diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-10-12 10:13:55 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-10-12 10:13:55 -0400 |
commit | 5e40d331bd72447197f26525f21711c4a265b6a6 (patch) | |
tree | cfbf5efba46b0c5c5b3c8149395f721eab839945 /crypto | |
parent | d0ca47575ab3b41bb7f0fe5feec13c6cddb2913a (diff) | |
parent | 594081ee7145cc30a3977cb4e218f81213b63dc5 (diff) |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris.
Mostly ima, selinux, smack and key handling updates.
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (65 commits)
integrity: do zero padding of the key id
KEYS: output last portion of fingerprint in /proc/keys
KEYS: strip 'id:' from ca_keyid
KEYS: use swapped SKID for performing partial matching
KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keys
X.509: If available, use the raw subjKeyId to form the key description
KEYS: handle error code encoded in pointer
selinux: normalize audit log formatting
selinux: cleanup error reporting in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
KEYS: Check hex2bin()'s return when generating an asymmetric key ID
ima: detect violations for mmaped files
ima: fix race condition on ima_rdwr_violation_check and process_measurement
ima: added ima_policy_flag variable
ima: return an error code from ima_add_boot_aggregate()
ima: provide 'ima_appraise=log' kernel option
ima: move keyring initialization to ima_init()
PKCS#7: Handle PKCS#7 messages that contain no X.509 certs
PKCS#7: Better handling of unsupported crypto
KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching for asymmetric keys
KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling
...
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 265 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 99 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 90 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 102 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 57 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 115 |
11 files changed, 518 insertions, 232 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h index a63c551c6557..f97330886d58 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h | |||
@@ -9,9 +9,10 @@ | |||
9 | * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. | 9 | * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. |
10 | */ | 10 | */ |
11 | 11 | ||
12 | int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id); | 12 | extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id); |
13 | 13 | ||
14 | static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key) | 14 | static inline |
15 | const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key) | ||
15 | { | 16 | { |
16 | return key->type_data.p[1]; | 17 | return key->type_data.p[1]; |
17 | } | 18 | } |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index eb8cd46961a5..bcbbbd794e1d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | |||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ | |||
15 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> | 15 | #include <linux/seq_file.h> |
16 | #include <linux/module.h> | 16 | #include <linux/module.h> |
17 | #include <linux/slab.h> | 17 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
18 | #include <linux/ctype.h> | ||
18 | #include "asymmetric_keys.h" | 19 | #include "asymmetric_keys.h" |
19 | 20 | ||
20 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); | 21 | MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); |
@@ -22,85 +23,209 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); | |||
22 | static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers); | 23 | static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers); |
23 | static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); | 24 | static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem); |
24 | 25 | ||
25 | /* | 26 | /** |
26 | * Match asymmetric key id with partial match | 27 | * asymmetric_key_generate_id: Construct an asymmetric key ID |
27 | * @id: key id to match in a form "id:<id>" | 28 | * @val_1: First binary blob |
29 | * @len_1: Length of first binary blob | ||
30 | * @val_2: Second binary blob | ||
31 | * @len_2: Length of second binary blob | ||
32 | * | ||
33 | * Construct an asymmetric key ID from a pair of binary blobs. | ||
28 | */ | 34 | */ |
29 | int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id) | 35 | struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1, |
36 | size_t len_1, | ||
37 | const void *val_2, | ||
38 | size_t len_2) | ||
30 | { | 39 | { |
31 | size_t idlen, kidlen; | 40 | struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; |
41 | |||
42 | kid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + len_1 + len_2, | ||
43 | GFP_KERNEL); | ||
44 | if (!kid) | ||
45 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | ||
46 | kid->len = len_1 + len_2; | ||
47 | memcpy(kid->data, val_1, len_1); | ||
48 | memcpy(kid->data + len_1, val_2, len_2); | ||
49 | return kid; | ||
50 | } | ||
51 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_generate_id); | ||
32 | 52 | ||
33 | if (!kid || !id) | 53 | /** |
34 | return 0; | 54 | * asymmetric_key_id_same - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs are the same. |
55 | * @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare | ||
56 | */ | ||
57 | bool asymmetric_key_id_same(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1, | ||
58 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2) | ||
59 | { | ||
60 | if (!kid1 || !kid2) | ||
61 | return false; | ||
62 | if (kid1->len != kid2->len) | ||
63 | return false; | ||
64 | return memcmp(kid1->data, kid2->data, kid1->len) == 0; | ||
65 | } | ||
66 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_same); | ||
35 | 67 | ||
36 | /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */ | 68 | /** |
37 | if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0) | 69 | * asymmetric_key_id_partial - Return true if two asymmetric keys IDs |
38 | id += 3; | 70 | * partially match |
71 | * @kid_1, @kid_2: The key IDs to compare | ||
72 | */ | ||
73 | bool asymmetric_key_id_partial(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1, | ||
74 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2) | ||
75 | { | ||
76 | if (!kid1 || !kid2) | ||
77 | return false; | ||
78 | if (kid1->len < kid2->len) | ||
79 | return false; | ||
80 | return memcmp(kid1->data + (kid1->len - kid2->len), | ||
81 | kid2->data, kid2->len) == 0; | ||
82 | } | ||
83 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_key_id_partial); | ||
39 | 84 | ||
40 | /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */ | 85 | /** |
41 | idlen = strlen(id); | 86 | * asymmetric_match_key_ids - Search asymmetric key IDs |
42 | kidlen = strlen(kid); | 87 | * @kids: The list of key IDs to check |
43 | if (idlen > kidlen) | 88 | * @match_id: The key ID we're looking for |
44 | return 0; | 89 | * @match: The match function to use |
90 | */ | ||
91 | static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids( | ||
92 | const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids, | ||
93 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id, | ||
94 | bool (*match)(const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid1, | ||
95 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid2)) | ||
96 | { | ||
97 | int i; | ||
98 | |||
99 | if (!kids || !match_id) | ||
100 | return false; | ||
101 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++) | ||
102 | if (match(kids->id[i], match_id)) | ||
103 | return true; | ||
104 | return false; | ||
105 | } | ||
45 | 106 | ||
46 | kid += kidlen - idlen; | 107 | /** |
47 | if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0) | 108 | * asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID. |
48 | return 0; | 109 | * @id: The ID as a hex string. |
110 | */ | ||
111 | struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id) | ||
112 | { | ||
113 | struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id; | ||
114 | size_t hexlen; | ||
115 | int ret; | ||
49 | 116 | ||
50 | return 1; | 117 | if (!*id) |
118 | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | ||
119 | hexlen = strlen(id); | ||
120 | if (hexlen & 1) | ||
121 | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | ||
122 | |||
123 | match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + hexlen / 2, | ||
124 | GFP_KERNEL); | ||
125 | if (!match_id) | ||
126 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | ||
127 | match_id->len = hexlen / 2; | ||
