1 files changed, 104 insertions, 27 deletions

diff --git a/net/sctp/output.c b/net/sctp/output.c
index 49b9f5f031a..847639d542c 100644
--- a/net/sctp/output.c
+++ b/net/sctp/output.c
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct sctp_packet *sctp_packet_config(struct sctp_packet *packet,
         packet->has_cookie_echo = 0;
         packet->has_sack = 0;
         packet->has_auth = 0;
+        packet->has_data = 0;
         packet->ipfragok = 0;
         packet->auth = NULL;
 
@@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ struct sctp_packet *sctp_packet_init(struct sctp_packet *packet,
         packet->has_cookie_echo = 0;
         packet->has_sack = 0;
         packet->has_auth = 0;
+        packet->has_data = 0;
         packet->ipfragok = 0;
         packet->malloced = 0;
         packet->auth = NULL;
@@ -185,6 +187,39 @@ sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_transmit_chunk(struct sctp_packet *packet,
         return retval;
 }
 
+/* Try to bundle an auth chunk into the packet. */
+static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_bundle_auth(struct sctp_packet *pkt,
+                                           struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
+{
+        struct sctp_association *asoc = pkt->transport->asoc;
+        struct sctp_chunk *auth;
+        sctp_xmit_t retval = SCTP_XMIT_OK;
+
+        /* if we don't have an association, we can't do authentication */
+        if (!asoc)
+                return retval;
+
+        /* See if this is an auth chunk we are bundling or if
+         * auth is already bundled.
+         */
+        if (chunk->chunk_hdr->type == SCTP_CID_AUTH || pkt->auth)
+                return retval;
+
+        /* if the peer did not request this chunk to be authenticated,
+         * don't do it
+         */
+        if (!chunk->auth)
+                return retval;
+
+        auth = sctp_make_auth(asoc);
+        if (!auth)
+                return retval;
+
+        retval = sctp_packet_append_chunk(pkt, auth);
+
+        return retval;
+}
+
 /* Try to bundle a SACK with the packet. */
 static sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_bundle_sack(struct sctp_packet *pkt,
                                            struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
@@ -231,12 +266,17 @@ sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_append_chunk(struct sctp_packet *packet,
         SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p chunk:%p\n", __FUNCTION__, packet,
                           chunk);
 
-        retval = sctp_packet_bundle_sack(packet, chunk);
-        psize = packet->size;
+        /* Try to bundle AUTH chunk */
+        retval = sctp_packet_bundle_auth(packet, chunk);
+        if (retval != SCTP_XMIT_OK)
+                goto finish;
 
+        /* Try to bundle SACK chunk */
+        retval = sctp_packet_bundle_sack(packet, chunk);
         if (retval != SCTP_XMIT_OK)
                 goto finish;
 
+        psize = packet->size;
         pmtu  = ((packet->transport->asoc) ?
                  (packet->transport->asoc->pathmtu) :
                  (packet->transport->pathmtu));
@@ -245,10 +285,16 @@ sctp_xmit_t sctp_packet_append_chunk(struct sctp_packet *packet,
 
         /* Decide if we need to fragment or resubmit later. */
         if (too_big) {
-                /* Both control chunks and data chunks with TSNs are
-                 * non-fragmentable.
+                /* It's OK to fragmet at IP level if any one of the following
+                 * is true:
+                 *      1. The packet is empty (meaning this chunk is greater
+                 *         the MTU)
+                 *      2. The chunk we are adding is a control chunk
+                 *      3. The packet doesn't have any data in it yet and data
+                 *      requires authentication.
                  */
-                if (sctp_packet_empty(packet) || !sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk)) {
+                if (sctp_packet_empty(packet) || !sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk) ||
+                    (!packet->has_data && chunk->auth)) {
                         /* We no longer do re-fragmentation.
                          * Just fragment at the IP layer, if we
                          * actually hit this condition
@@ -270,16 +316,31 @@ append:
         /* DATA is a special case since we must examine both rwnd and cwnd
          * before we send DATA.
          */
-        if (sctp_chunk_is_data(chunk)) {
+        switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) {
+            case SCTP_CID_DATA:
                 retval = sctp_packet_append_data(packet, chunk);
                 /* Disallow SACK bundling after DATA. */
                 packet->has_sack = 1;
+                /* Disallow AUTH bundling after DATA */
+                packet->has_auth = 1;
+                /* Let it be knows that packet has DATA in it */
+                packet->has_data = 1;
                 if (SCTP_XMIT_OK != retval)
                         goto finish;
-        } else if (SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO == chunk->chunk_hdr->type)
+                break;
+            case SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO:
                 packet->has_cookie_echo = 1;
-        else if (SCTP_CID_SACK == chunk->chunk_hdr->type)
+                break;
+
+            case SCTP_CID_SACK:
                 packet->has_sack = 1;
+                break;
+
+            case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
+                packet->has_auth = 1;
+                packet->auth = chunk;
+                break;
+        }
 
