diff options
author | Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu> | 2018-10-18 10:36:46 -0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-10-18 19:43:06 -0400 |
commit | b6168562c8ce2bd5a30e213021650422e08764dc (patch) | |
tree | 3c6b632a4886b00d77368e615c78590a5b89eb1e /net/socket.c | |
parent | 3c53ed8fef6881a864f0ee8240ed2793ef73ad0d (diff) |
net: socket: fix a missing-check bug
In ethtool_ioctl(), the ioctl command 'ethcmd' is checked through a switch
statement to see whether it is necessary to pre-process the ethtool
structure, because, as mentioned in the comment, the structure
ethtool_rxnfc is defined with padding. If yes, a user-space buffer 'rxnfc'
is allocated through compat_alloc_user_space(). One thing to note here is
that, if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL, the size of the buffer 'rxnfc' is
partially determined by 'rule_cnt', which is actually acquired from the
user-space buffer 'compat_rxnfc', i.e., 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt', through
get_user(). After 'rxnfc' is allocated, the data in the original user-space
buffer 'compat_rxnfc' is then copied to 'rxnfc' through copy_in_user(),
including the 'rule_cnt' field. However, after this copy, no check is
re-enforced on 'rxnfc->rule_cnt'. So it is possible that a malicious user
race to change the value in the 'compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt' between these two
copies. Through this way, the attacker can bypass the previous check on
'rule_cnt' and inject malicious data. This can cause undefined behavior of
the kernel and introduce potential security risk.
This patch avoids the above issue via copying the value acquired by
get_user() to 'rxnfc->rule_cn', if 'ethcmd' is ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/socket.c')
-rw-r--r-- | net/socket.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index 01f3f8f32d6f..390a8ecef4bf 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c | |||
@@ -2875,9 +2875,14 @@ static int ethtool_ioctl(struct net *net, struct compat_ifreq __user *ifr32) | |||
2875 | copy_in_user(&rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie, | 2875 | copy_in_user(&rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie, |
2876 | &compat_rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie, | 2876 | &compat_rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie, |
2877 | (void __user *)(&rxnfc->fs.location + 1) - | 2877 | (void __user *)(&rxnfc->fs.location + 1) - |
2878 | (void __user *)&rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie) || | 2878 | (void __user *)&rxnfc->fs.ring_cookie)) |
2879 | copy_in_user(&rxnfc->rule_cnt, &compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt, | 2879 | return -EFAULT; |
2880 | sizeof(rxnfc->rule_cnt))) | 2880 | if (ethcmd == ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL) { |
2881 | if (put_user(rule_cnt, &rxnfc->rule_cnt)) | ||
2882 | return -EFAULT; | ||
2883 | } else if (copy_in_user(&rxnfc->rule_cnt, | ||
2884 | &compat_rxnfc->rule_cnt, | ||
2885 | sizeof(rxnfc->rule_cnt))) | ||
2881 | return -EFAULT; | 2886 | return -EFAULT; |
2882 | } | 2887 | } |
2883 | 2888 | ||