
Note that if this fix is deemed valid, then earlier kernel versions (2.4
and 2.2) ought to be fixed too.
Changelog:
[Mar 23] Actually delete old CAP_FS_SET definition...
[Mar 20] Updated against J. Bruce Fields's patch
Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov <izh1979@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/capability.h | 23 |
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index 4864a43b2b45..c3021105edc0 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h | |||
@@ -377,7 +377,21 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { | |||
377 | #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \ | 377 | #define CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) \ |
378 | for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) | 378 | for (__capi = 0; __capi < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S; ++__capi) |
379 | 379 | ||
380 | /* | ||
381 | * CAP_FS_MASK and CAP_NFSD_MASKS: | ||
382 | * | ||
383 | * The fs mask is all the privileges that fsuid==0 historically meant. | ||
384 | * At one time in the past, that included CAP_MKNOD and CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. | ||
385 | * | ||
386 | * It has never meant setting security.* and trusted.* xattrs. | ||
387 | * | ||
388 | * We could also define fsmask as follows: | ||
389 | * 1. CAP_FS_MASK is the privilege to bypass all fs-related DAC permissions | ||
390 | * 2. The security.* and trusted.* xattrs are fs-related MAC permissions | ||
391 | */ | ||
392 | |||
380 | # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ | 393 | # define CAP_FS_MASK_B0 (CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_CHOWN) \ |
394 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD) \ | ||
381 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ | 395 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) \ |
382 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ | 396 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) \ |
383 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ | 397 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_FOWNER) \ |
@@ -392,11 +406,12 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data { | |||
392 | # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) | 406 | # define CAP_EMPTY_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ 0, 0 }}) |
393 | # define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) | 407 | # define CAP_FULL_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~0, ~0 }}) |
394 | # define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}) | 408 | # define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP), ~0 }}) |
395 | # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0, CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) | 409 | # define CAP_FS_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ |
410 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE), \ | ||
411 | CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) | ||
396 | # define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ | 412 | # define CAP_NFSD_SET ((kernel_cap_t){{ CAP_FS_MASK_B0 \ |
397 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) \ | 413 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE), \ |
398 | | CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_MKNOD), \ | 414 | CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) |
399 | CAP_FS_MASK_B1 } }) | ||
400 | 415 | ||
401 | #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ | 416 | #endif /* _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S != 2 */ |
402 | 417 | ||