Merge branch 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security

Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
 "This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
  yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
  linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"

* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
  ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
  selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
  selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
  selinux:  Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
  Warning in scanf string typing
  Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
  Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
  security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
  Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
  Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
  SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
  bugfix patch for SMACK
  Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
  Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
  Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
  Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
  smack: fix key permission verification
  KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h

27 files changed, 407 insertions, 137 deletions

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
index f1c5cc9d17a8..4c3efe434806 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Description:
                                  [fowner]]
                         lsm:    [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
                                  [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
-                        option: [[appraise_type=]]
+                        option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
 
                 base:   func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
                         mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
diff --git a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
index 5ea996f21d6c..b6ef7e9dba30 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/Smack.txt
@@ -204,6 +204,16 @@ onlycap
         these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
         label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
         file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+ptrace
+        This is used to define the current ptrace policy
+        0 - default: this is the policy that relies on smack access rules.
+            For the PTRACE_READ a subject needs to have a read access on
+            object. For the PTRACE_ATTACH a read-write access is required.
+        1 - exact: this is the policy that limits PTRACE_ATTACH. Attach is
+            only allowed when subject's and object's labels are equal.
+            PTRACE_READ is not affected. Can be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
+        2 - draconian: this policy behaves like the 'exact' above with an
+            exception that it can't be overriden with CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
 revoke-subject
         Writing a Smack label here sets the access to '-' for all access
         rules with that subject label.
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index 3ae45f09589b..017b0826642f 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -309,6 +309,17 @@ static inline key_serial_t key_serial(const struct key *key)
 
 extern void key_set_timeout(struct key *, unsigned);
 
+/*
+ * The permissions required on a key that we're looking up.
+ */
+#define KEY_NEED_VIEW   0x01    /* Require permission to view attributes */
+#define KEY_NEED_READ   0x02    /* Require permission to read content */
+#define KEY_NEED_WRITE  0x04    /* Require permission to update / modify */
+#define KEY_NEED_SEARCH 0x08    /* Require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
+#define KEY_NEED_LINK   0x10    /* Require permission to link */
+#define KEY_NEED_SETATTR 0x20   /* Require permission to change attributes */
+#define KEY_NEED_ALL    0x3f    /* All the above permissions */
+
 /**
  * key_is_instantiated - Determine if a key has been positively instantiated
  * @key: The key to check.
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 6478ce3252c7..9c6b9722ff48 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1708,7 +1708,7 @@ struct security_operations {
         void (*key_free) (struct key *key);
         int (*key_permission) (key_ref_t key_ref,
                                const struct cred *cred,
-                               key_perm_t perm);
+                               unsigned perm);
         int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
 #endif  /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
@@ -3034,7 +3034,7 @@ static inline int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
 int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags);
 void security_key_free(struct key *key);
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
-                            const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm);
+                            const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm);
 int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
 
 #else
@@ -3052,7 +3052,7 @@ static inline void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 
 static inline int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
                                           const struct cred *cred,
-                                          key_perm_t perm)
+                                          unsigned perm)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index ad0d4de69944..e76373de3129 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ static void cap_key_free(struct key *key)
 }
 
 static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
-                              key_perm_t perm)
+                              unsigned perm)
 {
         return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index ba9e4d792dd5..d9cd5ce14d2b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
                             struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value,
                             int *xattr_len)
 {
+        const char *audit_cause = "failed";
         struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
         const char *filename = file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
         int result = 0;
@@ -213,6 +214,12 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
         if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) {
                 u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version;
 
+                if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) {
+                        audit_cause = "failed(directio)";
+                        result = -EACCES;
+                        goto out;
+                }
+
                 /* use default hash algorithm */
                 hash.hdr.algo = ima_hash_algo;
 
@@ -233,9 +240,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
                                 result = -ENOMEM;
                 }
         }
+out:
         if (result)
                 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
-                                    filename, "collect_data", "failed",
+                                    filename, "collect_data", audit_cause,
                                     result, 0);
         return result;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 52ac6cf41f88..dcc98cf542d8 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -214,8 +214,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
                 xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
 
         rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, xattr_ptr, &xattr_len);
-        if (rc != 0)
+        if (rc != 0) {
+                if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)
+                        rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES;
                 goto out_digsig;
+        }
 
         pathname = filename ?: ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 93873a450ff7..40a7488f6721 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ enum {
         Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
         Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
         Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
-        Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid
+        Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -375,6 +375,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
         {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
         {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
         {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
+        {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
         {Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -622,6 +623,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
                         else
                                 result = -EINVAL;
                         break;
+                case Opt_permit_directio:
+                        entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
+                        break;
                 case Opt_err:
                         ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
                         result = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 2fb5e53e927f..33c0a70f6b15 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS        0xff000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG              0x01000000
 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED     0x02000000
+#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO     0x04000000
 
 #define IMA_DO_MASK             (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \
                                  IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 80b2aac4f50c..5f20da01fd8d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -176,20 +176,11 @@ extern int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref,
 /*
  * Check to see whether permission is granted to use a key in the desired way.
  */
-static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, key_perm_t perm)
+static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm)
 {
         return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
 }
 
-/* required permissions */
-#define KEY_VIEW        0x01    /* require permission to view attributes */
-#define KEY_READ        0x02    /* require permission to read content */
-#define KEY_WRITE       0x04    /* require permission to update / modify */
-#define KEY_SEARCH      0x08    /* require permission to search (keyring) or find (key) */
-#define KEY_LINK        0x10    /* require permission to link */
-#define KEY_SETATTR     0x20    /* require permission to change attributes */
-#define KEY_ALL         0x3f    /* all the above permissions */
-
 /*
  * Authorisation record for request_key().
  */
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 6e21c11e48bc..2048a110e7f1 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref,
         int ret;
 
         /* need write permission on the key to update it */
-        ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+        ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (ret < 0)
                 goto error;
 
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
 
         /* if we're going to allocate a new key, we're going to have
          * to modify the keyring */
-        ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+        ret = key_permission(keyring_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (ret < 0) {
                 key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
                 goto error_link_end;
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
         key_check(key);
 
         /* the key must be writable */
-        ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_WRITE);
+        ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (ret < 0)
                 goto error;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index cee72ce64222..cd5bd0cef25d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
         }
 
         /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error3;
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
         dest_ref = NULL;
         if (destringid) {
                 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
-                                           KEY_WRITE);
+                                           KEY_NEED_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
                         goto error3;
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
         long ret;
 
         lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
         }
 
         /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -365,12 +365,12 @@ long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
         key_ref_t key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 if (ret != -EACCES)
                         goto error;
-                key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
+                key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
                 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                         goto error;
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ long keyctl_invalidate_key(key_serial_t id)
 
         kenter("%d", id);
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
 
@@ -470,13 +470,13 @@ long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
         }
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_LINK);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
         key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
         long ret;
 
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
         char *tmpbuf;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
                  * authorisation token handy */
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
         }
 
         /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
-        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
+        keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
                 goto error2;
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
         dest_ref = NULL;
         if (destringid) {
                 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
-                                           KEY_WRITE);
+                                           KEY_NEED_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
                         ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
                         goto error3;
@@ -676,7 +676,7 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
 
         /* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
         if (dest_ref) {
-                ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
+                ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_LINK);
                 if (ret < 0)
                         goto error6;
 
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
         /* see if we can read it directly */
-        ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
+        ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ);
         if (ret == 0)
                 goto can_read_key;
         if (ret != -EACCES)
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group)
                 goto error;
 
         key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-                                  KEY_SETATTR);
+                                  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
                 goto error;
 
         key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-                                  KEY_SETATTR);
+                                  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
                 goto error;
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
 
