Audit: Final renamings and cleanup

Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>

1 files changed, 20 insertions, 20 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 7c69cb5e44fb..28fef6bf8534 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
         if (e->rule.fields)
                 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
                         struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
-                        kfree(f->se_str);
-                        security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+                        kfree(f->lsm_str);
+                        security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
                 }
         kfree(e->rule.fields);
         kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
                 f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
                 f->type = data->fields[i];
                 f->val = data->values[i];
-                f->se_str = NULL;
-                f->se_rule = NULL;
+                f->lsm_str = NULL;
+                f->lsm_rule = NULL;
                 switch(f->type) {
                 case AUDIT_PID:
                 case AUDIT_UID:
@@ -598,7 +598,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
                         entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
 
                         err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
-                                                       (void **)&f->se_rule);
+                                                       (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
                         /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
                          * become valid after a policy reload. */
                         if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
                                 kfree(str);
                                 goto exit_free;
                         } else
-                                f->se_str = str;
+                                f->lsm_str = str;
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_WATCH:
                         str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
                 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
                 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
                         data->buflen += data->values[i] =
-                                audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+                                audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str);
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_WATCH:
                         data->buflen += data->values[i] =
@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
                 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
                 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
                 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
-                        if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+                        if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str))
                                 return 1;
                         break;
                 case AUDIT_WATCH:
@@ -862,28 +862,28 @@ out:
         return new;
 }
 
-/* Duplicate LSM field information.  The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information.  The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
  * re-initialized. */
 static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
                                            struct audit_field *sf)
 {
         int ret = 0;
-        char *se_str;
+        char *lsm_str;
 
-        /* our own copy of se_str */
-        se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (unlikely(!se_str))
+        /* our own copy of lsm_str */
+        lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (unlikely(!lsm_str))
                 return -ENOMEM;
-        df->se_str = se_str;
+        df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
 
-        /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
-        ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
-                                       (void **)&df->se_rule);
+        /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+        ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
+                                       (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
         /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
          * become valid after a policy reload. */
         if (ret == -EINVAL) {
                 printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
-                       "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+                       "invalid\n", df->lsm_str);
                 ret = 0;
         }
 
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old,
         new->tree = old->tree;
         memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
 
-        /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+        /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
          * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
         for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
                 switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1762,7 +1762,7 @@ unlock_and_return:
         return result;
 }
 
-/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
  * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
  * specific filter fields.  When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
  * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the