128 | ret = hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen / 2); | ||
129 | if (ret < 0) { | ||
130 | kfree(match_id); | ||
131 | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); | ||
132 | } | ||
133 | return match_id; | ||
51 | } | 134 | } |
52 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match); | ||
53 | 135 | ||
54 | /* | 136 | /* |
55 | * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name | 137 | * Match asymmetric keys by an exact match on an ID. |
56 | * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys. We allow: | ||
57 | * | ||
58 | * "<desc>" - request a key by description | ||
59 | * "id:<id>" - request a key matching the ID | ||
60 | * "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype | ||
61 | */ | 138 | */ |
62 | static int asymmetric_key_match(const struct key *key, const void *description) | 139 | static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key, |
140 | const struct key_match_data *match_data) | ||
63 | { | 141 | { |
64 | const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); | 142 | const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); |
65 | const char *spec = description; | 143 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed; |
66 | const char *id; | ||
67 | ptrdiff_t speclen; | ||
68 | 144 | ||
69 | if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec) | 145 | return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id, |
70 | return 0; | 146 | asymmetric_key_id_same); |
147 | } | ||
71 | 148 | ||
72 | /* See if the full key description matches as is */ | 149 | /* |
73 | if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0) | 150 | * Match asymmetric keys by a partial match on an IDs. |
74 | return 1; | 151 | */ |
152 | static bool asymmetric_key_cmp_partial(const struct key *key, | ||
153 | const struct key_match_data *match_data) | ||
154 | { | ||
155 | const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); | ||
156 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed; | ||
75 | 157 | ||
76 | /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a | 158 | return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id, |
77 | * specifier, a colon and then an identifier. | 159 | asymmetric_key_id_partial); |
78 | */ | 160 | } |
79 | id = strchr(spec, ':'); | 161 | |
80 | if (!id) | 162 | /* |
81 | return 0; | 163 | * Preparse the match criterion. If we don't set lookup_type and cmp, |
164 | * the default will be an exact match on the key description. | ||
165 | * | ||
166 | * There are some specifiers for matching key IDs rather than by the key | ||
167 | * description: | ||
168 | * | ||
169 | * "id:<id>" - find a key by partial match on any available ID | ||
170 | * "ex:<id>" - find a key by exact match on any available ID | ||
171 | * | ||
172 | * These have to be searched by iteration rather than by direct lookup because | ||
173 | * the key is hashed according to its description. | ||
174 | */ | ||
175 | static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data) | ||
176 | { | ||
177 | struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id; | ||
178 | const char *spec = match_data->raw_data; | ||
179 | const char *id; | ||
180 | bool (*cmp)(const struct key *, const struct key_match_data *) = | ||
181 | asymmetric_key_cmp; | ||
82 | 182 | ||
83 | speclen = id - spec; | 183 | if (!spec || !*spec) |
84 | id++; | 184 | return -EINVAL; |
185 | if (spec[0] == 'i' && | ||
186 | spec[1] == 'd' && | ||
187 | spec[2] == ':') { | ||
188 | id = spec + 3; | ||
189 | cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp_partial; | ||
190 | } else if (spec[0] == 'e' && | ||
191 | spec[1] == 'x' && | ||
192 | spec[2] == ':') { | ||
193 | id = spec + 3; | ||
194 | } else { | ||
195 | goto default_match; | ||
196 | } | ||
85 | 197 | ||
86 | if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0) | 198 | match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id); |
87 | return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id); | 199 | if (IS_ERR(match_id)) |
200 | return PTR_ERR(match_id); | ||
88 | 201 | ||
89 | if (speclen == subtype->name_len && | 202 | match_data->preparsed = match_id; |
90 | memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0) | 203 | match_data->cmp = cmp; |
91 | return 1; | 204 | match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE; |
205 | return 0; | ||
92 | 206 | ||
207 | default_match: | ||
93 | return 0; | 208 | return 0; |
94 | } | 209 | } |
95 | 210 | ||
96 | /* | 211 | /* |
212 | * Free the preparsed the match criterion. | ||
213 | */ | ||
214 | static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data) | ||
215 | { | ||
216 | kfree(match_data->preparsed); | ||
217 | } | ||
218 | |||
219 | /* | ||
97 | * Describe the asymmetric key | 220 | * Describe the asymmetric key |
98 | */ | 221 | */ |
99 | static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) | 222 | static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) |
100 | { | 223 | { |
101 | const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); | 224 | const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); |
102 | const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key); | 225 | const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key); |
103 | size_t n; | 226 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; |
227 | const unsigned char *p; | ||
228 | int n; | ||
104 | 229 | ||
105 | seq_puts(m, key->description); | 230 | seq_puts(m, key->description); |
106 | 231 | ||
@@ -108,13 +233,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) | |||
108 | seq_puts(m, ": "); | 233 | seq_puts(m, ": "); |
109 | subtype->describe(key, m); | 234 | subtype->describe(key, m); |
110 | 235 | ||
111 | if (kid) { | 236 | if (kids && kids->id[1]) { |
237 | kid = kids->id[1]; | ||
112 | seq_putc(m, ' '); | 238 | seq_putc(m, ' '); |
113 | n = strlen(kid); | 239 | n = kid->len; |
114 | if (n <= 8) | 240 | p = kid->data; |
115 | seq_puts(m, kid); | 241 | if (n > 4) { |
116 | else | 242 | p += n - 4; |
117 | seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8); | 243 | n = 4; |
244 | } | ||
245 | seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p); | ||
118 | } | 246 | } |
119 | 247 | ||
120 | seq_puts(m, " ["); | 248 | seq_puts(m, " ["); |
@@ -165,6 +293,8 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | |||
165 | static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | 293 | static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) |
166 | { | 294 | { |
167 | struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0]; | 295 | struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0]; |
296 | struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1]; | ||
297 | int i; | ||
168 | 298 | ||
169 | pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); | 299 | pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); |
170 | 300 | ||
@@ -172,7 +302,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | |||
172 | subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]); | 302 | subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]); |
173 | module_put(subtype->owner); | 303 | module_put(subtype->owner); |
174 | } | 304 | } |
175 | kfree(prep->type_data[1]); | 305 | if (kids) { |
306 | for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++) | ||
307 | kfree(kids->id[i]); | ||
308 | kfree(kids); | ||
309 | } | ||
176 | kfree(prep->description); | 310 | kfree(prep->description); |
177 | } | 311 | } |
178 | 312 | ||
@@ -182,13 +316,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | |||
182 | static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key) | 316 | static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key) |
183 | { | 317 | { |
184 | struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); | 318 | struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key); |
319 | struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1]; | ||
320 | |||
185 | if (subtype) { | 321 | if (subtype) { |
186 | subtype->destroy(key->payload.data); | 322 | subtype->destroy(key->payload.data); |
187 | module_put(subtype->owner); | 323 | module_put(subtype->owner); |
188 | key->type_data.p[0] = NULL; | 324 | key->type_data.p[0] = NULL; |
189 | } | 325 | } |
190 | kfree(key->type_data.p[1]); | 326 | |
191 | key->type_data.p[1] = NULL; | 327 | if (kids) { |
328 | kfree(kids->id[0]); | ||
329 | kfree(kids->id[1]); | ||
330 | kfree(kids); | ||
331 | key->type_data.p[1] = NULL; | ||
332 | } | ||
192 | } | 333 | } |
193 | 334 | ||
194 | struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { | 335 | struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { |
