unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct

The commit referenced in the Fixes tag incorrectly accounted the number
of in-flight fds over a unix domain socket to the original opener
of the file-descriptor. This allows another process to arbitrary
deplete the original file-openers resource limit for the maximum of
open files. Instead the sending processes and its struct cred should
be credited.

To do so, we add a reference counted struct user_struct pointer to the
scm_fp_list and use it to account for the number of inflight unix fds.

Fixes: 712f4aad406bb1 ("unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets")
Reported-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

3 files changed, 13 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
index 14596fb37172..2696aefdc148 100644
--- a/net/core/scm.c
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
                 *fplp = fpl;
                 fpl->count = 0;
                 fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+                fpl->user = NULL;
         }
         fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
 
@@ -107,6 +108,10 @@ static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
                 *fpp++ = file;
                 fpl->count++;
         }
+
+        if (!fpl->user)
+                fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
         return num;
 }
 
@@ -119,6 +124,7 @@ void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
                 scm->fp = NULL;
                 for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
                         fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+                free_uid(fpl->user);
                 kfree(fpl);
         }
 }
@@ -336,6 +342,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
                 for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
                         get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
                 new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+                new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
         }
         return new_fpl;
 }
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index 49d5093eb055..29be035f9c65 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1496,7 +1496,7 @@ static void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
         UNIXCB(skb).fp = NULL;
 
         for (i = scm->fp->count-1; i >= 0; i--)
-                unix_notinflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+                unix_notinflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
 }
 
 static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1561,7 +1561,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
                 return -ENOMEM;
 
         for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
-                unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+                unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
         return max_level;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/unix/garbage.c b/net/unix/garbage.c
index 8fcdc2283af5..6a0d48525fcf 100644
--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
+++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp)
  * descriptor if it is for an AF_UNIX socket.
  */
 
-void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
 {
         struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
 
@@ -133,11 +133,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
                 }
                 unix_tot_inflight++;
         }
-        fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
+        user->unix_inflight++;
         spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 }
 
-void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp)
 {
         struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
 
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
                         list_del_init(&u->link);
                 unix_tot_inflight--;
         }
-        fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
+        user->unix_inflight--;
         spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
 }