Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux

Pull mudule updates from Rusty Russell:
 "We get rid of the general module prefix confusion with a binary config
  option, fix a remove/insert race which Never Happens, and (my
  favorite) handle the case when we have too many modules for a single
  commandline.  Seriously, the kernel is full, please go away!"

* tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux:
  modpost: fix unwanted VMLINUX_SYMBOL_STR expansion
  X.509: Support parse long form of length octets in Authority Key Identifier
  module: don't unlink the module until we've removed all exposure.
  kernel: kallsyms: memory override issue, need check destination buffer length
  MODSIGN: do not send garbage to stderr when enabling modules signature
  modpost: handle huge numbers of modules.
  modpost: add -T option to read module names from file/stdin.
  modpost: minor cleanup.
  genksyms: pass symbol-prefix instead of arch
  module: fix symbol versioning with symbol prefixes
  CONFIG_SYMBOL_PREFIX: cleanup.

1 files changed, 47 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 7fabc4c01993..facbf26bc6bb 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int rsa_extract_mpi(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
         return 0;
 }
 
+/* The keyIdentifier in AuthorityKeyIdentifier SEQUENCE is tag(CONT,PRIM,0) */
+#define SEQ_TAG_KEYID (ASN1_CONT << 6)
+
 /*
  * Process certificate extensions that are used to qualify the certificate.
  */
@@ -407,21 +410,57 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
         }
 
         if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
+                size_t key_len;
+
                 /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
                 if (vlen < 5)
                         return -EBADMSG;
-                if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)) ||
-                    v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
-                    v[2] != (ASN1_CONT << 6) ||
-                    v[3] != vlen - 4)
+
+                /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
+                if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)))
                         return -EBADMSG;
-                v += 4;
-                vlen -= 4;
 
-                f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+                /* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */
+                if (unlikely(vlen == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH))
+                        return -EBADMSG;
+
+                if (vlen < ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
+                        /* Short Form length */
+                        if (v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
+                            v[2] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
+                            v[3] > vlen - 4)
+                                return -EBADMSG;
+
+                        key_len = v[3];
+                        v += 4;
+                } else {
+                        /* Long Form length */
+                        size_t seq_len = 0;
+                        size_t sub = v[1] - ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
+
+                        if (sub > 2)
+                                return -EBADMSG;
+
+                        /* calculate the length from subsequent octets */
+                        v += 2;
+                        for (i = 0; i < sub; i++) {
+                                seq_len <<= 8;
+                                seq_len |= v[i];
+                        }
+
+                        if (seq_len != vlen - 2 - sub ||
+                            v[sub] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
+                            v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
+                                return -EBADMSG;
+
+                        key_len = v[sub + 1];
+                        v += (sub + 2);
+                }
+
+                f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
                 if (!f)
                         return -ENOMEM;
-                for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
+                for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
                         sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
                 pr_debug("authority   %s\n", f);
                 ctx->cert->authority = f;