diff options
author | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2011-01-17 11:05:27 -0500 |
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committer | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2011-01-17 11:05:27 -0500 |
commit | 7898e1f8e9eb1bee88c92d636e0ab93f2cbe31c6 (patch) | |
tree | d4aaa367bb42d0ff9d1e4ba227f248b5b9cd7687 /include/linux/xattr.h | |
parent | aeda4ac3efc29e4d55989abd0a73530453aa69ba (diff) |
Subject: [PATCH] Smack: mmap controls for library containment
In the embedded world there are often situations
where libraries are updated from a variety of sources,
for a variety of reasons, and with any number of
security characteristics. These differences
might include privilege required for a given library
provided interface to function properly, as occurs
from time to time in graphics libraries. There are
also cases where it is important to limit use of
libraries based on the provider of the library and
the security aware application may make choices
based on that criteria.
These issues are addressed by providing an additional
Smack label that may optionally be assigned to an object,
the SMACK64MMAP attribute. An mmap operation is allowed
if there is no such attribute.
If there is a SMACK64MMAP attribute the mmap is permitted
only if a subject with that label has all of the access
permitted a subject with the current task label.
Security aware applications may from time to time
wish to reduce their "privilege" to avoid accidental use
of privilege. One case where this arises is the
environment in which multiple sources provide libraries
to perform the same functions. An application may know
that it should eschew services made available from a
particular vendor, or of a particular version.
In support of this a secondary list of Smack rules has
been added that is local to the task. This list is
consulted only in the case where the global list has
approved access. It can only further restrict access.
Unlike the global last, if no entry is found on the
local list access is granted. An application can add
entries to its own list by writing to /smack/load-self.
The changes appear large as they involve refactoring
the list handling to accomodate there being more
than one rule list.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/xattr.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/xattr.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h index e6131ef98d8f..6050783005bd 100644 --- a/include/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h | |||
@@ -42,11 +42,13 @@ | |||
42 | #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" | 42 | #define XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT "SMACK64IPOUT" |
43 | #define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC" | 43 | #define XATTR_SMACK_EXEC "SMACK64EXEC" |
44 | #define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE" | 44 | #define XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE "SMACK64TRANSMUTE" |
45 | #define XATTR_SMACK_MMAP "SMACK64MMAP" | ||
45 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX | 46 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACK XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX |
46 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN | 47 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPIN |
47 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT | 48 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT |
48 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC | 49 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_EXEC |
49 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE | 50 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE |
51 | #define XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SMACK_MMAP | ||
50 | 52 | ||
51 | #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" | 53 | #define XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX "capability" |
52 | #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX | 54 | #define XATTR_NAME_CAPS XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX |