HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges

When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory.  Alternatively,
information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write
to the file descriptor.  Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases.

No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and
UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to
UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely.

Thanks to Dmitry Vyukov for adding uhid definitions to syzkaller and to
Jann Horn for commit 9da3f2b740544 ("x86/fault: BUG() when uaccess
helpers fault on kernel addresses"), allowing this bug to be found.

Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: d365c6cfd337 ("HID: uhid: add UHID_CREATE and UHID_DESTROY events")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.6+
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
index 3c5507313606..051639c09f72 100644
--- a/drivers/hid/uhid.c
+++ b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/hid.h>
@@ -722,6 +723,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
 
         switch (uhid->input_buf.type) {
         case UHID_CREATE:
+                /*
+                 * 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is
+                 * copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated
+                 * privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write().
+                 */
+                if (file->f_cred != current_cred() || uaccess_kernel()) {
+                        pr_err_once("UHID_CREATE from different security context by process %d (%s), this is not allowed.\n",
+                                    task_tgid_vnr(current), current->comm);
+                        ret = -EACCES;
+                        goto unlock;
+                }
                 ret = uhid_dev_create(uhid, &uhid->input_buf);
                 break;
         case UHID_CREATE2: