/*
* linux/kernel/capability.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
*
* Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
* 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
*/
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "cred-internals.h"
/*
* Leveraged for setting/resetting capabilities
*/
const kernel_cap_t __cap_empty_set = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
const kernel_cap_t __cap_full_set = CAP_FULL_SET;
const kernel_cap_t __cap_init_eff_set = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
int file_caps_enabled = 1;
static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
{
file_caps_enabled = 0;
return 1;
}
__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
/*
* More recent versions of libcap are available from:
*
* http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/
*/
static void warn_legacy_capability_use(void)
{
static int warned;
if (!warned) {
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses 32-bit capabilities"
" (legacy support in use)\n",
get_task_comm(name, current));
warned = 1;
}
}
/*
* Version 2 capabilities worked fine, but the linux/capability.h file
* that accompanied their introduction encouraged their use without
* the necessary user-space source code changes. As such, we have
* created a version 3 with equivalent functionality to version 2, but
* with a header change to protect legacy source code from using
* version 2 when it wanted to use version 1. If your system has code
* that trips the following warning, it is using version 2 specific
* capabilities and may be doing so insecurely.
*
* The remedy is to either upgrade your version of libcap (to 2.10+,
* if the application is linked against it), or recompile your
* application with modern kernel headers and this warning will go
* away.
*/
static void warn_deprecated_v2(void)
{
static int warned;
if (!warned) {
char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' uses deprecated v2"
" capabilities in a way that may be insecure.\n",
get_task_comm(name, current));
warned = 1;
}
}
/*
* Version check. Return the number of u32s in each capability flag
* array, or a negative value on error.
*/
static int cap_validate_magic(cap_user_header_t header, unsigned *tocopy)
{
__u32 version;
if (get_user(version, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
switch (version) {
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_1:
warn_legacy_capability_use();
*tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_1;
break;
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_2:
warn_deprecated_v2();
/*
* fall through - v3 is otherwise equivalent to v2.
*/
case _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3:
*tocopy = _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3;
break;
default:
if (put_user((u32)_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* The only thing that can change the capabilities of the current
* process is the current process. As such, we can't be in this code
* at the same time as we are in the process of setting capabilities
* in this process. The net result is that we can limit our use of
* locks to when we are reading the caps of another process.
*/
static inline int cap_get_target_pid(pid_t pid, kernel_cap_t *pEp,
kernel_cap_t *pIp, kernel_cap_t *pPp)
{
int ret;
if (pid && (pid != task_pid_vnr(current))) {
struct task_struct *target;
rcu_read_lock();
target = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
if (!target)
ret = -ESRCH;
else
ret = security_capget(target, pEp, pIp, pPp);
rcu_read_unlock();
} else
ret = security_capget(current, pEp, pIp, pPp);
return ret;
}
/**
* sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
* target pid data
* @dataptr: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
* and inheritable capabilities that are returned
*
* Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
{
int ret = 0;
pid_t pid;
unsigned tocopy;
kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0))
return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret;
if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
return -EFAULT;
if (pid < 0)
return -EINVAL;
ret = cap_get_target_pid(pid, &pE, &pI, &pP);
if (!ret) {
struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
kdata[i].effective = pE.cap[i];
kdata[i].permitted = pP.cap[i];
kdata[i].inheritable = pI.cap[i];
}
/*
* Note, in the case, tocopy < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S,
* we silently drop the upper capabilities here. This
* has the effect of making older libcap
* implementations implicitly drop upper capability
* bits when they perform a: capget/modify/capset
* sequence.
*
* This behavior is considered fail-safe
* behavior. Upgrading the application to a newer
* version of libcap will enable access to the newer
* capabilities.
*
* An alternative would be to return an error here
* (-ERANGE), but that causes legacy applications to
* unexpectidly fail; the capget/modify/capset aborts
* before modification is attempted and the application
* fails.
*/
if (copy_to_user(dataptr, kdata, tocopy
* sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) {
return -EFAULT;
}
}
return ret;
}
/**
* sys_capset - set capabilities for a process or (*) a group of processes
* @header: pointer to struct that contains capability version and
* target pid data
* @data: pointer to struct that contains the effective, permitted,
* and inheritable capabilities
*
* Set capabilities for the current process only. The ability to any other
* process(es) has been deprecated and removed.
*
* The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
*
* I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
* P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the old permitted
* E: must be set to a subset of new permitted
*
* Returns 0 on success and < 0 on error.
*/
SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
{
struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
unsigned i, tocopy, copybytes;
kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
struct cred *new;
int ret;
pid_t pid;
ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
return -EFAULT;
/* may only affect current now */
if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
return -EPERM;
copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct);
if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes))
return -EFAULT;
for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
effective.cap[i] = kdata[i].effective;
permitted.cap[i] = kdata[i].permitted;
inheritable.cap[i] = kdata[i].inheritable;
}
while (i < _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S) {
effective.cap[i] = 0;
permitted.cap[i] = 0;
inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
i++;
}
new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = security_capset(new, current_cred(),
&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
audit_log_capset(pid, new, current_cred());
return commit_creds(new);
error:
abort_creds(new);
return ret;
}
/**
* capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
* Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
* available for use, false if not.
*
* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
* assumption that it's about to be used.
*/
int capable(int cap)
{
if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
BUG();
}
if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
