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authorHector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es>2015-02-14 12:33:50 -0500
committerBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>2015-02-19 06:21:36 -0500
commit4e7c22d447bb6d7e37bfe39ff658486ae78e8d77 (patch)
treee8db57c617abe52edf654cc4adf55eae7e874081 /arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
parentf47233c2d34f243ecdaac179c3408a39ff9216a7 (diff)
x86, mm/ASLR: Fix stack randomization on 64-bit systems
The issue is that the stack for processes is not properly randomized on 64 bit architectures due to an integer overflow. The affected function is randomize_stack_top() in file "fs/binfmt_elf.c": static unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top) { unsigned int random_variable = 0; if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK; random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; } return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) + random_variable; return PAGE_ALIGN(stack_top) - random_variable; } Note that, it declares the "random_variable" variable as "unsigned int". Since the result of the shifting operation between STACK_RND_MASK (which is 0x3fffff on x86_64, 22 bits) and PAGE_SHIFT (which is 12 on x86_64): random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT; then the two leftmost bits are dropped when storing the result in the "random_variable". This variable shall be at least 34 bits long to hold the (22+12) result. These two dropped bits have an impact on the entropy of process stack. Concretely, the total stack entropy is reduced by four: from 2^28 to 2^30 (One fourth of expected entropy). This patch restores back the entropy by correcting the types involved in the operations in the functions randomize_stack_top() and stack_maxrandom_size(). The successful fix can be tested with: $ for i in `seq 1 10`; do cat /proc/self/maps | grep stack; done 7ffeda566000-7ffeda587000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7fff5a332000-7fff5a353000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffcdb7a1000-7ffcdb7c2000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] 7ffd5e2c4000-7ffd5e2e5000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack] ... Once corrected, the leading bytes should be between 7ffc and 7fff, rather than always being 7fff. Signed-off-by: Hector Marco-Gisbert <hecmargi@upv.es> Signed-off-by: Ismael Ripoll <iripoll@upv.es> [ Rebased, fixed 80 char bugs, cleaned up commit message, added test example and CVE ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Fixes: CVE-2015-1593 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150214173350.GA18393@www.outflux.net Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/mmap.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mmap.c6
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index 919b91205cd4..df4552bd239e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {
35 .flags = -1, 35 .flags = -1,
36}; 36};
37 37
38static unsigned int stack_maxrandom_size(void) 38static unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(void)
39{ 39{
40 unsigned int max = 0; 40 unsigned long max = 0;
41 if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) && 41 if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
42 !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) { 42 !(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
43 max = ((-1U) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT; 43 max = ((-1UL) & STACK_RND_MASK) << PAGE_SHIFT;
44 } 44 }
45 45
46 return max; 46 return max;