@@ -196,10 +337,10 @@ struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = { | |||
196 | .preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse, | 337 | .preparse = asymmetric_key_preparse, |
197 | .free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse, | 338 | .free_preparse = asymmetric_key_free_preparse, |
198 | .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, | 339 | .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, |
199 | .match = asymmetric_key_match, | 340 | .match_preparse = asymmetric_key_match_preparse, |
341 | .match_free = asymmetric_key_match_free, | ||
200 | .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, | 342 | .destroy = asymmetric_key_destroy, |
201 | .describe = asymmetric_key_describe, | 343 | .describe = asymmetric_key_describe, |
202 | .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE, | ||
203 | }; | 344 | }; |
204 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric); | 345 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_asymmetric); |
205 | 346 | ||
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c index 3de5fb011de0..751f8fd7335d 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | |||
@@ -72,11 +72,9 @@ error: | |||
72 | */ | 72 | */ |
73 | static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = { | 73 | static struct key_type key_type_pkcs7 = { |
74 | .name = "pkcs7_test", | 74 | .name = "pkcs7_test", |
75 | .def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, | ||
76 | .preparse = pkcs7_preparse, | 75 | .preparse = pkcs7_preparse, |
77 | .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, | 76 | .free_preparse = user_free_preparse, |
78 | .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, | 77 | .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate, |
79 | .match = user_match, | ||
80 | .revoke = user_revoke, | 78 | .revoke = user_revoke, |
81 | .destroy = user_destroy, | 79 | .destroy = user_destroy, |
82 | .describe = user_describe, | 80 | .describe = user_describe, |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c index 42e56aa7d277..3bd5a1e4c493 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | |||
@@ -29,8 +29,25 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context { | |||
29 | enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */ | 29 | enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */ |
30 | unsigned x509_index; | 30 | unsigned x509_index; |
31 | unsigned sinfo_index; | 31 | unsigned sinfo_index; |
32 | const void *raw_serial; | ||
33 | unsigned raw_serial_size; | ||
34 | unsigned raw_issuer_size; | ||
35 | const void *raw_issuer; | ||
32 | }; | 36 | }; |
33 | 37 | ||
38 | /* | ||
39 | * Free a signed information block. | ||
40 | */ | ||
41 | static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo) | ||
42 | { | ||
43 | if (sinfo) { | ||
44 | mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]); | ||
45 | kfree(sinfo->sig.digest); | ||
46 | kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id); | ||
47 | kfree(sinfo); | ||
48 | } | ||
49 | } | ||
50 | |||
34 | /** | 51 | /** |
35 | * pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message | 52 | * pkcs7_free_message - Free a PKCS#7 message |
36 | * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free | 53 | * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to free |
@@ -54,9 +71,7 @@ void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) | |||
54 | while (pkcs7->signed_infos) { | 71 | while (pkcs7->signed_infos) { |
55 | sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; | 72 | sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; |
56 | pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next; | 73 | pkcs7->signed_infos = sinfo->next; |
57 | mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]); | 74 | pkcs7_free_signed_info(sinfo); |
58 | kfree(sinfo->sig.digest); | ||
59 | kfree(sinfo); | ||
60 | } | 75 | } |
61 | kfree(pkcs7); | 76 | kfree(pkcs7); |
62 | } | 77 | } |
@@ -71,51 +86,46 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message); | |||
71 | struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen) | 86 | struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen) |
72 | { | 87 | { |
73 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx; | 88 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx; |
74 | struct pkcs7_message *msg; | 89 | struct pkcs7_message *msg = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
75 | long ret; | 90 | int ret; |
76 | 91 | ||
77 | ret = -ENOMEM; | ||
78 | msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL); | ||
79 | if (!msg) | ||
80 | goto error_no_sig; | ||
81 | ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL); | 92 | ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL); |
82 | if (!ctx) | 93 | if (!ctx) |
83 | goto error_no_ctx; | 94 | goto out_no_ctx; |
95 | ctx->msg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_message), GFP_KERNEL); | ||
96 | if (!ctx->msg) | ||
97 | goto out_no_msg; | ||
84 | ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL); | 98 | ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL); |
85 | if (!ctx->sinfo) | 99 | if (!ctx->sinfo) |
86 | goto error_no_sinfo; | 100 | goto out_no_sinfo; |
87 | 101 | ||
88 | ctx->msg = msg; | ||
89 | ctx->data = (unsigned long)data; | 102 | ctx->data = (unsigned long)data; |
90 | ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs; | 103 | ctx->ppcerts = &ctx->certs; |
91 | ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos; | 104 | ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->msg->signed_infos; |
92 | 105 | ||
93 | /* Attempt to decode the signature */ | 106 | /* Attempt to decode the signature */ |
94 | ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen); | 107 | ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&pkcs7_decoder, ctx, data, datalen); |
95 | if (ret < 0) | 108 | if (ret < 0) { |
96 | goto error_decode; | 109 | msg = ERR_PTR(ret); |
110 | goto out; | ||
111 | } | ||
97 | 112 | ||
113 | msg = ctx->msg; | ||
114 | ctx->msg = NULL; | ||
115 | |||
116 | out: | ||
98 | while (ctx->certs) { | 117 | while (ctx->certs) { |
99 | struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs; | 118 | struct x509_certificate *cert = ctx->certs; |
100 | ctx->certs = cert->next; | 119 | ctx->certs = cert->next; |
101 | x509_free_certificate(cert); | 120 | x509_free_certificate(cert); |
102 | } | 121 | } |
103 | mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]); | 122 | pkcs7_free_signed_info(ctx->sinfo); |
104 | kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest); | 123 | out_no_sinfo: |
105 | kfree(ctx->sinfo); | 124 | pkcs7_free_message(ctx->msg); |
125 | out_no_msg: | ||
106 | kfree(ctx); | 126 | kfree(ctx); |
127 | out_no_ctx: | ||
107 | return msg; | 128 | return msg; |
108 | |||
109 | error_decode: | ||
110 | mpi_free(ctx->sinfo->sig.mpi[0]); | ||
111 | kfree(ctx->sinfo->sig.digest); | ||
112 | kfree(ctx->sinfo); | ||
113 | error_no_sinfo: | ||
114 | kfree(ctx); | ||
115 | error_no_ctx: | ||
116 | pkcs7_free_message(msg); | ||
117 | error_no_sig: | ||
118 | return ERR_PTR(ret); | ||
119 | } | 129 | } |
120 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message); | 130 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_parse_message); |
121 | 131 | ||
@@ -246,10 +256,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen, | |||
246 | if (IS_ERR(x509)) | 256 | if (IS_ERR(x509)) |
247 | return PTR_ERR(x509); | 257 | return PTR_ERR(x509); |
248 | 258 | ||
249 | pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject); | ||
250 | pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint); | ||
251 | |||
252 | x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index; | 259 | x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index; |
260 | pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject); | ||
261 | pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data); | ||
262 | |||
253 | *ctx->ppcerts = x509; | 263 | *ctx->ppcerts = x509; |
254 | ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next; | 264 | ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next; |
255 | return 0; | 265 | return 0; |
@@ -338,8 +348,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, | |||
338 | const void *value, size_t vlen) | 348 | const void *value, size_t vlen) |
339 | { | 349 | { |
340 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; | 350 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; |
341 | ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value; | 351 | ctx->raw_serial = value; |
342 | ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen; | 352 | ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen; |
343 | return 0; | 353 | return 0; |
344 | } | 354 | } |
345 | 355 | ||
@@ -351,8 +361,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, | |||
351 | const void *value, size_t vlen) | 361 | const void *value, size_t vlen) |
352 | { | 362 | { |
353 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; | 363 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; |
354 | ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value; | 364 | ctx->raw_issuer = value; |
355 | ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen; | 365 | ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen; |
356 | return 0; | 366 | return 0; |
357 | } | 367 | } |
358 | 368 | ||
@@ -385,10 +395,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen, | |||
385 | const void *value, size_t vlen) | 395 | const void *value, size_t vlen) |
386 | { | 396 | { |
387 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; | 397 | struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context; |
388 | 398 | struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo; | |
389 | ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index; | 399 | struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; |
390 | *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo; | 400 | |
391 | ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next; | 401 | /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */ |
402 | kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial, | ||
403 | ctx->raw_serial_size, | ||
404 | ctx->raw_issuer, | ||
405 | ctx->raw_issuer_size); | ||
406 | if (IS_ERR(kid)) | ||
407 | return PTR_ERR(kid); | ||
408 | |||
409 | sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid; | ||
410 | sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index; | ||
411 | *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo; | ||
412 | ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next; | ||
392 | ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL); | 413 | ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL); |
393 | if (!ctx->sinfo) | 414 | if (!ctx->sinfo) |
394 | return -ENOMEM; | 415 | return -ENOMEM; |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h index d25f4d15370f..efc7dc9b8f9c 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | |||
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info { | |||
23 | struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */ | 23 | struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */ |
24 | unsigned index; | 24 | unsigned index; |
25 | bool trusted; | 25 | bool trusted; |
26 | bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */ | ||
26 | 27 | ||
27 | /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */ | 28 | /* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */ |
28 | const void *msgdigest; | 29 | const void *msgdigest; |
@@ -33,10 +34,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info { | |||
33 | const void *authattrs; | 34 | const void *authattrs; |
34 | 35 | ||
35 | /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */ | 36 | /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */ |
36 | const void *raw_serial; | 37 | struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id; |
37 | unsigned raw_serial_size; | ||
38 | unsigned raw_issuer_size; | ||
39 | const void *raw_issuer; | ||
40 | 38 | ||
41 | /* Message signature. | 39 | /* Message signature. |
42 | * | 40 | * |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c index e666eb011a85..1d29376072da 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | |||
@@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ | |||
23 | /** | 23 | /** |
24 | * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. | 24 | * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. |
25 | */ | 25 | */ |
26 | int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | 26 | static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, |
27 | struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo, | 27 | struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo, |
28 | struct key *trust_keyring) | 28 | struct key *trust_keyring) |
29 | { | 29 | { |
30 | struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig; | 30 | struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig; |
31 | struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p; | 31 | struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p; |
@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
35 | 35 | ||
36 | kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index); | 36 | kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index); |
37 | 37 | ||
38 | if (sinfo->unsupported_crypto) { | ||
39 | kleave(" = -ENOPKG [cached]"); | ||
40 | return -ENOPKG; | ||
41 | } | ||
42 | |||
38 | for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) { | 43 | for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) { |
39 | if (x509->seen) { | 44 | if (x509->seen) { |
40 | if (x509->verified) { | 45 | if (x509->verified) { |
@@ -49,15 +54,18 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
49 | /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted | 54 | /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted |
50 | * keys. | 55 | * keys. |
51 | */ | 56 | */ |
52 | key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject, | 57 | key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id, |
53 | x509->fingerprint); | 58 | false); |
54 | if (!IS_ERR(key)) | 59 | if (!IS_ERR(key)) { |
55 | /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message | 60 | /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message |
56 | * is apparently the same as one we already trust. | 61 | * is apparently the same as one we already trust. |
57 | * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate | 62 | * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate |
58 | * the signature on the descendant. | 63 | * the signature on the descendant. |
59 | */ | 64 | */ |
65 | pr_devel("sinfo %u: Cert %u as key %x\n", | ||
66 | sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key)); | ||
60 | goto matched; | 67 | goto matched; |
68 | } | ||
61 | if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)) | 69 | if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)) |
62 | return -ENOMEM; | 70 | return -ENOMEM; |
63 | 71 | ||
@@ -77,16 +85,36 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
77 | /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the | 85 | /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the |
78 | * trusted keys. | 86 | * trusted keys. |
79 | */ | 87 | */ |
80 | if (!last || !last->issuer || !last->authority) { | 88 | if (last && last->authority) { |
81 | kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]"); | 89 | key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority, |
82 | return -ENOKEY; | 90 | false); |
91 | if (!IS_ERR(key)) { | ||
92 | x509 = last; | ||
93 | pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n", | ||
94 | sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key)); | ||
95 | goto matched; | ||
96 | } | ||
97 | if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY) | ||
98 | return PTR_ERR(key); | ||
99 | } | ||
100 | |||
101 | /* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches | ||
102 | * the signed info directly. | ||
103 | */ | ||
104 | key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, | ||
105 | sinfo->signing_cert_id, | ||
106 | false); | ||
107 | if (!IS_ERR(key)) { | ||
108 | pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n", | ||
109 | sinfo->index, key_serial(key)); | ||
110 | x509 = NULL; | ||
111 | goto matched; | ||
83 | } | 112 | } |
113 | if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY) | ||
114 | return PTR_ERR(key); | ||
84 | 115 | ||
85 | key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer, | 116 | kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]"); |
86 | last->authority); | 117 | return -ENOKEY; |
87 | if (IS_ERR(key)) | ||
88 | return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY; | ||
89 | x509 = last; | ||
90 | 118 | ||
91 | matched: | 119 | matched: |
92 | ret = verify_signature(key, sig); | 120 | ret = verify_signature(key, sig); |
@@ -100,10 +128,12 @@ matched: | |||
100 | } | 128 | } |
101 | 129 | ||
102 | verified: | 130 | verified: |
103 | x509->verified = true; | 131 | if (x509) { |
104 | for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) { | 132 | x509->verified = true; |
105 | p->verified = true; | 133 | for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) { |
106 | p->trusted = trusted; | 134 | p->verified = true; |
135 | p->trusted = trusted; | ||
136 | } | ||
107 | } | 137 | } |
108 | sinfo->trusted = trusted; | 138 | sinfo->trusted = trusted; |
109 | kleave(" = 0"); | 139 | kleave(" = 0"); |
@@ -141,24 +171,28 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
141 | { | 171 | { |
142 | struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; | 172 | struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; |
143 | struct x509_certificate *p; | 173 | struct x509_certificate *p; |
144 | int cached_ret = 0, ret; | 174 | int cached_ret = -ENOKEY; |
175 | int ret; | ||
145 | 176 | ||
146 | for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) | 177 | for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) |
147 | p->seen = false; | 178 | p->seen = false; |
148 | 179 | ||
149 | for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { | 180 | for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { |
150 | ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring); | 181 | ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring); |
151 | if (ret < 0) { | 182 | switch (ret) { |
152 | if (ret == -ENOPKG) { | 183 | case -ENOKEY: |
184 | continue; | ||
185 | case -ENOPKG: | ||
186 | if (cached_ret == -ENOKEY) | ||
153 | cached_ret = -ENOPKG; | 187 | cached_ret = -ENOPKG; |
154 | } else if (ret == -ENOKEY) { | 188 | continue; |
155 | if (cached_ret == 0) | 189 | case 0: |
156 | cached_ret = -ENOKEY; | 190 | *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted; |
157 | } else { | 191 | cached_ret = 0; |
158 | return ret; | 192 | continue; |
159 | } | 193 | default: |
194 | return ret; | ||
160 | } | 195 | } |
161 | *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted; | ||
162 | } | 196 | } |
163 | 197 | ||
164 | return cached_ret; | 198 | return cached_ret; |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index c62cf8006e1f..cd455450b069 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | |||
@@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
131 | struct x509_certificate *x509; | 131 | struct x509_certificate *x509; |
132 | unsigned certix = 1; | 132 | unsigned certix = 1; |
133 | 133 | ||
134 | kenter("%u,%u,%u", | 134 | kenter("%u", sinfo->index); |
135 | sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size); | ||
136 | 135 | ||
137 | for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) { | 136 | for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) { |
138 | /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will | 137 | /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will |
@@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
140 | * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's | 139 | * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that. It's |
141 | * possible this will need element-by-element comparison. | 140 | * possible this will need element-by-element comparison. |
142 | */ | 141 | */ |
143 | if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size || | 142 | if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id)) |
144 | memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial, | ||
145 | sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0) | ||
146 | continue; | 143 | continue; |
147 | pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n", | 144 | pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n", |
148 | sinfo->index, certix); | 145 | sinfo->index, certix); |
149 | 146 | ||
150 | if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size || | ||
151 | memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer, | ||
152 | sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) { | ||
153 | pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n", | ||
154 | sinfo->index); | ||
155 | continue; | ||
156 | } | ||
157 | |||
158 | if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) { | 147 | if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) { |
159 | pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n", | 148 | pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n", |
160 | sinfo->index); | 149 | sinfo->index); |
@@ -164,9 +153,14 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
164 | sinfo->signer = x509; | 153 | sinfo->signer = x509; |
165 | return 0; | 154 | return 0; |
166 | } | 155 | } |
167 | pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n", | 156 | |
168 | sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial); | 157 | /* The relevant X.509 cert isn't found here, but it might be found in |
169 | return -ENOKEY; | 158 | * the trust keyring. |
159 | */ | ||
160 | pr_debug("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*phN)\n", | ||
161 | sinfo->index, | ||
162 | sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data); | ||
163 | return 0; | ||
170 | } | 164 | } |
171 | 165 | ||
172 | /* | 166 | /* |
@@ -184,15 +178,18 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
184 | p->seen = false; | 178 | p->seen = false; |
185 | 179 | ||
186 | for (;;) { | 180 | for (;;) { |
187 | pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint); | 181 | pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n", |
182 | x509->subject, | ||
183 | x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial); | ||
188 | x509->seen = true; | 184 | x509->seen = true; |
189 | ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); | 185 | ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); |
190 | if (ret < 0) | 186 | if (ret < 0) |
191 | return ret; | 187 | goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509; |
192 | 188 | ||
193 | pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); | 189 | pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); |
194 | if (x509->authority) | 190 | if (x509->authority) |
195 | pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority); | 191 | pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n", |
192 | x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data); | ||
196 | 193 | ||
197 | if (!x509->authority || | 194 | if (!x509->authority || |
198 | strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) { | 195 | strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) { |
@@ -209,7 +206,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
209 | 206 | ||
210 | ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509); | 207 | ret = x509_check_signature(x509->pub, x509); |
211 | if (ret < 0) | 208 | if (ret < 0) |
212 | return ret; | 209 | goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509; |
213 | x509->signer = x509; | 210 | x509->signer = x509; |
214 | pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); | 211 | pr_debug("- self-signed\n"); |
215 | return 0; | 212 | return 0; |
@@ -218,13 +215,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
218 | /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's | 215 | /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's |
219 | * list to see if the next one is there. | 216 | * list to see if the next one is there. |
220 | */ | 217 | */ |
221 | pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority); | 218 | pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", |
219 | x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data); | ||
222 | for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) { | 220 | for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) { |
223 | pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint); | 221 | if (!p->skid) |
224 | if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size && | 222 | continue; |
225 | strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 && | 223 | pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n", |
226 | memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer, | 224 | p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data); |
227 | x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0) | 225 | if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority)) |
228 | goto found_issuer; | 226 | goto found_issuer; |
229 | } | 227 | } |
230 | 228 | ||
@@ -233,7 +231,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
233 | return 0; | 231 | return 0; |
234 | 232 | ||
235 | found_issuer: | 233 | found_issuer: |
236 | pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject); | 234 | pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject); |
237 | if (p->seen) { | 235 | if (p->seen) { |
238 | pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n", | 236 | pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n", |
239 | sinfo->index); | 237 | sinfo->index); |
@@ -250,6 +248,17 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
250 | x509 = p; | 248 | x509 = p; |
251 | might_sleep(); | 249 | might_sleep(); |
252 | } | 250 | } |
251 | |||
252 | maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509: | ||
253 | /* Just prune the certificate chain at this point if we lack some | ||
254 | * crypto module to go further. Note, however, we don't want to set | ||
255 | * sinfo->missing_crypto as the signed info block may still be | ||
256 | * validatable against an X.509 cert lower in the chain that we have a | ||
257 | * trusted copy of. | ||
258 | */ | ||
259 | if (ret == -ENOPKG) | ||
260 | return 0; | ||
261 | return ret; | ||
253 | } | 262 | } |
254 | 263 | ||
255 | /* | 264 | /* |
@@ -269,11 +278,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
269 | if (ret < 0) | 278 | if (ret < 0) |
270 | return ret; | 279 | return ret; |
271 | 280 | ||
272 | /* Find the key for the signature */ | 281 | /* Find the key for the signature if there is one */ |
273 | ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo); | 282 | ret = pkcs7_find_key(pkcs7, sinfo); |
274 | if (ret < 0) | 283 | if (ret < 0) |
275 | return ret; | 284 | return ret; |
276 | 285 | ||
286 | if (!sinfo->signer) | ||
287 | return 0; | ||
288 | |||
277 | pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n", | 289 | pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n", |
278 | sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index); | 290 | sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index); |
279 | 291 | ||
@@ -291,11 +303,33 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, | |||
291 | /** | 303 | /** |
292 | * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message | 304 | * pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message |
293 | * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified | 305 | * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified |
306 | * | ||
307 | * Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest | ||
308 | * matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one | ||
309 | * of the X.509 certificates it carries that matches another X.509 cert in the | ||
310 | * message can be verified. | ||
311 | * | ||
312 | * This does not look to match the contents of the PKCS#7 message against any | ||
313 | * external public keys. | ||
314 | * | ||
315 | * Returns, in order of descending priority: | ||
316 | * | ||
317 | * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an | ||
318 | * appropriate X.509 certificate, or: | ||
319 | * | ||
320 | * (*) -EBADMSG if some part of the message was invalid, or: | ||
321 | * | ||
322 | * (*) -ENOPKG if none of the signature chains are verifiable because suitable | ||
323 | * crypto modules couldn't be found, or: | ||
324 | * | ||
325 | * (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified | ||
326 | * (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or: | ||
294 | */ | 327 | */ |
295 | int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) | 328 | int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) |
296 | { | 329 | { |
297 | struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; | 330 | struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo; |
298 | struct x509_certificate *x509; | 331 | struct x509_certificate *x509; |
332 | int enopkg = -ENOPKG; | ||
299 | int ret, n; | 333 | int ret, n; |
300 | 334 | ||
301 | kenter(""); | 335 | kenter(""); |
@@ -304,18 +338,24 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) | |||
304 | ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); | 338 | ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); |
305 | if (ret < 0) | 339 | if (ret < 0) |
306 | return ret; | 340 | return ret; |
307 | pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority); | 341 | pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n", |
342 | n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data); | ||
308 | } | 343 | } |
309 | 344 | ||
310 | for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { | 345 | for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { |
311 | ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo); | 346 | ret = pkcs7_verify_one(pkcs7, sinfo); |
312 | if (ret < 0) { | 347 | if (ret < 0) { |
348 | if (ret == -ENOPKG) { | ||
349 | sinfo->unsupported_crypto = true; | ||
350 | continue; | ||
351 | } | ||
313 | kleave(" = %d", ret); | 352 | kleave(" = %d", ret); |
314 | return ret; | 353 | return ret; |
315 | } | 354 | } |
355 | enopkg = 0; | ||
316 | } | 356 | } |
317 | 357 | ||
318 | kleave(" = 0"); | 358 | kleave(" = %d", enopkg); |
319 | return 0; | 359 | return enopkg; |
320 | } | 360 | } |
321 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify); | 361 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify); |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c index 50b3f880b4ff..7525fd183574 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | |||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ | |||
11 | * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. | 11 | * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. |
12 | */ | 12 | */ |
13 | 13 | ||
14 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) "SIG: "fmt | ||
14 | #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> | 15 | #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> |
15 | #include <linux/module.h> | 16 | #include <linux/module.h> |
16 | #include <linux/err.h> | 17 | #include <linux/err.h> |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index ac72348c186a..a668d90302d3 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | |||
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert) | |||
46 | public_key_destroy(cert->pub); | 46 | public_key_destroy(cert->pub); |
47 | kfree(cert->issuer); | 47 | kfree(cert->issuer); |
48 | kfree(cert->subject); | 48 | kfree(cert->subject); |
49 | kfree(cert->fingerprint); | 49 | kfree(cert->id); |
50 | kfree(cert->skid); | ||
50 | kfree(cert->authority); | 51 | kfree(cert->authority); |
51 | kfree(cert->sig.digest); | 52 | kfree(cert->sig.digest); |
52 | mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s); | 53 | mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s); |
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen) | |||
62 | { | 63 | { |
63 | struct x509_certificate *cert; | 64 | struct x509_certificate *cert; |
64 | struct x509_parse_context *ctx; | 65 | struct x509_parse_context *ctx; |
66 | struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; | ||
65 | long ret; | 67 | long ret; |
66 | 68 | ||
67 | ret = -ENOMEM; | 69 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
@@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen) | |||
89 | if (ret < 0) | 91 | if (ret < 0) |
90 | goto error_decode; | 92 | goto error_decode; |
91 | 93 | ||
94 | /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */ | ||
95 | kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial, | ||
96 | cert->raw_serial_size, | ||
97 | cert->raw_issuer, | ||
98 | cert->raw_issuer_size); | ||
99 | if (IS_ERR(kid)) { | ||
100 | ret = PTR_ERR(kid); | ||
101 | goto error_decode; | ||
102 | } | ||
103 | cert->id = kid; | ||
104 | |||
92 | kfree(ctx); | 105 | kfree(ctx); |
93 | return cert; | 106 | return cert; |
94 | 107 | ||
@@ -407,36 +420,36 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, | |||
407 | const void *value, size_t vlen) | 420 | const void *value, size_t vlen) |
408 | { | 421 | { |
409 | struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; | 422 | struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; |
423 | struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; | ||
410 | const unsigned char *v = value; | 424 | const unsigned char *v = value; |
411 | char *f; | ||
412 | int i; | 425 | int i; |
413 | 426 | ||
414 | pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); | 427 | pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); |
415 | 428 | ||
416 | if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) { | 429 | if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) { |
417 | /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */ | 430 | /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */ |
418 | if (vlen < 3) | 431 | if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3) |
419 | return -EBADMSG; | 432 | return -EBADMSG; |
