[PATCH] audit: rename AUDIT_SE_* constants

This patch renames some audit constant definitions and adds
additional definitions used by the following patch.  The renaming
avoids ambiguity with respect to the new definitions.

Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>

 include/linux/audit.h          |   15 ++++++++----
 kernel/auditfilter.c           |   50 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 kernel/auditsc.c               |   10 ++++----
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   32 +++++++++++++-------------
 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

1 files changed, 16 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e9548bc049e..92e80b99d18 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1845,15 +1845,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
                 return -ENOTSUPP;
 
         switch (field) {
-        case AUDIT_SE_USER:
-        case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
-        case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
                 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
                 if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
                         return -EINVAL;
                 break;
-        case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-        case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
                 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
                         return -EINVAL;
@@ -1874,29 +1874,29 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
         tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
 
         switch (field) {
-        case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
                 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
                 if (!userdatum)
                         rc = -EINVAL;
                 else
                         tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
                 break;
-        case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
                 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
                 if (!roledatum)
                         rc = -EINVAL;
                 else
                         tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
                 break;
-        case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
                 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
                 if (!typedatum)
                         rc = -EINVAL;
                 else
                         tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
                 break;
-        case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-        case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
                 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
                 break;
         }
@@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
         /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
            without a match */
         switch (field) {
-        case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
                 switch (op) {
                 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                         match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                         break;
                 }
                 break;
-        case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
                 switch (op) {
                 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                         match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
@@ -1968,7 +1968,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                         break;
                 }
                 break;
-        case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
                 switch (op) {
                 case AUDIT_EQUAL:
                         match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
@@ -1978,9 +1978,9 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
                         break;
                 }
                 break;
-        case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
-        case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
-                level = (field == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+        case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+                level = (field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ?
                          &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
                 switch (op) {
                 case AUDIT_EQUAL: