SELinux: remove inode_has_perm_noadp

Both callers could better be using file_has_perm() to get better audit
results.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 24 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c99027dc0b36..8417a6afaf30 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1488,20 +1488,6 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
         return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
 }
 
-static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
-                                struct inode *inode,
-                                u32 perms,
-                                unsigned flags)
-{
-        struct common_audit_data ad;
-        struct selinux_audit_data sad = {0,};
-
-        COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
-        ad.u.inode = inode;
-        ad.selinux_audit_data = &sad;
-        return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
-}
-
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
    pathname if needed. */
@@ -2128,21 +2114,17 @@ static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
                 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
                         struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
-                        struct inode *inode;
 
                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
-                           Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
+                           Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
                            file may belong to another process and we are only
                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
                         file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
                                                 struct tty_file_private, list);
                         file = file_priv->file;
-                        inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
-                        if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
-                                           FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
+                        if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
                                 drop_tty = 1;
-                        }
                 }
                 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
                 tty_kref_put(tty);
@@ -3276,12 +3258,10 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
-        struct inode *inode;
         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
-        inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
         fsec = file->f_security;
-        isec = inode->i_security;
+        isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
         /*
          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
@@ -3299,7 +3279,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
          * new inode label or new policy.
          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
          */
-        return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
+        return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
 }
 
 /* task security operations */