make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'

Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
direct (optimized) user access.

But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
similar.  Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
actually been range-checked.

If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin().  But
nothing really forces the range check.

By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
near the actual accesses.  We have way too long a history of people
trying to avoid them.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
index b53e1b5d80f4..58eacd41526c 100644
--- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
+++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c
@@ -114,10 +114,11 @@ long strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
 
                 kasan_check_write(dst, count);
                 check_object_size(dst, count, false);
-                user_access_begin();
-                retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
-                user_access_end();
-                return retval;
+                if (user_access_begin(src, max)) {
+                        retval = do_strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count, max);
+                        user_access_end();
+                        return retval;
+                }
         }
         return -EFAULT;
 }