Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "Highlights:

  IMA:
   - provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules

  KEYS:
   - add a system blacklist keyring

   - add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
     functionality to userland via keyctl()

  LSM:
   - harden LSM API with __ro_after_init

   - add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux

   - revive security_task_alloc hook

  TPM:
   - implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
  tpm: Fix reference count to main device
  tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
  tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
  tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
  keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
  apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
  apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
  apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
  apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
  security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
  apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
  Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
  smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
  KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
  KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
  KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
  KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
  KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
  KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
  KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
  ...

1 files changed, 18 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 7ff6d1b10cec..196c7134bee6 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1432,25 +1432,26 @@ out:
 }
 
 /* rcu lock must be held */
-static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+static int check_prlimit_permission(struct task_struct *task,
+                                    unsigned int flags)
 {
         const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
+        bool id_match;
 
         if (current == task)
                 return 0;
 
         tcred = __task_cred(task);
-        if (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
-            uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
-            uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid)  &&
-            gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
-            gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
-            gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid))
-                return 0;
-        if (ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
-                return 0;
+        id_match = (uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->euid) &&
+                    uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->suid) &&
+                    uid_eq(cred->uid, tcred->uid)  &&
+                    gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->egid) &&
+                    gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->sgid) &&
+                    gid_eq(cred->gid, tcred->gid));
+        if (!id_match && !ns_capable(tcred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+                return -EPERM;
 
-        return -EPERM;
+        return security_task_prlimit(cred, tcred, flags);
 }
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
@@ -1460,12 +1461,17 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
         struct rlimit64 old64, new64;
         struct rlimit old, new;
         struct task_struct *tsk;
+        unsigned int checkflags = 0;
         int ret;
 
+        if (old_rlim)
+                checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_READ;
+
         if (new_rlim) {
                 if (copy_from_user(&new64, new_rlim, sizeof(new64)))
                         return -EFAULT;
                 rlim64_to_rlim(&new64, &new);
+                checkflags |= LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE;
         }
 
         rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1474,7 +1480,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(prlimit64, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, resource,
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 return -ESRCH;
         }
-        ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk);
+        ret = check_prlimit_permission(tsk, checkflags);
         if (ret) {
                 rcu_read_unlock();
                 return ret;