         /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
         if (ringid > 0) {
-                dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+                dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
                 if (IS_ERR(dkref))
                         return PTR_ERR(dkref);
                 *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
         long ret;
 
         key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
-                                  KEY_SETATTR);
+                                  KEY_NEED_SETATTR);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
                  * if we have the authorisation token handy */
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
         char *context;
         long ret;
 
-        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
+        key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
         if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
                 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
                         return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
@@ -1482,7 +1482,7 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
         struct cred *cred;
         int ret;
 
-        keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
+        keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_NEED_LINK);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
                 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 2fb2576dc644..9cf2575f0d97 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
         /* key must have search permissions */
         if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
             key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-                                ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0) {
+                                ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) {
                 ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
                 kleave(" = %d [!perm]", ctx->skipped_ret);
                 goto skipped;
@@ -721,7 +721,7 @@ ascend_to_node:
                 /* Search a nested keyring */
                 if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM) &&
                     key_task_permission(make_key_ref(key, ctx->possessed),
-                                        ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+                                        ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
                         continue;
 
                 /* stack the current position */
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
                 return ERR_PTR(-ENOTDIR);
 
         if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_CHECK_PERM)) {
-                err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_SEARCH);
+                err = key_task_permission(keyring_ref, ctx->cred, KEY_NEED_SEARCH);
                 if (err < 0)
                         return ERR_PTR(err);
         }
@@ -973,7 +973,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
 
                         if (!skip_perm_check &&
                             key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0),
-                                           KEY_SEARCH) < 0)
+                                           KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0)
                                 continue;
 
                         /* we've got a match but we might end up racing with
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index efcc0c855a0d..732cc0beffdf 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  * permissions bits or the LSM check.
  */
 int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
-                        key_perm_t perm)
+                        unsigned perm)
 {
         struct key *key;
         key_perm_t kperm;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ use_these_perms:
         if (is_key_possessed(key_ref))
                 kperm |= key->perm >> 24;
 
-        kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_ALL;
+        kperm = kperm & perm & KEY_NEED_ALL;
 
         if (kperm != perm)
                 return -EACCES;
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
index 0ad3ee283781..c9fae5ea89fe 100644
--- a/security/keys/persistent.c
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static long key_get_persistent(struct user_namespace *ns, kuid_t uid,
         return PTR_ERR(persistent_ref);
 
 found:
-        ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_LINK);
+        ret = key_task_permission(persistent_ref, current_cred(), KEY_NEED_LINK);
         if (ret == 0) {
                 persistent = key_ref_to_ptr(persistent_ref);
                 ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ long keyctl_get_persistent(uid_t _uid, key_serial_t destid)
         }
 
         /* There must be a destination keyring */
-        dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
+        dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_NEED_WRITE);
         if (IS_ERR(dest_ref))
                 return PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
         if (key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref)->type != &key_type_keyring) {
diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c
index 88e9a466940f..d3f6f2fd21db 100644
--- a/security/keys/proc.c
+++ b/security/keys/proc.c
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
          * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our
          *   access to __current_cred() safe
          */
-        rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_VIEW);
+        rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW);
         if (rc < 0)
                 return 0;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/sysctl.c b/security/keys/sysctl.c
index 8c0af08760c8..b68faa1a5cfd 100644
--- a/security/keys/sysctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/sysctl.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
 
 static const int zero, one = 1, max = INT_MAX;
 
-ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
+struct ctl_table key_sysctls[] = {
         {
                 .procname = "maxkeys",
                 .data = &key_quota_maxkeys,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 8b774f362a3d..31614e9e96e5 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1425,7 +1425,7 @@ void security_key_free(struct key *key)
 }
 
 int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
-                            const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
+                            const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
 {
         return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index fc3e6628a864..a18f1fa6440b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -444,11 +444,15 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
         avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
                            ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
                            ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+        if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
+                audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
+                                 ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
+        }
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
 noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-                u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+                u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
                 struct common_audit_data *a,
                 unsigned flags)
 {
@@ -477,6 +481,7 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
         sad.tsid = tsid;
         sad.audited = audited;
         sad.denied = denied;
+        sad.result = result;
 
         a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2c7341dbc5d6..83d06db34d03 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2123,11 +2123,13 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
 
                 /*
-                 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
-                 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
+                 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs or nosuid and a
+                 * transition is explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
                  */
                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
                         return -EPERM;
+                if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
+                        return -EACCES;
         } else {
                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
@@ -2770,6 +2772,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *na
 
 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
                                            u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+                                           int result,
                                            unsigned flags)
 {
         struct common_audit_data ad;
@@ -2780,7 +2783,7 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
         ad.u.inode = inode;
 
         rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
-                            audited, denied, &ad, flags);
+                            audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
         if (rc)
                 return rc;
         return 0;
@@ -2822,7 +2825,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
         if (likely(!audited))
                 return rc;
 
-        rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
+        rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
         if (rc2)
                 return rc2;
         return rc;
@@ -5722,7 +5725,7 @@ static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
 
 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
                                   const struct cred *cred,
-                                  key_perm_t perm)
+                                  unsigned perm)
 {
         struct key *key;
         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index f53ee3c58d0f..ddf8eec03f21 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
 }
 
 int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-                   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied,
+                   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
                    struct common_audit_data *a,
                    unsigned flags);
 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
         if (likely(!audited))
                 return 0;
         return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
-                              requested, audited, denied,
+                              requested, audited, denied, result,
                               a, 0);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index 933e735bb185..2cc496149842 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
 #include "hashtab.h"
 
 struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
         u32 hvalue;
         struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
 
+        cond_resched();
+
         if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
                 return -EINVAL;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index c85bc1ec040c..d307b37ddc2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -492,6 +492,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
                         rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
                         if (rc)
                                 return rc;
+
+                        cond_resched();
                 }
                 ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
                 c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index d072fd32212d..020307ef0972 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 
 struct socket_smack {
         struct smack_known      *smk_out;       /* outbound label */
-        char                    *smk_in;        /* inbound label */
-        char                    *smk_packet;    /* TCP peer label */
+        struct smack_known      *smk_in;        /* inbound label */
+        struct smack_known      *smk_packet;    /* TCP peer label */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ struct smk_port_label {
         struct list_head        list;
         struct sock             *smk_sock;      /* socket initialized on */
         unsigned short          smk_port;       /* the port number */
-        char                    *smk_in;        /* incoming label */
+        struct smack_known      *smk_in;        /* inbound label */
         struct smack_known      *smk_out;       /* outgoing label */
 };
 
@@ -177,6 +177,14 @@ struct smk_port_label {
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM           184     /* 23 * 8 */
 
 /*
+ * Ptrace rules
+ */
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT    0
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT      1
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN  2
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_MAX        SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN
+
+/*
  * Flags for untraditional access modes.
  * It shouldn't be necessary to avoid conflicts with definitions
  * in fs.h, but do so anyway.
@@ -225,6 +233,7 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
  */
 int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
 int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
 struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
 char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
@@ -244,6 +253,7 @@ extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
+extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
 
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
 extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 14293cd9b1e5..c062e9467b62 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -192,20 +192,21 @@ out_audit:
 }
 
 /**
- * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * smk_tskacc - determine if a task has a specific access to an object
+ * @tsp: a pointer to the subject task
  * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
  * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  * @a : common audit data
  *
- * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * This function checks the subject task's label/object label pair
  * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
- * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that the task may have the capability
  * to override the rules.
  */
-int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *subject, char *obj_label,
+               u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
-        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
-        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+        struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(subject);
         int may;
         int rc;
 
