Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:

 - EVM gains support for loading an x509 cert from the kernel
   (EVM_LOAD_X509), into the EVM trusted kernel keyring.

 - Smack implements 'file receive' process-based permission checking for
   sockets, rather than just depending on inode checks.

 - Misc enhancments for TPM & TPM2.

 - Cleanups and bugfixes for SELinux, Keys, and IMA.

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (41 commits)
  selinux: Inode label revalidation performance fix
  KEYS: refcount bug fix
  ima: ima_write_policy() limit locking
  IMA: policy can be updated zero times
  selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()
  selinux: export validatetrans decisions
  gfs2: Invalid security labels of inodes when they go invalid
  selinux: Revalidate invalid inode security labels
  security: Add hook to invalidate inode security labels
  selinux: Add accessor functions for inode->i_security
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecid non-const
  security: Make inode argument of inode_getsecurity non-const
  selinux: Remove unused variable in selinux_inode_init_security
  keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
  keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips
  keys, trusted: fix: *do not* allow duplicate key options
  tpm_ibmvtpm: properly handle interrupted packet receptions
  tpm_tis: Tighten IRQ auto-probing
  tpm_tis: Refactor the interrupt setup
  tpm_tis: Get rid of the duplicate IRQ probing code
  ...

3 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index d6dd95cc59e6..3a3e5deeda8d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1719,7 +1719,7 @@ static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
 
 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
 void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
-                      const struct inode *inode)
+                      struct inode *inode)
 {
         name->ino   = inode->i_ino;
         name->dev   = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index de6cbb7cf547..cbbe6bb6496e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ extern u32 audit_ever_enabled;
 
 extern void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
                              const struct dentry *dentry,
-                             const struct inode *inode);
+                             struct inode *inode);
 extern void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
                           kernel_cap_t *cap);
 extern void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context,
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b86cc04959de..195ffaee50b9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
                    unsigned int flags)
 {
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-        const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
         struct audit_names *n;
         bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
 
@@ -1848,12 +1848,12 @@ void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
  * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
  * unsuccessful attempts.
  */
-void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
+void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
                          const struct dentry *dentry,
                          const unsigned char type)
 {
         struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
-        const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+        struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
         const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
         struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;