Revert "arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions"

This reverts commit bc07c2c6e9ed125d362af0214b6313dca180cb08.

While the aim is increased security for --x memory maps, it does not
protect against kernel level reads. Until SECCOMP is implemented for
arm64, revert this patch to avoid giving a false idea of execute-only
mappings.

Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>

2 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
index e4c60d6e18b8..aa150ed99f22 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -86,13 +86,12 @@ extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val);
 #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC          __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
 #define PAGE_READONLY           __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN | PTE_UXN)
 #define PAGE_READONLY_EXEC      __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_USER | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
-#define PAGE_EXECONLY           __pgprot(_PAGE_DEFAULT | PTE_NG | PTE_PXN)
 
 #define __P000  PAGE_NONE
 #define __P001  PAGE_READONLY
 #define __P010  PAGE_COPY
 #define __P011  PAGE_COPY
-#define __P100  PAGE_EXECONLY
+#define __P100  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
 #define __P101  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
 #define __P110  PAGE_COPY_EXEC
 #define __P111  PAGE_COPY_EXEC
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ extern void __pgd_error(const char *file, int line, unsigned long val);
 #define __S001  PAGE_READONLY
 #define __S010  PAGE_SHARED
 #define __S011  PAGE_SHARED
-#define __S100  PAGE_EXECONLY
+#define __S100  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
 #define __S101  PAGE_READONLY_EXEC
 #define __S110  PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
 #define __S111  PAGE_SHARED_EXEC
@@ -137,8 +136,8 @@ extern struct page *empty_zero_page;
 #define pte_write(pte)          (!!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_WRITE))
 #define pte_exec(pte)           (!(pte_val(pte) & PTE_UXN))
 
-#define pte_valid_ng(pte) \
-        ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_NG))
+#define pte_valid_user(pte) \
+        ((pte_val(pte) & (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER)) == (PTE_VALID | PTE_USER))
 
 static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)
 {
@@ -192,7 +191,7 @@ extern void __sync_icache_dcache(pte_t pteval, unsigned long addr);
 static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
                               pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)
 {
-        if (pte_valid_ng(pte)) {
+        if (pte_valid_user(pte)) {
                 if (!pte_special(pte) && pte_exec(pte))
                         __sync_icache_dcache(pte, addr);
                 if (pte_dirty(pte) && pte_write(pte))
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 89c6763d5e7e..bcc965e2cce1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -173,7 +173,8 @@ static int __do_page_fault(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 good_area:
         /*
          * Check that the permissions on the VMA allow for the fault which
-         * occurred.
+         * occurred. If we encountered a write or exec fault, we must have
+         * appropriate permissions, otherwise we allow any permission.
          */
         if (!(vma->vm_flags & vm_flags)) {
                 fault = VM_FAULT_BADACCESS;
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ static int __kprobes do_page_fault(unsigned long addr, unsigned int esr,
         struct task_struct *tsk;
         struct mm_struct *mm;
         int fault, sig, code;
-        unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE;
+        unsigned long vm_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC;
         unsigned int mm_flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE;
 
         tsk = current;