         /* It is OK to send this chunk.  */
         list_add_tail(&chunk->list, &packet->chunk_list);
@@ -307,6 +368,8 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet)
         int padding;            /* How much padding do we need?  */
         __u8 has_data = 0;
         struct dst_entry *dst = tp->dst;
+        unsigned char *auth = NULL;     /* pointer to auth in skb data */
+        __u32 cksum_buf_len = sizeof(struct sctphdr);
 
         SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s: packet:%p\n", __FUNCTION__, packet);
 
@@ -360,16 +423,6 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet)
         sh->vtag     = htonl(packet->vtag);
         sh->checksum = 0;
 
-        /* 2) Calculate the Adler-32 checksum of the whole packet,
-         *    including the SCTP common header and all the
-         *    chunks.
-         *
-         * Note: Adler-32 is no longer applicable, as has been replaced
-         * by CRC32-C as described in <draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctpcsum-02.txt>.
-         */
-        if (!(dst->dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM))
-                crc32 = sctp_start_cksum((__u8 *)sh, sizeof(struct sctphdr));
-
         /**
          * 6.10 Bundling
          *
@@ -420,14 +473,16 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet)
                 if (padding)
                         memset(skb_put(chunk->skb, padding), 0, padding);
 
-                if (dst->dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM)
-                        memcpy(skb_put(nskb, chunk->skb->len),
+                /* if this is the auth chunk that we are adding,
+                 * store pointer where it will be added and put
+                 * the auth into the packet.
+                 */
+                if (chunk == packet->auth)
+                        auth = skb_tail_pointer(nskb);
+
+                cksum_buf_len += chunk->skb->len;
+                memcpy(skb_put(nskb, chunk->skb->len),
                                chunk->skb->data, chunk->skb->len);
-                else
-                        crc32 = sctp_update_copy_cksum(skb_put(nskb,
-                                                        chunk->skb->len),
-                                                chunk->skb->data,
-                                                chunk->skb->len, crc32);
 
                 SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s %p[%s] %s 0x%x, %s %d, %s %d, %s %d\n",
                                   "*** Chunk", chunk,
@@ -449,9 +504,31 @@ int sctp_packet_transmit(struct sctp_packet *packet)
                         sctp_chunk_free(chunk);
         }
 
-        /* Perform final transformation on checksum. */
-        if (!(dst->dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM))
+        /* SCTP-AUTH, Section 6.2
+         *    The sender MUST calculate the MAC as described in RFC2104 [2]
+         *    using the hash function H as described by the MAC Identifier and
+         *    the shared association key K based on the endpoint pair shared key
+         *    described by the shared key identifier.  The 'data' used for the
+         *    computation of the AUTH-chunk is given by the AUTH chunk with its
+         *    HMAC field set to zero (as shown in Figure 6) followed by all
+         *    chunks that are placed after the AUTH chunk in the SCTP packet.
+         */
+        if (auth)
+                sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(asoc, nskb,
+                                        (struct sctp_auth_chunk *)auth,
+                                        GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+        /* 2) Calculate the Adler-32 checksum of the whole packet,
+         *    including the SCTP common header and all the
+         *    chunks.
+         *
+         * Note: Adler-32 is no longer applicable, as has been replaced
+         * by CRC32-C as described in <draft-ietf-tsvwg-sctpcsum-02.txt>.
+         */
+        if (!(dst->dev->features & NETIF_F_NO_CSUM)) {
+                crc32 = sctp_start_cksum((__u8 *)sh, cksum_buf_len);
                 crc32 = sctp_end_cksum(crc32);
+        }
 
         /* 3) Put the resultant value into the checksum field in the
          *    common header, and leave the rest of the bits unchanged.