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diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm
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-What:           security/evm
-Date:           March 2011
-Contact:        Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
-Description:
-                EVM protects a file's security extended attributes(xattrs)
-                against integrity attacks. The initial method maintains an
-                HMAC-sha1 value across the extended attributes, storing the
-                value as the extended attribute 'security.evm'.
-
-                EVM depends on the Kernel Key Retention System to provide it
-                with a trusted/encrypted key for the HMAC-sha1 operation.
-                The key is loaded onto the root's keyring using keyctl.  Until
-                EVM receives notification that the key has been successfully
-                loaded onto the keyring (echo 1 > <securityfs>/evm), EVM
-                can not create or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but
-                returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN.  Loading the key and signaling EVM
-                should be done as early as possible.  Normally this is done
-                in the initramfs, which has already been measured as part
-                of the trusted boot.  For more information on creating and
-                loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to:
-                Documentation/keys-trusted-encrypted.txt.  (A sample dracut
-                patch, which loads the trusted/encrypted key and enables
-                EVM, is available from http://linux-ima.sourceforge.net/#EVM.)