@@ -219,7 +220,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
                  * it can further restrict access.
                  */
                 may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
-                                        &tsp->smk_rules);
+                                        &subject->smk_rules);
                 if (may < 0)
                         goto out_audit;
                 if ((mode & may) == mode)
@@ -241,6 +242,24 @@ out_audit:
         return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+        struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+        return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_label, mode, a);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 /**
  * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
@@ -285,7 +304,10 @@ static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
         audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
         audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
-        audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+        if (sad->request[0] == '\0')
+                audit_log_format(ab, " labels_differ");
+        else
+                audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 14f52be78c75..f2c30801ce41 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -157,6 +157,74 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
         return rc;
 }
 
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
+ * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
+ *
+ * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
+ */
+static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
+{
+        switch (mode) {
+        case PTRACE_MODE_READ:
+                return MAY_READ;
+        case PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH:
+                return MAY_READWRITE;
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
+ * @tracer: tracer process
+ * @tracee_label: label of the process that's about to be traced,
+ *                the pointer must originate from smack structures
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
+ */
+static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, char *tracee_label,
+                                 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
+{
+        int rc;
+        struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
+        struct task_smack *tsp;
+        struct smack_known *skp;
+
+        if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+                smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+                smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
+                saip = &ad;
+        }
+
+        tsp = task_security(tracer);
+        skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+
+        if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
+            (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
+             smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
+                if (skp->smk_known == tracee_label)
+                        rc = 0;
+                else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
+                        rc = -EACCES;
+                else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+                        rc = 0;
+                else
+                        rc = -EACCES;
+
+                if (saip)
+                        smack_log(skp->smk_known, tracee_label, 0, rc, saip);
+
+                return rc;
+        }
+
+        /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
+        rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_label, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+        return rc;
+}
+
 /*
  * LSM hooks.
  * We he, that is fun!
@@ -165,16 +233,15 @@ static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
 /**
  * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
  * @ctp: child task pointer
- * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
  *
- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ * Do the capability checks.
  */
 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
         int rc;
-        struct smk_audit_info ad;
         struct smack_known *skp;
 
         rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
@@ -182,10 +249,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
                 return rc;
 
         skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
-        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
-        smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
 
-        rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, mode, &ad);
+        rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp->smk_known, mode, __func__);
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -195,23 +260,21 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
  *
  * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
  *
- * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
+ * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
  */
 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 {
         int rc;
-        struct smk_audit_info ad;
         struct smack_known *skp;
 
         rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
         if (rc != 0)
                 return rc;
 
-        skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
-        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
-        smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
+        skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
 
-        rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+        rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp->smk_known,
+                                   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
         return rc;
 }
 
@@ -413,9 +476,11 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
          * Initialize the root inode.
          */
         isp = inode->i_security;
-        if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
-                inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
-                isp = inode->i_security;
+        if (isp == NULL) {
+                isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
+                if (isp == NULL)
+                        return -ENOMEM;
+                inode->i_security = isp;
         } else
                 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
 
@@ -453,7 +518,7 @@ static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
  * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
  * @bprm: the exec information
  *
- * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
  */
 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
@@ -473,7 +538,22 @@ static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
                 return 0;
 
-        if (bprm->unsafe)
+        if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+                struct task_struct *tracer;
+                rc = 0;
+
+                rcu_read_lock();
+                tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+                if (likely(tracer != NULL))
+                        rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
+                                                   isp->smk_task->smk_known,
+                                                   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
+                                                   __func__);
+                rcu_read_unlock();
+
+                if (rc != 0)
+                        return rc;
+        } else if (bprm->unsafe)
                 return -EPERM;
 
         bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
@@ -880,18 +960,20 @@ static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
                 return;
         }
 
-        skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+                skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
                 if (skp != NULL)
                         isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
                 else
                         isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
         } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+                skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
                 if (skp != NULL)
                         isp->smk_task = skp;
                 else
                         isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
         } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+                skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
                 if (skp != NULL)
                         isp->smk_mmap = skp;
                 else
@@ -938,24 +1020,37 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
             strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
-            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
+            strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
                 if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
                         rc = -EPERM;
         } else
                 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 
+        if (rc != 0)
+                return rc;
+
         smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
         smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
-        if (rc == 0)
-                rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 
-        if (rc == 0) {
-                isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+        rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+        if (rc != 0)
+                return rc;
+
+        isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+        /*
+         * Don't do anything special for these.
+         *      XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
+         *      XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
+         *      XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC
+         */
+        if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
                 isp->smk_task = NULL;
+        else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
                 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
-        }
+        else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+                isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
 
-        return rc;
+        return 0;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1000,7 +1095,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
         ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
-                isp = ssp->smk_in;
+                isp = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
         else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
                 isp = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
         else
@@ -1367,19 +1462,32 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
 /**
  * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
  * @file: the object
- * @cred: unused
+ * @cred: task credential
  *
  * Set the security blob in the file structure.
+ * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
+ * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
+ * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
  *
  * Returns 0
  */
 static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
+        struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
         struct inode_smack *isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+        struct smk_audit_info ad;
+        int rc;
 
-        file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+        if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+                return 0;
 
-        return 0;
+        smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+        smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+        rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, isp->smk_inode, MAY_READ, &ad);
+        if (rc == 0)
+                file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
+
+        return rc;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1764,7 +1872,7 @@ static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
         if (ssp == NULL)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
-        ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+        ssp->smk_in = skp;
         ssp->smk_out = skp;
         ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 
@@ -2004,7 +2112,7 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
 
         if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
                 skp = smack_net_ambient;
-                object = ssp->smk_in;
+                object = ssp->smk_in->smk_known;
         } else {
                 skp = ssp->smk_out;
                 object = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
@@ -2034,9 +2142,9 @@ static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
         list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
                 if (spp->smk_port != port)
                         continue;
-                object = spp->smk_in;
+                object = spp->smk_in->smk_known;
                 if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
-                        ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out->smk_known;
+                        ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
                 break;
         }
 
@@ -2076,7 +2184,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
         int rc = 0;
 
         if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
-                return -EACCES;
+                return -EINVAL;
 
         skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
         if (skp == NULL)
@@ -2100,7 +2208,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
         ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
-                ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+                ssp->smk_in = skp;
         else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
                 ssp->smk_out = skp;
                 if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
@@ -2713,6 +2821,15 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
          * of the superblock.
          */
         if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
+                if (sbp->s_magic == CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC) {
+                        /*
+                         * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
+                         * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
+                         * options.
+                         */
+                        sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+                        sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_star.smk_known;
+                }
                 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
                 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
                 goto unlockandout;
@@ -2726,16 +2843,20 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
          */
         switch (sbp->s_magic) {
         case SMACK_MAGIC:
+        case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+        case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+        case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
                 /*
                  * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
                  * that the smack file system doesn't do
                  * extended attributes.
-                 */
-                final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
-                break;
-        case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
-                /*
+                 *
                  * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
+                 *
+                 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+                 * structures associated with the task involved.
+                 *
+                 * Cgroupfs is special
                  */
                 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
                 break;
@@ -2747,13 +2868,6 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
                  */
                 final = ckp->smk_known;
                 break;
-        case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
-                /*
-                 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
-                 * structures associated with the task involved.
-                 */
-                final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
-                break;
         case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
                 /*
                  * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
@@ -2959,30 +3073,34 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
                                      struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
 {
         struct smack_known *skp;
+        struct smack_known *okp;
         struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
         struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
         struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
         struct smk_audit_info ad;
         int rc = 0;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
         struct lsm_network_audit net;
-
-        smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
-        smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
 
         if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
                 skp = ssp->smk_out;
-                rc = smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+                okp = osp->smk_out;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+                smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+                smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
+#endif
+                rc = smk_access(skp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+                if (rc == 0)
+                        rc = smk_access(okp, okp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
         }
 
