Patched in Tegra support.

1 files changed, 49 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/securebits.h b/include/linux/securebits.h
index da1b33b33af..33406174cbe 100644
--- a/include/linux/securebits.h
+++ b/include/linux/securebits.h
@@ -1,7 +1,54 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H
 #define _LINUX_SECUREBITS_H 1
 
-#include <uapi/linux/securebits.h>
-
+/* Each securesetting is implemented using two bits. One bit specifies
+   whether the setting is on or off. The other bit specify whether the
+   setting is locked or not. A setting which is locked cannot be
+   changed from user-level. */
+#define issecure_mask(X)        (1 << (X))
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
 #define issecure(X)             (issecure_mask(X) & current_cred_xxx(securebits))
+#endif
+
+#define SECUREBITS_DEFAULT 0x00000000
+
+/* When set UID 0 has no special privileges. When unset, we support
+   inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root executable under
+   compatibility mode. We raise the effective and inheritable bitmasks
+   *of the executable file* if the effective uid of the new process is
+   0. If the real uid is 0, we raise the effective (legacy) bit of the
+   executable file. */
+#define SECURE_NOROOT                   0
+#define SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED            1  /* make bit-0 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_NOROOT           (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT))
+#define SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED    (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED))
+
+/* When set, setuid to/from uid 0 does not trigger capability-"fixup".
+   When unset, to provide compatiblility with old programs relying on
+   set*uid to gain/lose privilege, transitions to/from uid 0 cause
+   capabilities to be gained/lost. */
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP          2
+#define SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED   3  /* make bit-2 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP  (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
+#define SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED \
+                        (issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED))
+
+/* When set, a process can retain its capabilities even after
+   transitioning to a non-root user (the set-uid fixup suppressed by
+   bit 2). Bit-4 is cleared when a process calls exec(); setting both
+   bit 4 and 5 will create a barrier through exec that no exec()'d
+   child can use this feature again. */
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS                4
+#define SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED         5  /* make bit-4 immutable */
+
+#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS        (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+#define SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED (issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+
+#define SECURE_ALL_BITS         (issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | \
+                                 issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | \
+                                 issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS))
+#define SECURE_ALL_LOCKS        (SECURE_ALL_BITS << 1)
+
 #endif /* !_LINUX_SECUREBITS_H */