Merge commit 'v3.5-rc2' into next

16 files changed, 173 insertions, 186 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 032daab449b0..8ea39aabe948 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -490,17 +490,9 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
         return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
 }
 
-static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-        int rc = 0;
-
-        /* do DAC check */
-        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
-        if (rc || addr_only)
-                return rc;
-
         return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
 }
 
@@ -646,7 +638,8 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
         .file_permission =              apparmor_file_permission,
         .file_alloc_security =          apparmor_file_alloc_security,
         .file_free_security =           apparmor_file_free_security,
-        .file_mmap =                    apparmor_file_mmap,
+        .mmap_file =                    apparmor_mmap_file,
+        .mmap_addr =                    cap_mmap_addr,
         .file_mprotect =                apparmor_file_mprotect,
         .file_lock =                    apparmor_file_lock,
 
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fca889676c5e..61095df8b89a 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
-        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mmap);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr);
+        set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock);
         set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f80d11609391..6dbae4650abe 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -77,12 +77,12 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
                 int cap, int audit)
 {
         for (;;) {
-                /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
-                if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)
+                /* The owner of the user namespace has all caps. */
+                if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid))
                         return 0;
 
                 /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
-                if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns)
+                if (targ_ns == cred->user_ns)
                         return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
 
                 /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
                  *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
                  * it over all children user namespaces as well.
                  */
-                targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns;
+                targ_ns = targ_ns->parent;
         }
 
         /* We never get here */
@@ -137,10 +137,10 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
         rcu_read_lock();
         cred = current_cred();
         child_cred = __task_cred(child);
-        if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+        if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
             cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
                 goto out;
-        if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+        if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                 goto out;
         ret = -EPERM;
 out:
@@ -169,10 +169,10 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
         rcu_read_lock();
         cred = __task_cred(parent);
         child_cred = current_cred();
-        if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+        if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
             cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
                 goto out;
-        if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+        if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                 goto out;
         ret = -EPERM;
 out:
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
         /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
          * capability
          */
-        if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+        if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
                         CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
                 return 0;
         return 1;
@@ -473,19 +473,22 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
         struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
         bool effective, has_cap = false;
         int ret;
+        kuid_t root_uid;
 
         effective = false;
         ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
         if (ret < 0)
                 return ret;
 
+        root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
+
         if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
                 /*
                  * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
                  * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
                  * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
                  */
-                if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+                if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
                         warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
                         goto skip;
                 }
@@ -496,12 +499,12 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
                  *
                  * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
                  */
-                if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
+                if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
                         /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
                         new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
                                                          old->cap_inheritable);
                 }
-                if (new->euid == 0)
+                if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
                         effective = true;
         }
 skip:
@@ -516,8 +519,8 @@ skip:
          *
          * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
          */
-        if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
-             new->egid != old->gid ||
+        if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) ||
+             !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) ||
              !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
             bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
                 /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -553,7 +556,7 @@ skip:
          */
         if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
                 if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
-                    new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
+                    !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
                     issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
                         ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
                         if (ret < 0)
@@ -578,16 +581,17 @@ skip:
 int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+        kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0);
 
-        if (cred->uid != 0) {
+        if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) {
                 if (bprm->cap_effective)
                         return 1;
                 if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted))
                         return 1;
         }
 
-        return (cred->euid != cred->uid ||
-                cred->egid != cred->gid);
+        return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+                !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -677,15 +681,21 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
  */
 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-        if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) &&
-            (new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) &&
+        kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+
+        if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) ||
+             uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) ||
+             uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) &&
+            (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
+             !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&
+             !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) &&
             !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
                 cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
                 cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
         }
-        if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0)
+        if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
                 cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
-        if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0)
+        if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
                 new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
 }
 
@@ -718,11 +728,12 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
                  *          if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
                  */
                 if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
-                        if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0)
+                        kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+                        if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
                                 new->cap_effective =
                                         cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
 
-                        if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0)
+                        if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
                                 new->cap_effective =
                                         cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
                                                          new->cap_permitted);
@@ -875,7 +886,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                     || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2))   /*[2]*/
                     || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS))   /*[3]*/
                     || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
-                                    current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
+                                    current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
                                     SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0)           /*[4]*/
                         /*
                          * [1] no changing of bits that are locked
@@ -947,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 }
 
 /*
- * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
- * @file: unused
- * @reqprot: unused
- * @prot: unused
- * @flags: unused
+ * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
  * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
- * @addr_only: unused
  *
  * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
  * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
  * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
  * -EPERM if not.
  */
-int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-                  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-                  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
         int ret = 0;
 
@@ -975,3 +979,9 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         }
         return ret;
 }
+
+int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+                  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+        return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index c43a3323feea..442204cc22d9 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -447,22 +447,16 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
                 .read_seq_string = devcgroup_seq_read,
                 .private = DEVCG_LIST,
         },
+        { }     /* terminate */
 };
 
-static int devcgroup_populate(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
-                                struct cgroup *cgroup)
-{
-        return cgroup_add_files(cgroup, ss, dev_cgroup_files,
-                                        ARRAY_SIZE(dev_cgroup_files));
-}
-
 struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
         .name = "devices",
         .can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach,
         .create = devcgroup_create,
         .destroy = devcgroup_destroy,
-        .populate = devcgroup_populate,
         .subsys_id = devices_subsys_id,
+        .base_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files,
 };
 
 int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index e35ae1d208a8..1c261763f479 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
 
         ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
                                            ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
-                                           iovstack, &iov, 1);
+                                           iovstack, &iov);
         if (ret < 0)
                 return ret;
         if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index f173be2ce3ea..c990b8c8ef1d 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
 
 #ifdef __KDEBUG
 #define kenter(FMT, ...) \
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
 #define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK   0x04
 
 extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
+extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork);
 
 extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
 extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index c9bf66ac36e0..50d96d4e06f2 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
         quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
 
         /* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
-        user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user->user_ns);
+        user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user_ns);
         if (!user)
                 goto no_memory_1;
 
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index b61c063888b9..3bdc419b272f 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
         vm = false;
         if (_payload) {
                 ret = -ENOMEM;
-                payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+                payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
                 if (!payload) {
                         if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
                                 goto error2;
@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
                 goto no_payload;
 
         ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
-                                    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov, 1);
+                                    ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
         if (ret < 0)
                 return ret;
         if (ret == 0)
@@ -1454,50 +1454,57 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
  */
 long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
 {
-#ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
         struct task_struct *me, *parent;
         const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
-        struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+        struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork;
         key_ref_t keyring_r;
+        struct cred *cred;
         int ret;
 
         keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
         if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
                 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
 
+        ret = -ENOMEM;
+        newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL);
+        if (!newwork)
+                goto error_keyring;
+
         /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
          * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
          * our parent */
-        ret = -ENOMEM;
         cred = cred_alloc_blank();
         if (!cred)
-                goto error_keyring;
+                goto error_newwork;
 
         cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
-        keyring_r = NULL;
+        init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred);
 
         me = current;
         rcu_read_lock();
         write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 
-        parent = me->real_parent;
         ret = -EPERM;
+        oldwork = NULL;
+        parent = me->real_parent;
 
         /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
         if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
-                goto not_permitted;
+                goto unlock;
 
         /* the parent must be single threaded */
         if (!thread_group_empty(parent))
-                goto not_permitted;
+                goto unlock;
 
         /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
          * there's no point */
         mycred = current_cred();
         pcred = __task_cred(parent);
         if (mycred == pcred ||
-            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
-                goto already_same;
+            mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
+                ret = 0;
+                goto unlock;
+        }
 
         /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
          * SUID/SGID */
@@ -1507,50 +1514,40 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
             pcred->gid  != mycred->egid ||
             pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
             pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
-                goto not_permitted;
+                goto unlock;
 
         /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
         if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
              pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) ||
             mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
-                goto not_permitted;
+                goto unlock;
 
-        /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
-         * that */
-        oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+        /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
+        oldwork = task_work_cancel(parent, key_change_session_keyring);
 
         /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
          * restarting */
-        parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
-        cred = NULL;
-        set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
-
-        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-        rcu_read_unlock();
-        if (oldcred)
-                put_cred(oldcred);
-        return 0;
-
-already_same:
-        ret = 0;
-not_permitted:
+        ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, true);
+        if (!ret)
+                newwork = NULL;
+unlock:
         write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
         rcu_read_unlock();
-        put_cred(cred);
+        if (oldwork) {
+                put_cred(oldwork->data);
+                kfree(oldwork);
+        }
+        if (newwork) {
+                put_cred(newwork->data);
+                kfree(newwork);
+        }
         return ret;
 
+error_newwork:
+        kfree(newwork);
 error_keyring:
         key_ref_put(keyring_r);
         return ret;
-
-#else /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
-        /*
-         * To be removed when TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME has been implemented on
-         * m68k/xtensa
-         */
-#warning TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME not implemented
-        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-#endif /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 57d96363d7f1..0b4d019e027d 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
 
         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 
-        if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user->user_ns)
+        if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user_ns)
                 goto use_other_perms;
 
         /* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
                         goto use_these_perms;
                 }
 
-                ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
+                ret = groups_search(cred->group_info,
+                                    make_kgid(current_user_ns(), key->gid));
                 if (ret) {
                         kperm = key->perm >> 8;
                         goto use_these_perms;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index e137fcd7042c..4ad54eea1ea4 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -834,23 +834,17 @@ error:
  * Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
  * the target  process is about to resume userspace execution.
  */
-void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork)
 {
-        const struct cred *old;
-        struct cred *new;
-
-        if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
-                return;
+        const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+        struct cred *new = twork->data;
 
-        write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-        new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
-        current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
-        write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-
-        if (!new)
+        kfree(twork);
+        if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+                put_cred(new);
                 return;
+        }
 
-        old = current_cred();
         new->  uid      = old->  uid;
         new-> euid      = old-> euid;
         new-> suid      = old-> suid;
@@ -860,7 +854,7 @@ void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
         new-> sgid      = old-> sgid;
         new->fsgid      = old->fsgid;
         new->user       = get_uid(old->user);
-        new->user_ns    = new->user->user_ns;
+        new->user_ns    = get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
         new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
 
         new->securebits = old->securebits;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index cc3790315d2f..000e75017520 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -93,16 +93,9 @@ static void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)
 static int call_usermodehelper_keys(char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
                                         struct key *session_keyring, int wait)
 {
-        gfp_t gfp_mask = (wait == UMH_NO_WAIT) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL;
-        struct subprocess_info *info =
-                call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, gfp_mask);
-
-        if (!info)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        call_usermodehelper_setfns(info, umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
-                                        key_get(session_keyring));
-        return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
+        return call_usermodehelper_fns(path, argv, envp, wait,
+                                       umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
+                                       key_get(session_keyring));
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5497a57fba01..3efc9b12aef4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR       2
@@ -657,18 +660,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
         return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-                        unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-                        unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-        int ret;
+        /*
+         * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+         * it to imply PROT_EXEC?  If not, nothing to talk about...
+         */
+        if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+                return prot;
+        if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+                return prot;
+        /*
+         * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+         */
+        if (!file)
+                return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+        /*
+         * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+         * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+         */
+        if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+                unsigned long caps = 0;
+                struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+                if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
+                        caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
+                if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
+                        return prot;
+#endif
+                return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+        }
+        /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+        return prot;
+}
 
-        ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+                        unsigned long flags)
+{
+        int ret;
+        ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+                                        mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
         if (ret)
                 return ret;
         return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 }
 
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+        return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
                             unsigned long prot)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fa2341b68331..372ec6502aa8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3083,9 +3083,7 @@ error:
         return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-                             unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-                             unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
         int rc = 0;
         u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3104,10 +3102,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
         }
 
         /* do DAC check on address space usage */
-        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
-        if (rc || addr_only)
-                return rc;
+        return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+}
 
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+                             unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
                 prot = reqprot;
 
@@ -5570,7 +5570,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
-        .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
+        .mmap_file =                    selinux_mmap_file,
+        .mmap_addr =                    selinux_mmap_addr,
         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 0920ea3bf599..d309e7f472d8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/if.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_queue.h>
 #include <linux/inet_diag.h>
 #include <linux/xfrm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -70,12 +69,6 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
         { RTM_SETDCB,           NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
 };
 
-static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] =
-{
-        { IPQM_MODE,            NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
-        { IPQM_VERDICT,         NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
-};
-
 static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
 {
         { TCPDIAG_GETSOCK,      NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
@@ -145,12 +138,6 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
                                  sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
                 break;
 
-        case SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET:
-        case SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET:
-                err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_firewall_perms,
-                                 sizeof(nlmsg_firewall_perms));
-                break;
-
         case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET:
                 err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms,
                                  sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms));
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4e93f9ef970b..3ad290251288 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1259,12 +1259,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
                 if (!inode)
                         goto out;
 
-                ret = -EINVAL;
-                len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
-                if (len < 0)
-                        goto out;
-
                 ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+                len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
                 if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
                         goto out;
 
@@ -1557,19 +1553,10 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
 static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
                                 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-        ssize_t rc, len;
-        char *page;
         unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
-        page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (!page)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
-        rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
-        free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
-        return rc;
+        char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+        ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+        return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
@@ -1580,19 +1567,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
                                 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-        ssize_t rc, len;
-        char *page;
         unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
-        page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-        if (!page)
-                return -ENOMEM;
-
-        len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
-        rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
-        free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
-        return rc;
+        char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+        ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+        return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d583c0545808..ee0bb5735f35 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_file_mmap :
+ * smack_mmap_file :
  * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
  * if mapping anonymous memory.
  * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
@@ -1180,10 +1180,9 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
  * @flags contains the operational flags.
  * Return 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
                            unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
-                           unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
-                           unsigned long addr_only)
+                           unsigned long flags)
 {
         struct smack_known *skp;
         struct smack_rule *srp;
@@ -1198,11 +1197,6 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
         int tmay;
         int rc;
 
-        /* do DAC check on address space usage */
-        rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
-        if (rc || addr_only)
-                return rc;
-
         if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
                 return 0;
 
@@ -3482,7 +3476,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
         .file_ioctl =                   smack_file_ioctl,
         .file_lock =                    smack_file_lock,
         .file_fcntl =                   smack_file_fcntl,
-        .file_mmap =                    smack_file_mmap,
+        .mmap_file =                    smack_mmap_file,
+        .mmap_addr =                    cap_mmap_addr,
         .file_set_fowner =              smack_file_set_fowner,
         .file_send_sigiotask =          smack_file_send_sigiotask,
         .file_receive =                 smack_file_receive,