         /*
          * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
          */
         if (rc == 0) {
-                nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
-                ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out->smk_known;
+                nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
+                ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
         }
 
         return rc;
@@ -3014,7 +3132,7 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
                 return 0;
 
         skp = ssp->smk_out;
-        return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+        return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3109,7 +3227,7 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
                 if (found)
                         return skp;
 
-                if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
+                if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
                         return &smack_known_web;
                 return &smack_known_star;
         }
@@ -3228,7 +3346,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
                  * This is the simplist possible security model
                  * for networking.
                  */
-                rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+                rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
                 if (rc != 0)
                         netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
                 break;
@@ -3263,7 +3381,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
 
         ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
         if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
-                rcp = ssp->smk_packet;
+                rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
                 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
         }
 
@@ -3348,7 +3466,7 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
                 return;
 
         ssp = sk->sk_security;
-        ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+        ssp->smk_in = skp;
         ssp->smk_out = skp;
         /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
 }
@@ -3408,7 +3526,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
          * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
          * here. Read access is not required.
          */
-        rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+        rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
         if (rc != 0)
                 return rc;
 
@@ -3452,7 +3570,7 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
 
         if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
                 skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
-                ssp->smk_packet = skp->smk_known;
+                ssp->smk_packet = skp;
         } else
                 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 }
@@ -3506,11 +3624,12 @@ static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
  * an error code otherwise
  */
 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
-                                const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
+                                const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
 {
         struct key *keyp;
         struct smk_audit_info ad;
         struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+        int request = 0;
 
         keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
         if (keyp == NULL)
@@ -3531,7 +3650,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
         ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
         ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
 #endif
-        return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+        if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
+                request = MAY_READ;
+        if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
+                request = MAY_WRITE;
+        return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 3198cfe1dcc6..32b248820840 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ enum smk_inos {
         SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ = 18,   /* set rules with subject label to '-' */
         SMK_CHANGE_RULE = 19,   /* change or add rules (long labels) */
         SMK_SYSLOG      = 20,   /* change syslog label) */
+        SMK_PTRACE      = 21,   /* set ptrace rule */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -101,6 +102,15 @@ struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
 struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
 
 /*
+ * Ptrace current rule
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT    regular smack ptrace rules (/proc based)
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT      labels must match, but can be overriden with
+ *                         CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN  lables must match, CAP_SYS_PTRACE has no effect
+ */
+int smack_ptrace_rule = SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
  * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
  * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
  * can write to the specified label.
@@ -1183,7 +1193,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
         data[count] = '\0';
 
-        rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%d %s",
+        rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%u %s",
                 &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &m, smack);
         if (rc != 6) {
                 rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
@@ -2244,6 +2254,68 @@ static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = {
 
 
 /**
+ * smk_read_ptrace - read() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ptrace(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+                               size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+        char temp[32];
+        ssize_t rc;
+
+        if (*ppos != 0)
+                return 0;
+
+        sprintf(temp, "%d\n", smack_ptrace_rule);
+        rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+        return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ptrace - write() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ptrace(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+                                size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+        char temp[32];
+        int i;
+
+        if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+                return -EPERM;
+
+        if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+                return -EINVAL;
+
+        if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+                return -EFAULT;
+
+        temp[count] = '\0';
+
+        if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        if (i < SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT || i > SMACK_PTRACE_MAX)
+                return -EINVAL;
+        smack_ptrace_rule = i;
+
+        return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ptrace_ops = {
+        .write          = smk_write_ptrace,
+        .read           = smk_read_ptrace,
+        .llseek         = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
  * smk_fill_super - fill the smackfs superblock
  * @sb: the empty superblock
  * @data: unused
@@ -2296,6 +2368,8 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
                         "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
                 [SMK_SYSLOG] = {
                         "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+                [SMK_PTRACE] = {
+                        "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
                 /* last one */
                         {""}
         };