420 | if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2) | 433 | if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2) |
421 | return -EBADMSG; | 434 | return -EBADMSG; |
422 | v += 2; | 435 | v += 2; |
423 | vlen -= 2; | 436 | vlen -= 2; |
424 | 437 | ||
425 | f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | 438 | ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen; |
426 | if (!f) | 439 | ctx->cert->raw_skid = v; |
427 | return -ENOMEM; | 440 | kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_subject, |
428 | for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++) | 441 | ctx->cert->raw_subject_size, |
429 | sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]); | 442 | v, vlen); |
430 | pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f); | 443 | if (IS_ERR(kid)) |
431 | ctx->cert->fingerprint = f; | 444 | return PTR_ERR(kid); |
445 | ctx->cert->skid = kid; | ||
446 | pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data); | ||
432 | return 0; | 447 | return 0; |
433 | } | 448 | } |
434 | 449 | ||
435 | if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) { | 450 | if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) { |
436 | size_t key_len; | ||
437 | |||
438 | /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */ | 451 | /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */ |
439 | if (vlen < 5) | 452 | if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5) |
440 | return -EBADMSG; | 453 | return -EBADMSG; |
441 | 454 | ||
442 | /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */ | 455 | /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */ |
@@ -454,7 +467,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, | |||
454 | v[3] > vlen - 4) | 467 | v[3] > vlen - 4) |
455 | return -EBADMSG; | 468 | return -EBADMSG; |
456 | 469 | ||
457 | key_len = v[3]; | 470 | vlen = v[3]; |
458 | v += 4; | 471 | v += 4; |
459 | } else { | 472 | } else { |
460 | /* Long Form length */ | 473 | /* Long Form length */ |
@@ -476,17 +489,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, | |||
476 | v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub) | 489 | v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub) |
477 | return -EBADMSG; | 490 | return -EBADMSG; |
478 | 491 | ||
479 | key_len = v[sub + 1]; | 492 | vlen = v[sub + 1]; |
480 | v += (sub + 2); | 493 | v += (sub + 2); |
481 | } | 494 | } |
482 | 495 | ||
483 | f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | 496 | kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer, |
484 | if (!f) | 497 | ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size, |
485 | return -ENOMEM; | 498 | v, vlen); |
486 | for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++) | 499 | if (IS_ERR(kid)) |
487 | sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]); | 500 | return PTR_ERR(kid); |
488 | pr_debug("authority %s\n", f); | 501 | pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data); |
489 | ctx->cert->authority = f; | 502 | ctx->cert->authority = kid; |
490 | return 0; | 503 | return 0; |
491 | } | 504 | } |
492 | 505 | ||
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index 1b76f207c1f3..3dfe6b5d6f0b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | |||
@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate { | |||
19 | struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */ | 19 | struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */ |
20 | char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ | 20 | char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ |
21 | char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ | 21 | char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ |
22 | char *fingerprint; /* Key fingerprint as hex */ | 22 | struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Serial number + issuer */ |
23 | char *authority; /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */ | 23 | struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */ |
24 | struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier (optional) */ | ||
24 | struct tm valid_from; | 25 | struct tm valid_from; |
25 | struct tm valid_to; | 26 | struct tm valid_to; |
26 | const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ | 27 | const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ |
@@ -33,10 +34,13 @@ struct x509_certificate { | |||
33 | const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */ | 34 | const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */ |
34 | const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */ | 35 | const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */ |
35 | unsigned raw_subject_size; | 36 | unsigned raw_subject_size; |
37 | unsigned raw_skid_size; | ||
38 | const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */ | ||
36 | unsigned index; | 39 | unsigned index; |
37 | bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ | 40 | bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */ |
38 | bool verified; | 41 | bool verified; |
39 | bool trusted; | 42 | bool trusted; |
43 | bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if can't be verified due to missing crypto */ | ||
40 | }; | 44 | }; |
41 | 45 | ||
42 | /* | 46 | /* |
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index f3d62307e6ee..a6c42031628e 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | |||
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ | |||
25 | #include "x509_parser.h" | 25 | #include "x509_parser.h" |
26 | 26 | ||
27 | static bool use_builtin_keys; | 27 | static bool use_builtin_keys; |
28 | static char *ca_keyid; | 28 | static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid; |
29 | 29 | ||
30 | #ifndef MODULE | 30 | #ifndef MODULE |
31 | static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) | 31 | static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) |
@@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str) | |||
33 | if (!str) /* default system keyring */ | 33 | if (!str) /* default system keyring */ |
34 | return 1; | 34 | return 1; |
35 | 35 | ||
36 | if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) | 36 | if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) { |
37 | ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ | 37 | struct asymmetric_key_id *p; |
38 | else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) | 38 | p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3); |
39 | if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL)) | ||
40 | pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n"); | ||
41 | else if (!IS_ERR(p)) | ||
42 | ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */ | ||
43 | } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) { | ||
39 | use_builtin_keys = true; | 44 | use_builtin_keys = true; |
45 | } | ||
40 | 46 | ||
41 | return 1; | 47 | return 1; |
42 | } | 48 | } |
@@ -46,31 +52,35 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup); | |||
46 | /** | 52 | /** |
47 | * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params. | 53 | * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params. |
48 | * @keyring: The keys to search. | 54 | * @keyring: The keys to search. |
49 | * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs. | 55 | * @kid: The key ID. |
50 | * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string. | 56 | * @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false. |
51 | * | 57 | * |
52 | * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might, | 58 | * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might, |
53 | * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509 | 59 | * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509 |
54 | * certificate that needs to be verified. | 60 | * certificate that needs to be verified. |
55 | */ | 61 | */ |
56 | struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, | 62 | struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, |
57 | const char *subject, | 63 | const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid, |
58 | const char *key_id) | 64 | bool partial) |
59 | { | 65 | { |
60 | key_ref_t key; | 66 | key_ref_t key; |
61 | size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id); | 67 | char *id, *p; |
62 | char *id; | ||
63 | 68 | ||
64 | /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */ | 69 | /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */ |
65 | id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | 70 | p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
66 | if (!id) | 71 | if (!id) |
67 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); | 72 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
68 | 73 | ||
69 | memcpy(id, subject, subject_len); | 74 | if (partial) { |
70 | id[subject_len + 0] = ':'; | 75 | *p++ = 'i'; |
71 | id[subject_len + 1] = ' '; | 76 | *p++ = 'd'; |
72 | memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len); | 77 | } else { |
73 | id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0; | 78 | *p++ = 'e'; |
79 | *p++ = 'x'; | ||
80 | } | ||
81 | *p++ = ':'; | ||
82 | p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len); | ||
83 | *p = 0; | ||
74 | 84 | ||
75 | pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); | 85 | pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id); |
76 | 86 | ||
@@ -112,6 +122,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) | |||
112 | 122 | ||
113 | pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); | 123 | pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); |
114 | 124 | ||
125 | if (cert->unsupported_crypto) | ||
126 | return -ENOPKG; | ||
115 | if (cert->sig.rsa.s) | 127 | if (cert->sig.rsa.s) |
116 | return 0; | 128 | return 0; |
117 | 129 | ||
@@ -124,8 +136,13 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert) | |||
124 | * big the hash operational data will be. | 136 | * big the hash operational data will be. |
125 | */ | 137 | */ |
126 | tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0); | 138 | tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo], 0, 0); |
127 | if (IS_ERR(tfm)) | 139 | if (IS_ERR(tfm)) { |
128 | return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? -ENOPKG : PTR_ERR(tfm); | 140 | if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) { |
141 | cert->unsupported_crypto = true; | ||
142 | return -ENOPKG; | ||
143 | } | ||
144 | return PTR_ERR(tfm); | ||
145 | } | ||
129 | 146 | ||
130 | desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); | 147 | desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc); |
131 | digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); | 148 | digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); |
@@ -172,6 +189,8 @@ int x509_check_signature(const struct public_key *pub, | |||
172 | return ret; | 189 | return ret; |
173 | 190 | ||
174 | ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig); | 191 | ret = public_key_verify_signature(pub, &cert->sig); |
192 | if (ret == -ENOPKG) | ||
193 | cert->unsupported_crypto = true; | ||
175 | pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret); | 194 | pr_debug("Cert Verification: %d\n", ret); |
176 | return ret; | 195 | return ret; |
177 | } | 196 | } |
@@ -195,11 +214,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, | |||
195 | if (!trust_keyring) | 214 | if (!trust_keyring) |
196 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; | 215 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
197 | 216 | ||
198 | if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid)) | 217 | if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->authority, ca_keyid)) |
199 | return -EPERM; | 218 | return -EPERM; |
200 | 219 | ||
201 | key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, | 220 | key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority, |
202 | cert->issuer, cert->authority); | 221 | false); |
203 | if (!IS_ERR(key)) { | 222 | if (!IS_ERR(key)) { |
204 | if (!use_builtin_keys | 223 | if (!use_builtin_keys |
205 | || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) | 224 | || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags)) |
@@ -214,9 +233,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, | |||
214 | */ | 233 | */ |
215 | static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | 234 | static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) |
216 | { | 235 | { |
236 | struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids; | ||
217 | struct x509_certificate *cert; | 237 | struct x509_certificate *cert; |
238 | const char *q; | ||
218 | size_t srlen, sulen; | 239 | size_t srlen, sulen; |
219 | char *desc = NULL; | 240 | char *desc = NULL, *p; |
220 | int ret; | 241 | int ret; |
221 | 242 | ||
222 | cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen); | 243 | cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen); |
@@ -249,19 +270,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | |||
249 | pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo], | 270 | pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo], |
250 | hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]); | 271 | hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]); |
251 | 272 | ||
252 | if (!cert->fingerprint) { | ||
253 | pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n", | ||
254 | cert->subject); | ||
255 | ret = -EKEYREJECTED; | ||
256 | goto error_free_cert; | ||
257 | } | ||
258 | |||
259 | cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo]; | 273 | cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo]; |
260 | cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; | 274 | cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; |
261 | 275 | ||
262 | /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ | 276 | /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ |
263 | if (!cert->authority || | 277 | if (!cert->authority || |
264 | strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) { | 278 | asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) { |
265 | ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */ | 279 | ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */ |
266 | if (ret < 0) | 280 | if (ret < 0) |
267 | goto error_free_cert; | 281 | goto error_free_cert; |
@@ -273,31 +287,52 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) | |||
273 | 287 | ||
274 | /* Propose a description */ | 288 | /* Propose a description */ |
275 | sulen = strlen(cert->subject); | 289 | sulen = strlen(cert->subject); |
276 | srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint); | 290 | if (cert->raw_skid) { |
291 | srlen = cert->raw_skid_size; | ||
292 | q = cert->raw_skid; | ||
293 | } else { | ||
294 | srlen = cert->raw_serial_size; | ||
295 | q = cert->raw_serial; | ||
296 | } | ||
297 | if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) { | ||
298 | srlen--; | ||
299 | q++; | ||
300 | } | ||
301 | |||
277 | ret = -ENOMEM; | 302 | ret = -ENOMEM; |
278 | desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); | 303 | desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
279 | if (!desc) | 304 | if (!desc) |
280 | goto error_free_cert; | 305 | goto error_free_cert; |
281 | memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen); | 306 | p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen); |
282 | desc[sulen] = ':'; | 307 | p += sulen; |
283 | desc[sulen + 1] = ' '; | 308 | *p++ = ':'; |
284 | memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen); | 309 | *p++ = ' '; |
285 | desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0; | 310 | p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen); |
311 | *p = 0; | ||
312 | |||
313 | kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL); | ||
314 | if (!kids) | ||
315 | goto error_free_desc; | ||
316 | kids->id[0] = cert->id; | ||
317 | kids->id[1] = cert->skid; | ||
286 | 318 | ||
287 | /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ | 319 | /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ |
288 | __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); | 320 | __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); |
289 | prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype; | 321 | prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype; |
290 | prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint; | 322 | prep->type_data[1] = kids; |
291 | prep->payload[0] = cert->pub; | 323 | prep->payload[0] = cert->pub; |
292 | prep->description = desc; | 324 | prep->description = desc; |
293 | prep->quotalen = 100; | 325 | prep->quotalen = 100; |
294 | 326 | ||
295 | /* We've finished with the certificate */ | 327 | /* We've finished with the certificate */ |
296 | cert->pub = NULL; | 328 | cert->pub = NULL; |
297 | cert->fingerprint = NULL; | 329 | cert->id = NULL; |
330 | cert->skid = NULL; | ||
298 | desc = NULL; | 331 | desc = NULL; |
299 | ret = 0; | 332 | ret = 0; |
300 | 333 | ||
334 | error_free_desc: | ||
335 | kfree(desc); | ||
301 | error_free_cert: | 336 | error_free_cert: |
302 | x509_free_certificate(cert); | 337 | x509_free_certificate(cert); |
303 | return ret; | 338 | return ret; |