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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2007-02-10 04:43:19 -0500
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org>2007-02-11 13:51:19 -0500
commit6ff1b4426e3afc61dcb67299709fde9041d59265 (patch)
treeaa6856d926d26e768809b60f1aa21b78ce0589c2 /include/asm-alpha/ucontext.h
parentdaa88c8d214ca4ab2f1764b6e503cef4b3cde9b2 (diff)
[PATCH] make reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bould not require CAP_SYS_MODULE
Reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound requires CAP_SYS_MODULE. (see proc_dointvec_bset in kernel/sysctl.c) sysctl appears to drive all over proc reading everything it can get it's hands on and is complaining when it is being denied access to read cap-bound. Clearly writing to cap-bound should be a sensitive operation but requiring CAP_SYS_MODULE to read cap-bound seems a bit to strong. I believe the information could with reasonable certainty be obtained by looking at a bunch of the output of /proc/pid/status which has very low security protection, so at best we are just getting a little obfuscation of information. Currently SELinux policy has to 'dontaudit' capability checks for CAP_SYS_MODULE for things like sysctl which just want to read cap-bound. In doing so we also as a byproduct have to hide warnings of potential exploits such as if at some time that sysctl actually tried to load a module. I wondered if anyone would have a problem opening cap-bound up to read from anyone? Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/asm-alpha/ucontext.h')
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