selinux: cleanup selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match()

Do some basic simplification and comment reformatting.

Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 18 insertions, 36 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index f8d71262b45d..4a7ba4ac487e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -155,42 +155,30 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 {
         int rc;
-        u32 sel_sid;
 
-        /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
-        if (ctx) {
-                if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
-                        return -EINVAL;
-
-                sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-        } else
-                /*
-                 * All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
-                 * otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
-                 * would prevent inadvertent "leaks".
-                 */
+        /* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an otherwise applicable
+         * "non-labeled" policy. This would prevent inadvertent "leaks". */
+        if (!ctx)
                 return 0;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, sel_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH,
-                          NULL);
-
-        if (rc == -EACCES)
-                return -ESRCH;
+        /* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
+        if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
+                return -EINVAL;
 
-        return rc;
+        rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+                          SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
+        return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
 }
 
 /*
  * LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a state matches
  * the given policy, flow combo.
  */
-
-int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
-                        const struct flowi *fl)
+int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
+                                      struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+                                      const struct flowi *fl)
 {
         u32 state_sid;
-        int rc;
 
         if (!xp->security)
                 if (x->security)
@@ -213,18 +201,12 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
         if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
                 return 0;
 
-        rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
-                          ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
-                          NULL)? 0:1;
-
-        /*
-         * We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check
-         * since the SA is now of the same label as the flow and
-         * a flow Vs. policy polmatch check had already happened
-         * in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above.
-         */
-
-        return rc;
+        /* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
+         * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
+         * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
+        return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+                            SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
+                            NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
 
 /*