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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-12-05 12:44:57 -0500
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2009-12-05 12:44:57 -0500
commit83fdbfbfe6e7e8906e3a3f8f6bc074d887e92109 (patch)
tree977e10a076d76fdb2622f089211f3d0954ba6873 /kernel
parentd9b2c4d0b03c721808c0d259e43a27f1e80205bc (diff)
parentc84d6efd363a3948eb32ec40d46bab6338580454 (diff)
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (30 commits) TOMOYO: Add recursive directory matching operator support. remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option SELinux: print denials for buggy kernel with unknown perms Silence the existing API for capability version compatibility check. LSM: Move security_path_chmod()/security_path_chown() to after mutex_lock(). SELinux: header generation may hit infinite loop selinux: Fix warnings security: report the module name to security_module_request Config option to set a default LSM sysctl: require CAP_SYS_RAWIO to set mmap_min_addr tpm: autoload tpm_tis based on system PnP IDs tpm_tis: TPM_STS_DATA_EXPECT workaround define convenient securebits masks for prctl users (v2) tpm: fix header for modular build tomoyo: improve hash bucket dispersion tpm add default function definitions LSM: imbed ima calls in the security hooks SELinux: add .gitignore files for dynamic classes security: remove root_plug SELinux: fix locking issue introduced with c6d3aaa4e35c71a3 ...
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c15
-rw-r--r--kernel/kmod.c8
2 files changed, 12 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 4e17041963f5..7f876e60521f 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_empty_set);
29EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set); 29EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_full_set);
30EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set); 30EXPORT_SYMBOL(__cap_init_eff_set);
31 31
32#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
33int file_caps_enabled = 1; 32int file_caps_enabled = 1;
34 33
35static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str) 34static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
@@ -38,7 +37,6 @@ static int __init file_caps_disable(char *str)
38 return 1; 37 return 1;
39} 38}
40__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable); 39__setup("no_file_caps", file_caps_disable);
41#endif
42 40
43/* 41/*
44 * More recent versions of libcap are available from: 42 * More recent versions of libcap are available from:
@@ -169,8 +167,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
169 kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP; 167 kernel_cap_t pE, pI, pP;
170 168
171 ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy); 169 ret = cap_validate_magic(header, &tocopy);
172 if (ret != 0) 170 if ((dataptr == NULL) || (ret != 0))
173 return ret; 171 return ((dataptr == NULL) && (ret == -EINVAL)) ? 0 : ret;
174 172
175 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid)) 173 if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
176 return -EFAULT; 174 return -EFAULT;
@@ -238,7 +236,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
238SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data) 236SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
239{ 237{
240 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S]; 238 struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
241 unsigned i, tocopy; 239 unsigned i, tocopy, copybytes;
242 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective; 240 kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
243 struct cred *new; 241 struct cred *new;
244 int ret; 242 int ret;
@@ -255,8 +253,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
255 if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current)) 253 if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
256 return -EPERM; 254 return -EPERM;
257 255
258 if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, 256 copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct);
259 tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct))) 257 if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata))
258 return -EFAULT;
259
260 if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes))
260 return -EFAULT; 261 return -EFAULT;
261 262
262 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) { 263 for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 9fcb53a11f87..25b103190364 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -80,16 +80,16 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
80#define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */ 80#define MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT 50 /* Completely arbitrary value - KAO */
81 static int kmod_loop_msg; 81 static int kmod_loop_msg;
82 82
83 ret = security_kernel_module_request();
84 if (ret)
85 return ret;
86
87 va_start(args, fmt); 83 va_start(args, fmt);
88 ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args); 84 ret = vsnprintf(module_name, MODULE_NAME_LEN, fmt, args);
89 va_end(args); 85 va_end(args);
90 if (ret >= MODULE_NAME_LEN) 86 if (ret >= MODULE_NAME_LEN)
91 return -ENAMETOOLONG; 87 return -ENAMETOOLONG;
92 88
89 ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name);
90 if (ret)
91 return ret;
92
93 /* If modprobe needs a service that is in a module, we get a recursive 93 /* If modprobe needs a service that is in a module, we get a recursive
94 * loop. Limit the number of running kmod threads to max_threads/2 or 94 * loop. Limit the number of running kmod threads to max_threads/2 or
95 * MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT, whichever is the smaller. A cleaner method 95 * MAX_KMOD_CONCURRENT, whichever is the smaller. A cleaner method